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This chapter develops a sketch of a critical social ontology and contrasts it to a theory of sociality as presented in the work of Michael Brown. I argue that the ontology of our social forms requires categories for understanding them descriptively, functionally as well as in evaluative terms. I contend that a theory of power is needed for an understanding of the ontology of our social forms and that this can contribute to the construction of a more critical social ontology. I argue that a critical social ontology is a more attractive and satisfying paradigm for critical theory than current post-metaphysical approaches that emphasize discourse, recognition or other neo-Idealistic aspects of human sociality.

This chapter offers a critique of the affirmative forms of thought that attempt to ground the ontology of social being through subjective-idealist terms. Some recent examples came in the form of notion of truth grounded in subjects' experience and in rationality of language and discourse. The first part of the chapter demonstrates the perilous implications of such an approach for social theory tasked with ontology and for the conception of truth necessary for its task. The second part scrutinizes the paradigm of society that stems from this subjective-idealist notion of truth and social ontology that adopts discourse, language, and literary metaphors to comprehend social being. As an alternative, the final part of the chapter offers a preliminary sketch of the relation of ontology, normativity, and mediation, as well as the notion of critique necessary for social theory tasked with ontology.

Multi-level analysis offers a useful approach to examine social and cultural questions, evolutionary biology, and research methods. Attempts to interlock the three streams of analysis can provide a rich, holistic view of past, current, and possible future research. A clarification of the possible importance of evolutionary biology and the research underpinnings of the original chapter on trustscapes and distrustscapes is attempted here.

This paper seeks to expand the value of multidisciplinary research and research methods that were discussed in the original chapter. First, I attempt to clarify the importance of studying and integrating both social and biological disciplines as they relate to organization trust and distrust issues. Second, I expand the discussion of evolutionary biological issues in ways that clarify their importance to an understanding of the social concepts of trust and distrust. Finally, I argue that multi-level analysis is best served by multi-research methodologies: methodologies that explore the researcher’s and research subject’s basic assumptions, their values, and their operating environments. All three issues are framed within the contexts of Denise Rousseau’s and Jone Pearce’s commentaries on “Trustscapes and Distrustscapes: A Multi-Level Approach for Understanding Stability and Change.”

Tourism studies have conceptualized social media as artifacts and networks of tangible objects based on neat distinctions and categorizations. These neat ontological distinctions and categorizations have been discussed within the academic field of actor-network theory. Several scholars have most significantly investigated the spatialities of messier ways of conceptualizing and approaching societal objects and the trajectories of societal phenomena. Efforts are being made to widen the ontological register that has traditionally dominated social science research, including tourism studies. The purpose of this chapter is to address and problematize the social media pertaining to tourism, focusing on a research project as analytical and methodological lens.

We argue for a new microfoundational approach to organizational identity to replace common vertical theory-borrowing from individual identity theory. Organizational identity becomes either an individualistic account of member representations of the group identity held together by other-regarding cognitive structures or a group-level account where jointly understood identity is tied to joint goals and agency as we-intentionality. Organizational identity is linked to collective action through intentionality. For large organizations, jointly held identity is crucial to guide individual action on behalf of the collective. This approach also internalizes shared identity within the organization as a collectively constructed cognitive representation rather than just an externally oriented social evaluation of membership in a category. In support of this approach, the authors examine a case study of individual wineries’ expectations and perceptions of the collective identity of their jointly constructed wine trail and how these evaluations affect commitment to membership and collective action.

This chapter highlights the characteristics of Asia through the analysis of policy-related documents by five donor countries, namely Japan, South Korea, China, India and Thailand. It will also examine the roles played by regional bodies such as the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) and ASPBAE (the Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education) as the horizontal channels influencing aid policies in respective countries. Together with the analysis of the national and organizational policies, the regional process of building consensus on the post-2015 agenda is examined, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific Regional Education Conference (APREC) held in August 2014.

The analysis reveals that the region has two faces: one is imaginary and the other is functional. There is a common trend across Asian donors to refer to their historical ties with regions and countries to which they provide assistance and their traditional notions of education and development. They highlight Asian features in contrast to conventional aid principles and approaches based on the Western value system, either apparently or in a muted manner. In this sense, the imagined community of Asia with common cultural roots is perceived by the policymakers across the board.

At the same time, administratively, the importance of the region as a stage between the national and global levels is recognized increasingly in the multilateral global governance structure. With this broadened participatory structure, as discussed in the chapter ‘Post-EFA Global Discourse: The Process of Shaping the Shared View of the ‘Education Community’’, the expected function of the region to transmit the norms and requests from the global level and to collect and summarize national voices has increased.

Dewey, through his contributions to pragmatism (America’s sole original philosophy), has long been considered relative to symbolic interactionism (SI), which emerged from that philosophy. His impact on SI, while falling short of those of Mead and Cooley, has mainly come from (and has been limited to) concepts and insights developed in Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (1922/1957) and his earlier, seminal, article, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” published in 1896 during his tenure at the University of Chicago (1894–1904). SI, however, has wrongly ignored Dewey’s political theory, especially his concept of domination. In order to rectify this inattention, I summarize the social and historical contexts that motivated Dewey’s turn toward domination; outline the radical nature of his political theory; illustrate similarities of his political theory with Marx’s; expatiate on his concept of domination, including his argument for social practices to reduce surplus domination; and explicate the theoretical and political implications of taking his political theory seriously.

Love and force are thought of as the ultimate antithesis in human relations; the substitution of love for force is the utopian dream, the consummation devoutly to be wished but hardly hoped for, the far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves – perhaps – slowly if at all. It may therefore seem perverse to raise a question as to whether there is any fundamental or real difference between love and force. Yet consideration of that question will show that from a scientific, logical point of view, love is equivalent to force in human relations, and is in fact but a variety of force. It will show too, that force in the world in general, to be given any meaning at all, has to be regarded as a kind of love, as Empedocles contended long ago. This is no mere speculation or word-play; the point is of the most fundamental and practical significance in the field of social science, regarded as a project for improving the quality of social life.