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Transitioning engineering knowledge to practice is critical for the success of a working engineer. Decision-Based learning (DBL) provides a path for developing this capability during the educational experience rather than relying on post-educational experiences in the field. In this chapter, DBL is framed in the context of an engineering educational experience, with a discussion of how certain attributes of engineering and DBL can complement each other. An overall class structure conducive to implementing DBL instruction methods is presented. A possible process for defining an expert decision model (EDM) for engineering topics is explored. This type of decision model can help communicate and teach students the small decisions that culminate to an expert conclusion on a topic, giving the student a clear way to justify analysis and design decisions. An EDM for selecting of a static failure theory with an accompanying learning module and representative assignment problems that accompany the module are presented. The implementation of a DBL approach in an engineering classroom is discussed, and reflections are given about the experience for both the instructor and the students.

A dynamic oligopoly model of the cigarette industry is developed to study the responses of firms to various antismoking policies and to estimate the implications for the policy efficacy. The structural parameters are estimated using a combination of micro and macro level data and firms’ optimal price and advertising strategies are solved as a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium. The simulation results show that tobacco tax increase reduces both the overall smoking rate and the youth smoking rate, while advertising restrictions may increase the youth smoking rate. Firm’s responses strengthen the impact of antismoking policies in the short run.

Mises (1949[1963], p. 692) explains that market-failure justifications for state actions, such as economic regulation “ascribe to the state not only the best intentions but also omniscience.” He then points out that neither assumption is valid: government is not benevolent since both, those who are employed by the state and those who demand state actions, have subjective self-interests, and it is not all knowing since knowledge is widely dispersed and the cost of coordination is infinitely high, particularly without market profits and prices as coordinating mechanisms. Furthermore, Mises suggests that dropping either assumption undermines the conclusions that state intervention is necessarily desirable even if some sort of market failure is actually identified. Austrian economists in the Mises tradition have tended to focus on the knowledge problem in their challenges to regulation, however. Many Austrians obviously recognize the interest problem, of course, but they often assume it away in order to illustrate that government interference with markets is not desirable even if it is well intended. In contrast, public-choice analysis tends to focus on the interest problem as source of government failure, although some public-choice analysts also obviously recognize the knowledge problem. Indeed, this difference in perspective is so pronounced that Ikeda (1997, p. 240) explicitly distinguishes between Public Choice and Austrian political economy by suggesting that the Austrian approach assumes benevolence on the part of government officials, while the public-choice approach assume narrow interests.¹ Ikeda (1997, p. 150) also suggests that the separation of these two approaches is justified because “Austrian political economy and public choice are each capable of standing on their own [so] public-theorists…find it optimal simply to continue to pursue their research along the line of either the former or the latter approaches.” The following presentation questions this assertion. Instead, both assumptions should be dropped, and the resulting integrated Austrian-public-choice model should be expanded to include assumptions about the relationships between regulations, property rights security, and both market and political behavior.²

In the original history of the socialist calculation debate (e.g., Bergson, 1948), Oscar Lange proved that bureaucrats can find the equivalent of equilibrium prices through trial and error. In the revised history of this debate (e.g., Caldwell, 1997; Lavoie, 1985), Lange proposed an erroneous solution to the calculation problem. Dynamic entrepreneurial rivalry moves prices toward equilibrium. Lange and other “Market Socialists” allies thought only in terms of a static competitive market equilibrium that excludes the role entrepreneurs play in adjusting prices.

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is critical to assess their impacts on individual markets, the digital sector, and the overall European economy. The European Commission (EC) released an Impact Assessment in support of the DMA that purports to evaluate it using cost/benefit analysis.

An economic evaluation of the DMA should consider its full impacts on dynamic competition. The Impact Assessment neither assesses the DMA's impact on dynamic competition in the digital economy nor evaluates the impacts of specific DMA prohibitions and obligations. Instead, it considers benefits in general and largely ignores costs. We study its benefit assessments and find they are based on highly inappropriate methodologies and assumptions. A cost/benefit study using inappropriate methodologies and largely ignoring costs cannot provide a sound policy assessment.

Instead of promoting dynamic competition between platforms, the DMA will likely reinforce existing market structures, ossify market boundaries, and stunt European innovation. The DMA is likely to chill R&D by encouraging free riding on the investments of others, which discourages making those investments. Avoiding harm to innovation is critical because innovation delivers large, positive spillover benefits, driving increases in productivity, employment, wages, and prosperity.

The DMA prioritizes static over dynamic competition, with the potential to harm the European economy. Given this, the Impact Assessment does not demonstrate that the DMA will be beneficial overall, and its implementation must be carefully tailored to alleviate or lessen its potential to harm Europe’s economic performance.

This paper explores what differentiates success from failure in post-acquisition integration. It seeks to overcome some of the limitations of previous research by adopting a more holistic and dynamic examination of the process and by focusing on aspects that can be readily applied in practice. Four cases of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the global automobile industry are examined using secondary data and taking a grounded theory approach. The four cases comprise two pairs of successes and two pairs of failures. Two of the pairs comprise established multinational companies, while two others comprise emerging multinational companies’ acquisitions of Korean automakers; in each case, there was one successful M&A and one failure. It is inducted that what differentiates the successful cases from the failures is their different approaches to two common tensions in post-acquisition integration, namely, their approaches to integration strategy and people issues. A two-level framework is proposed in which post-integration is managed simultaneously and dynamically at the strategic and people levels. These inductive findings, if verified by a more broadly based empirical examination, will extend M&A theory by providing a more integrated and dynamic approach to post-acquisition integration, in which strategic and people perspectives are jointly taken into account and interact with each other, thereby creating value for both acquiring and acquired firms.