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This study systematically addresses an important yet neglected question pertaining to the potentially time-varying effects of economic development on political democracy. Building on Huntington's insightful observations of alternating “waves” and “reverse waves” of democracy in world history, we deduce research hypotheses subject to empirical falsification and find, through a systematic analysis of the experiences of 87 countries from the 1960s to 1990s, that the impact of economic development on democracy shifted from the well-known U-shaped relationship to an inverted U-curve. These shifts occurred around 1980, a time point that corresponds to Diamond's classification of the end of the “second reverse wave” and beginning of the “third wave” of democratization. The finding thus demonstrates that the “wavy” progression of democracy in the world reflects historically changing dynamics of economic development and their impacts on political democracy over time.

This study aims to analyze the influence of political regime on economic growth.

The methodology was based on an inter-period comparison of the evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals in three different political regimes in Ecuador, a South American country.

The results showed that what determines the evolution of macroeconomic fundamentals is not the political regime that oversees it, but the size of a positive exogenous shock on the price of raw materials, which, by providing higher incomes, considerably increases the level of investment and net exports. However, the political regime does affect the distribution of income in sectors such as health and education.

As far as the authors know, this may be the first paper to explore the importance of a positive exogenous shock on a political regime for the case of primary-exporting Latin American economies, which are price takers subject to exogenous shocks.

This paper explores the sociological, economic, and political reasons for the collapse of Venezuela's 40-year “pacted” democracy, the eight-year conflict between the country's new president and the opposition, where this conflict has led Venezuela, and what its prospects are for the near future. It proposes that the collapse of Venezuela's “ancien regime” can best be understood by an examination of the impact the rise and fall of oil prices had on its economy, society, and polity. A 20-year economic decline led to the election of Hugo Chavez, a radical outsider, who refused to play along with the country's old political class. This class, in turn, refused to accept Chavez as the legitimately elected president and launched the country on an eight-year roller-coaster ride of counter-revolution and radicalization, which recently ended with the reelection of Chavez and a massive popular endorsement for the establishment of “21st century socialism” in Venezuela. Exactly what such a project means is still unclear, but it so far involves state support for self-managed workplaces and an anti-capitalist and participatory democratic state in the midst of a still functioning capitalist economy. With the apparent defeat of obstacles that are external to the Bolivarian movement, as the pro-Chavez movement is called, such as the domestic opposition and U.S. intervention, the movement is now forced to confront its internal obstacles, such as clientelism, corruption, and personalism, if it is to succeed in the long run.

The study aims to deal with three theoretical approaches to answer the research question: Does political reform in rentier States (Kuwait as a model) lead to political stability? The first approach: Following the steps of political reform in rentier States leads eventually to political stability. The second approach: Political stability in rentier States does not necessarily lead to political reform. The third approach: In rentier States, the decisive factor in interpreting the correlation between political reform and political stability requires explaining other intermediary factors.

David Easton’s input-output model: Easton defined the political system as the interactions related to the authoritarian allocation of values in society, that is, the distribution of resources by decisions adopted by individuals, and provided a framework for analysis of the political system in which it sees an integrated circuit of a dynamic nature that starts with inputs and outputs feedback, input and output. Inputs refer to the effects of the environment on the system. Outputs are the effects of the system on the environment, which are the decisions and policies taken by the system to meet the demands. Reverse feedback is the flow of information to the system about the results of its actions, the results of its decisions and policies. Generate new inputs in the form of a demand or support, and the system’s feedback feeds a kind of movement.

It can be said that the future of the rentier state is particularly dangerous in the Arab countries where the problem today is the sharp drop in oil prices, which requires the need to enter into the stage of major transformations and work to bring about fundamental changes and enter into radical constitutional, economic, political and social reforms before turning them from the state rent to countries that lack political stability.

The aim of this research is to present a theoretical study of political reform. The study began to consolidate the concept of political reform, which was and still is the goal of many political and social reform leaders and movements, in addition to being a major topic in political theories. Reform can be carried out by violence and by peaceful change. In any case, reform remains a humanitarian need that cannot be ignored or avoided, because the alternative is worsening and deteriorating political and social conditions.

The Arab Spring revolutions set many challenges for the Arab countries. These countries had to start political reforms. The State of Kuwait was one of the most important rentier countries that, after the Arab Spring revolutions, was concerned with ensuring that individuals and groups exercised their political rights through political participation in decision-making. It guarantees the human existence of society and protects it through the law and its legislation, and grants rights and freedoms and does not oppose it.

Political reforms lead to accommodating the demands of the opposition, increasing the political participation of citizens, activating the political role of women, activating the role of civil society and increasing political mobility.

The importance of the research paper is to emphasize the term rentier state and confirm the importance of reform in rentier countries and the paper asks whether the expansion of political rights, citizenship and participation will lead to stability or instability in these countries.

