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Asset‐backed securitization (ABS), which was brought into China in 2005 and followed by a rapid expansion, is an important financial instrument for real estate industry. The purpose of this empirical study is to assess the effects of asset securitization on stock market and equity holders' wealth by examining stock price changes upon securitization transactions in China from 2005 to September 2008.

Event study is implemented to test the wealth effects of ABS on shareholders. First, normal stock returns of companies with ABS issuance during the studied period are introduced by running the market model regression; excess returns to stockholders at the time that the securitization became public knowledge are then examined; finally, significance of the excess returns are tested and influencing factors including firm and transaction characteristics are discussed.

This paper finds that securitization generally does not have significant impact on wealth of stockholders; a considerable number of securitizations are even wealth destroying. The paper interprets these findings to mean that securitization is usually a negative signal to the stock market for first‐time securitizers, but indifferent or positive for frequent securitizers. Additionally, wealth effect of securitization on stockholders also largely depends on its underlying assets.

The outcome of this paper will assist companies, banks, and governments in understanding the effects of asset securitization, thus maximizing gains from securitization and enacting suitable polices and regulations. The paper suggests that companies and governments should examine market conditions and promote securitization only when the market is calm. Additionally, first‐time issuers of asset securitization should be cautious of possible losses caused by signs of the firm's insufficient funding, while subsequent issuance can be regarded as a relatively safe financial instrument.

This paper aims to offer a comprehensive comparison of the characteristics between banks that securitize and banks that do not and to provide evidence of the capital arbitrage theory of securitization.

First, the fundamental financial similarities and differences between banks that securitize assets and banks that do not participate in the securitization market are tested. Second, variables that help predict whether a bank securitizes assets are analyzed. Third, the determinants of securitization extent in banks that securitize assets are investigated – for general securitization extent and for specific type of asset securitized. Using a sample of 112 banks that securitize different assets, a matched sample of banks that do not securitize based on entity type and size is created. A quarterly panel data set of these banks dating back to 2001 is used.

The results indicate that bank size is a significant determinant of whether a bank securitizes. Further, overall securitization extent is negatively related to the bank's capital ratio (in support of capital arbitrage theory), but this result is primarily driven by credit card securitization.

Utilizing a unique data set of quarterly data from bank Call Reports; the panel data set is large relative to past studies. A matched sample approach was used to test fundamental financial similarities and differences between securitizing and non‐securitizing banks. In addition to aggregated securitization, an examination was made of how different classes of assets affect the banks' risk‐based capital ratios and test the capital arbitrage theory of securitization.

To highlight that the risk retention rules associated with the holding of securitization investments, commonly thought to apply only to the sponsors and manufacturers of securitisations, also affect EU institutional investors and potentially impact non-EU fund managers that invest in these assets.

To address which classes of investor are affected and then to provide an overview of the obligations on affected investors that do invest in securitization investments.

There is much that is straightforward about the relevant obligations but there are a number of quirks that have not necessarily been fully appreciated by the market: these include the applicability to investors on a “look through” basis that may, inter alia, affect US credit fund managers with EU institutional investors.

EU institutional investors that do invest in this asset class should be considering the need to take practical steps to prepare written due diligence materials; non-EU credit managers that run e.g. ABS funds offered into the EU or in which there may be EU institutional investors should consider if they may have any obligations under the EU Securitization Regulation.

The aspects of the Securitization Regulation that affect institutional investors and regular fund managers have not been addressed as thoroughly as they have by the main securitization sector (banks, CLO managers and similar). This article seeks to remedy that and should prove of value to compliance, legal and other professionals at those types of institution.

The purpose of this paper is to validate the concern that banks' increasing involvement in securitization activity restrains banks' lending, as well as their degree of risk tolerance. Theoretical frameworks claim that securitization reduces risk, hence decreasing banks' degree of risk aversion. Subsequently, banks would be motivated to increase their percentage of assets devoted to risky activities, which is lending to economic sectors. However, banking statistics dictates that banks' lending is on the decline while banks' securitization activities are on the rise.

The paper refers specifically to the Malaysian Islamic commercial banks and utilizes standard panel data analysis.

