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Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to bring data to suggest that group processes have a biological base, lodged in human neurology as it evolved over the last 7 million years.

Design/methodology/approach – The method for discovering the neurological basis of group processes is labelled evolutionary sociology, and this method revolves around: (1) cladistic analysis of traits of distant ancestors to humans and the great apes, with whom humans share a very high proportion of genes, (2) comparative neurology between the great apes and humans that can inform us about how the brains of humans were rewired from the structures shared by the last common ancestor to humans and apes, and (3) ecological analysis of the habitats and niches that generated selection pressures on the neurology of apes and hominins.

Findings – A key finding is that most of the interpersonal processes that drive group processes are neurologically based and evolved before the brain among hominins was sufficiently large to generate systems of symbols organized in cultural texts remotely near the human measure. There is, then, good reason to study the neurological basis of behavior because neurology explains more about the dynamics of interpersonal behavior than does culture, which was a very late arrival to the hominin line.

Research implications – One implication of these findings is that social scientific analysis of interpersonal processes and group dynamics can no longer assume that groups are solely a constructed process, mediated by culture and social structure. There were powerful selection pressures during the course of hominin evolution to increase hominin sociality and especially group formation, which required considerable rewiring of the basic ape brain. Since groups are not “natural” to apes in general and even to an evolved ape-like humans, it is important to discover how humans ever became group-organizing animals. The answer resides in the dramatic enhancing of emotions in hominins and humans, which shifts attention away from the neocortex to the older subcortical areas of the brain. Once this shift is made, theorizing and research, as well as public views on human sociality, need to be recast as, first, an evolved biological trait and, only second, as a most tenuous and fragile of a big-brained animal using language and culture to construct its social world.

Originality/value – The value of this kind of analysis is to liberate sociology and the social sciences in general from simplistic views that, because humans have language and can use language to construct culture and social structures, the underlying biology and neurology of human action is not relevant to understanding the social world. Indeed, just the opposite is the case: to the extent that social scientists insist upon a social constructionists research agenda, they will fail to conceptualize and perform research on more fundamental forces in the social world, including group dynamics.

Various authors allege that the theory of group selection is inconsistent with methodological individualism, and therefore analysts must reject at least one of these principles. The present article argues for their compatibility. The meaning of methodological individualism is clarified, and the new version of group selection (articulated by Wilson & Sober, 1994, 1998) is explained. The two principles are then incorporated into a single methodological approach. Group selection affects the assumptions made about the kind of individuals who populate social scientific models, while methodological individualism requires models’ conclusions to follow from the actions and interactions of those individuals.

Don Bellante

As the cognitive sciences – particularly neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and a rejuvenated artificial intelligence movement that has largely abandoned the model of the mind as a formal machine – have seen major development over the past quarter-century, it is inevitable that the findings thrown up by this ‘cognitive revolution’ should be examined for their relevance to the understanding of economic behavior. This ongoing examination has tended to emphasize those characteristics of human cognitive capabilities that call into question the descriptive adequacy of the rational-choice model, focusing on departures from individual rationality that may have economic consequences at the market level.¹ Such a move may be the obvious one for an economist confronted with this interdisciplinary challenge, but it is not the only one. The new insights into the functioning of the brain can also be deployed in the understanding of complex systems in general – and of specific social arrangements in particular – and that is the direction taken here. By critically examining the systemic similarities and differences between the social arrangements of science and market, the aim is to show how a complex systems approach, inspired by developments in cognitive psychology but applying these at the level of the system rather than of the individual, can provide a new and useful way of understanding social systems.