The United Nations Guiding Principles locate human rights at the centre of the corporate social responsibility agenda and provide a substantial platform for the development of business and human rights policy and practice. The initiative gives opportunity and focus for the rethinking and reconfiguration of corporate accountability for human rights. It also presents a threat: the danger, as we see it, is that the Guiding Principles are interpreted and implemented in an uncritical way, on a “humanitarian” model of imposed expertise. The critical and radical democratic communities have tended to be, perhaps rightly, suspicious of rights talk and sceptical of any suggestion that rights and the discourse of human rights can play a progressive role. The purpose of this paper is to explore these issues from a radical perspective.

This paper uses insights taken from Jacques Rancière’s work to argue that there is vital critical potential in human rights. There is an obvious negativity to Rancière’s thought insofar as it conceives of the political as a challenge to the existing social order. The positive dimension to his work, which has its origins in his commitment to and tireless affirmation of the fact of equality, is equally important, if perhaps less obvious. Together the negative and positive moments provide a dynamic conception of human rights and a dialectical view of the relation between human rights and the social order, which enables us to overcome much of the criticism levelled at human rights by certain theorists.

Rancière’s conception of the political puts human rights inscriptions, and the traces of equality they carry, at the heart of progressive politics. The authors close the paper with a discussion of the role that accounting for human rights can play in such a democratic politics, and by urging, on that basis, the critical accounting community to cautiously embrace the opportunity presented by the Guiding Principles.

This paper has some novelty in its application of Rancière’s thinking on political theory to the problems of critical accounting and in particular the critical potential of accounting and human rights. The paper makes a theoretical contribution to a critical understanding of the relationship between accounting, human rights, and democracy.

The issue of democracy and development interrelationship is very complex and debatable. There does not seem to exist any automatic relationship between them and the purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationships of democracy with civil society and development based on Islamic World View.

A theoretical approach has been developed to examine how stable democracies and sustainable human development can be attained only with a balanced combination of the involvement of state and society to ensure socially most desired goods and services based on the theory of choice. The empirical evidence is used to show how the democracy can be promoted in terms of creating proper conditions that can empower the people to form civil society to press for democratization, using self‐expression values compatible to shura.

The paper concludes that democracy must be homegrown and cannot be implanted by external forces by “Iraqi‐style invasion”.

An original study on the interrelationship between state and civil society in the Arab world, within the context of Islam.

History teaches that agreement about the distribution of valued things is seldom deep or widespread in large populations. When distributive issues rise to clear public consciousness, the tendency is towards civil strife. Stable democratic institutions are rarely the result of all or even most social actors cooperating voluntarily, peacefully and with adequate information; nearly always, they are the products of shrewd decisions made by those who are seriously influential – elites. Elites must trust each other to manage politics in ways that prevent distributive issues from reaching acute degrees that impel power seizures. But can elite trust be sustained in advanced post-industrial conditions? The question arises because of steadily declining needs for many kinds of work, exacerbated by large migrations from non-Western countries and a resulting insecurity that populists exploit divisively for political gain. They act as pied pipers offering delusive enticements, making irresponsible promises and exhibiting disdain for rule of law. Disinclined to deal realistically with, or even acknowledge, long-term post-industrial problems of work, populists erode elite trust and weaken the basis of stable democratic institutions.

The contribution starts out from the question whether the political legitimacy of the Third Wave democracies has suffered in the wake of the Great Recession. The expectation of a damaging effect of an economic or political crisis on legitimacy is based on Lipset’s assumption that established democracies with a high degree of political legitimacy are better capable of coping with such crises than young democracies. The database includes two surveys of members of parliament conducted in 2007 and 2013 in Sweden, Germany and five Third Wave democracies located in different world regions (Chile, South Korea, Poland, South Africa and Turkey). Waves 5 and 6 of the World Values Survey that were conducted at about the same time were used for comparing the legitimacy beliefs among MPs and citizens. The data show that the scores for all indicators of political legitimacy are higher among MPs than among citizens and that the differences between the two groups of respondents are considerably larger in the five young democracies. Confidence in political parties is fairly low, especially among citizens, while the evaluation of the quality of democracy in the respondents’ country is much higher. Both evaluations have been rather stable over time. In the two established democracies, support for democracy among citizens is nearly as high as among MPs. In the five young democracies, the MP-citizen differential is larger and support for democracy in the population shows a steady increase only in Chile, while it has remained low in Poland and Turkey and even decreased in Korea and South Africa. This indicates that democracy has not taken deep roots in four of the five new democracies included in the study. In Korea and South Africa, the decline in support for democracy started already before the onset of the economic crisis and therefore cannot be attributed to the recession. This is confirmed by the lack of a statistical relationship between political legitimacy on one side and economic evaluations on the other side. A multiple regression analysis shows strong country-specific effects, while individual-level variables have only minor effects.