Supportive evidence was found that banks' involvement in securitization activity do restrain their lending activity. In addition, banks tend to have a riskier portfolio composition following their involvement in securitization activity. Taken together, this signals that banks' involvement in securitization activity needs to be regulated or restricted since excessive securitization activities could curtail credit and increase risk inherent in banks' lending portfolio.

This study departs from previous literature in the sense that an alternative method is introduced to measure banks' securitization activity.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a direct link between securitizations and accrual-based earnings management by investigating whether financial statements in the periods of securitizations are more likely to be restated at a later time. In addition, this study examines whether the association between securitization and accounting restatements is more pronounced in the pre-financial crisis period and for banks with less independent or industry-specialized auditors.

This study covers a sample of bank holding companies with restatement information between 2001 and 2012. Using the incidence of material accounting restatements as a proxy for accrual earnings management, this study investigates whether securitizations are likely used as a tool for accrual earnings management. A logistic model is applied with standard errors clustered at the firm-year level. Various robustness tests are conducted to rule out the possibilities that the results are driven by unintentional reporting errors or endogeneity of the securitization decisions.

The empirical results reveal a positive and significant association between banks’ securitization activities and the likelihood of having accounting restatements. Moreover, this positive association is more pronounced in the pre-financial crisis period and for banks with less independent or industry-specialized auditors.

The findings suggest that managers take advantage of discretions on accounting rules for securitizations to manage earnings. This evidence provides multi-dimension implications for standard setters and practitioners, as well as investors.

This is one of the very first papers to document evidence that accrual earnings management is involved in securitization.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the securitization of rental streams, a new investment and finance product introduced in the USA in 2013 that enables fundraising from large residential portfolios owned by major investment funds and investment banking. The securities are made up of non-performance loans as well as real estate portfolios of financial entities.

An academic analysis of the European securitization market is performed, as well as a broad overview of the state of the art of the rental housing market and investment property market. Moreover, a market study of Real Estate Owned (hereinafter, REOs) and Real Estate Debts is carried out to determine both the present framework and future trends. Various financial entities and real estate management companies are examined through interviews and data collection to assess the reality of distressed assets and residential portfolios owned by major investors. It introduced the Broker’s Price Opinion concept, de loan-to-value concept and the London Interbank Offered Rate.

REO-to-rental securitization is a step forward toward the democratization of finance through the globalization of the residential market, improving risk sharing for major and retail investors. The securitization of rental streams in Europe has not taken off, despite several issuances in the USA since 2013 with significant success where first tranches obtained a credit qualification of triple-A from the majority of the main rating agencies.

At the end of 2013, a global investment firm launched an innovative finance and investment vehicle that securitized the cash flows originating from leased residential properties. That issue resulted in considerable success and in the development of a new alternative and innovative financing source for real estate activity. Taking into account that housing is a primary need of our society, there is a strong motivation for improving the residential market, and thus, REO-to-rental securitization could help take a step forward in making the housing market more efficient.

Bank securitisation is deemed to have been a major contributing factor to the 2007/2008 financial crises via fuelling credit growth accompanied by lower banks’ credit standards. Yet, prior to the crisis a common view was that securitisation activity makes the financial system more stable as risk was more easily diversified, managed and allocated economy-wide. The purpose of this paper is to review the extant literature to explore the so far generated knowledge on the impact of securitisation on banking risks. In particular, the authors examine the theoretical arguments and empirical studies on securitisation and banking risks before and after the global financial crisis of 2007/2008.

Review and discussion of the literature.

Theoretical literature univocally accentuate the undesirable consequences of securitisation, which may promote retention of riskier loans, undermine banks’ screening and monitoring incentives and enhance banks’ risk appetite. However, empirical evidence does not uniformly support the theoretical conclusions. If banks are securitisation active they lend more to risky borrowers, have less diversified portfolios and hold less capital, retain riskier loans and are aggressive in loan pricing. Others argue that securitisation reduces banks insolvency risk, increases profitability, provides liquidity and leads to greater supply of loans. Mortgage securitisation is an area where there is consistent evidence of bank risk taking via securitisation.

The paper identifies open issues for future research.

The paper surveys the risks and rewards of asset securitisation and illustrates how this structured finance technique can lift credit constraints to small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) as banks to turn more conservative in their lending in response to more risk‐sensitive capital requirements for credit risk.

