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This study aims to understand what primary relationship problem mechanisms can exist in the franchise channel and how exchange partners respond to them. This study demonstrates how the franchisor’s relationship problem mechanisms (threat, contract enforcement) affect the franchisee’s negative active responses (venting, threatened withdrawal).

This study tested hypotheses through multiple regression analysis using data from 200 franchisees in Korea-based food franchise systems.

The results indicated that threat increases venting and threatened withdrawal, while contract enforcement only increases venting. Venting increases threatened withdrawal. In addition, the results indicated that the franchisor’s behavior monitoring positively moderates the relationship between relationship problem mechanisms and negative active responses.

This study helps strategically manage responses to relationship problems by categorizing ‘relationship problem mechanisms’ into intentional relationship problem mechanisms based on communication (threat) and unintentional relationship problem mechanisms based on action (contract enforcement). This study finds that both relationship problem mechanisms, intentional or unintentional, eventually cause threatened withdrawal directly or indirectly. Even if the threat is merely communication, not action, it is more likely to cause relationship dissolution than contract enforcement by directly triggering any negative active response. This study also finds that behavior monitoring can affect exchange partners through interaction with other management mechanisms rather than directly affecting them.

Integrating the resource-based view (RBV) with pay dispersion research, the authors examine how the allocation of resources between hiring new employees and compensating current employees, as well as the allocation of resources among new employees, affects organizational performance.

The authors use panel data on Major League Baseball teams. The authors also use system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations to control for the impact of past performance on current performance, unobserved individual heterogeneity and omitted variable bias.

The authors find that the larger the portion of the human resources (HR) budget allocated to hiring new employees, the poorer organizational performance becomes unless the focal organization has already significantly underperformed. The authors also find that pay concentration among new employees has a positive impact on organizational performance unless the focal organization has already significantly overperformed.

This study extends RBV research by examining how resource allocation patterns affect organizational performance, which has rarely been studied. Moreover, by showing the organizational context's significant effect on the outcome of financial allocation for resource acquisition, this study extends both the RBV research and the pay dispersion research.