The mechanics of securitisation provide an analytical framework and perspective for our analysis of conditions for sustainable SME securitisation and its potential contribution to greater risk diversification of both issuers and investors. The paper also elicits lessons to be learned for essential regulatory and policy measures to guide a sound development of securitisation markets from an empirical review of SME securitisation in Germany.

The paper finds that the structural versatility of securitisation offers economic benefits irrespective of the configuration of the financial system. The development of a viable securitisation market for SME‐related claims in a bank‐based financial system is likely to require financial sector initiatives, whose scope and intensity might be enhanced by development agencies. Orchestrated policy efforts make for a benign strategy to incubate SME securitisation in a timely fashion, while keeping legal uncertainty and economic attrition to a minimum.

As opposed to previous papers, the paper defines and discusses SME securitisation from both the perspective of bank‐ and firm‐sponsored securitisation and issue hands‐on recommendations for its efficient implementation.

The transmission of monetary policy rates to lending rates is viewed as a crucial path of monetary policy. As an integral part of the financial system and the recent financial crisis, securitized assets have the potential to affect the interest rate pass-through process and monetary policy effectiveness. This paper aims to investigate the influence of securitization on the transmission of policy rate changes to lending rates and how rate transmission has changed since the recent financial crisis. Emphasis is placed on differences among the mortgage, consumer credit and business loan securitization markets and between agency and private-label securitization transactions.

The empirical framework is an error-correction model augmented to directly measure the influence of securitization. Monetary policy effectiveness is measured by the size and speed of transmitted policy rate changes to lending rates. An efficiency measure of relative adjustment accounts for differences in the size of long-run responses across loan markets and changes in efficiency from securitization within loan markets.

The size and speed of interest rate pass-through tend to increase with securitization. Liquidity, capital relief and funding from securitization help to make lending rates more responsive. Increases in pass-through with securitization are less in the consumer credit and business loan markets after the recent financial crisis relative to before the crisis. In contrast, mortgage markets tend to have larger pass-through after the financial crisis. Differences in rate transmission after the recent financial crisis point to the role on nonbanks in consumer credit and business loans and asset purchase programs of the Federal Reserve in mortgage markets. Securitization tends to make the adjustment process more efficient, and gains in efficiency from securitization are larger after the financial crisis.

A key contribution of the study differentiates securitization across markets and types to determine the effects on the interest rate pass-through process. The results show that increases in the efficiency of the adjustment process from securitization tend to be greater in mortgage markets and for all private-label securitized assets. These findings have implications for proposed government-sponsored entity (GSE) reform to reduce the role of GSEs in the housing market, promote private-label mortgage credit and strengthen securitization deals.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an insight of Islamic securitization based on sukuk structures.

Descriptive, analytical, and comparative analyses are used to discuss the risk‐sharing behaviour in Islamic securitization through different structures of mudharabah and musharakah sukuk derived from asset securitization.

The paper reveals that although sukuk are structured in a similar way to conventional asset‐backed securities, they can have significantly different underlying structures, provisions and shariah‐compliant. In particular, it prohibits the receipt and payment of interest and stipulates that income must be derived from an underlying real business risk rather than as a guaranteed return from interest. With regards to sukuk securitization, an asset is one of the vital elements that should exist as an evidence to support the process and make it permissible in Islam. In terms of Islamic securitization mechanism, it can be divided into two principles, namely, debt based and partnership. This paper further emphasizes that sukuk structures based on partnership principle is regarded as risk sharing rather than risk shifting, where it works by combining risk‐exposures in such a way that they offset one another to some degree. Accordingly, overall risk will be less than total risks on individual basis.

This paper has important implication for the understanding of risk management practices particularly in structuring sukuk. Banks as originators and special purpose vehicles (SPV) as issuers, might consider more sukuk on partnership principles since it directed towards risk‐sharing concept that could lead to increase mobilization of savings and investment. As for the investors or sukuk holders, the partnership principle could generate the wealth creation, which to be shared between both investors (fund providers) and issuers (fund users), while both bear the risks involved and the resulting loss.

The paper will fill the gap in the existing literature of Islamic finance by showing that Islamic securitization via sukuk is a viable source of funds that could help stabilize the securities market, and as solution to the current subprime mortgages financial crisis.