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1 – 10 of over 1000Andrea M. Scheetz and Joseph Wall
With the increasing prevalence of awards for reporting fraudulent activity, it is important to learn if there are unintended consequences associated with the language offering…
Abstract
With the increasing prevalence of awards for reporting fraudulent activity, it is important to learn if there are unintended consequences associated with the language offering such awards. Aside from issues regarding submitting unsubstantiated claims of fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank Act may inadvertently encourage would-be whistleblowers to delay reporting fraud. Potential whistleblowers may choose to delay reporting due to the consideration of alternatives to external reporting, in a misguided attempt to increase the size of an award, or due to their ethical stance on the issues. Using a three-stage mixed methods (experiment, open-ended interviews, and experiment) approach, this study provides evidence that increased knowledge of statutes involving external whistleblowing may result in reporting delays. The data suggest that despite statements from the SEC forbidding this, managers may choose to delay reporting when under the threshold necessary to receive an award. In such a manner, managers may be allowing the fraud to grow to a necessary perceived level over time. As might be expected, the accountants in this study were more cautious, checking to see if internal reporting worked first. Of particular note, 16 individuals indicated that they would never report, with the motivation apparently driven by fear of job loss and/or retaliation. Lastly, the intention to delay or speed up reporting may be very different based on the perception of ethics involved in the decision.
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This study investigates the relation between lawsuit attributes that support an inference of fraud and the probability and the size of securities lawsuit settlement. A sample of…
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This study investigates the relation between lawsuit attributes that support an inference of fraud and the probability and the size of securities lawsuit settlement. A sample of 607 securities lawsuits between 1996 and 2006 is used in the analysis of the probability of settlement and a subsample of 261 lawsuit settlements is used in the analysis of the size of settlement. The empirical results indicate a positive association between the probability of a settlement and accounting irregularity, SEC enforcement action and stock offer. Accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action are also documented to be positively related to the size of the settlement. The results imply that a stock offer supports a strong inference of fraud and the presence of accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action in a lawsuit filing strengthens the fraud allegation and increases the likelihood of a settlement. The findings also suggest that the stronger the inference of fraud, the greater the size of the settlement. The results of this study add to our understanding of the determinants of securities lawsuit settlement. Studies using securities litigation as a proxy for fraud can use the results of this study to distinguish between fraud-related and nonfraud-related lawsuits.
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Joann Segovia, Vicky Arnold and Steve G. Sutton
Multiple stakeholders in the financial reporting process have articulated concerns over the rules-based orientation that U.S. accounting standards have adopted. Many argue that a…
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Multiple stakeholders in the financial reporting process have articulated concerns over the rules-based orientation that U.S. accounting standards have adopted. Many argue that a more principles-based approach to standards setting, typified by international accounting standards, would improve the quality of financial reporting and strengthen the auditor's position when dealing with client pressure, thereby enabling a focus on transparency and fairness of financial reports. In early 2009, the U.S. appeared poised to transition U.S. accounting standards to international accounting standards. The transition decision was made after the recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (i.e., SEC Pozen Committee) publicly expressed strong support in its final report (SEC, 2008a). The SEC in turn issued its “Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers on November 14, 2008” (SEC, 2008b) outlining the transition procedures. However, with Shapiro taking over as chairperson of the SEC, this move now appears less likely pending a stronger review of how principles-based international standards may impact the strength of financial regulatory oversight – a potential delay met with disdain by the pro principles-based European regulatory community (Doran, 2009). While transition to international standards continues to progress, little research examining whether principles-based standards affect auditor decision-making has been conducted. The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of principles- vs. rules-based standards on auditors' willingness to allow preparers leeway in reporting practices and to consider how auditors' decision behavior is influenced by potential client pressure and/or opposing pressure from the SEC. Based on a sample of 114 experienced auditors, the results show that auditors are more willing to allow clients to manage earnings under rules-based standards; and, these results are persistent even under external pressure. Results also indicate that more experienced auditors are less willing to allow clients who exert high pressure to report earnings aggressively, while SEC pressure has more affect on less experienced auditors. These results provide important insights to the FASB, SEC, and IASB as they weigh arguments underlying the principles- vs. rules-based debate.
Martin Freedman and Jin Dong Park
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an interpretative release ostensibly mandating the disclosure of the impact that climate change may have on the…
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The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an interpretative release ostensibly mandating the disclosure of the impact that climate change may have on the registrant. One means of enforcement for this release is through the use of comment letters. Prior empirical studies have supported the argument that the SEC oversight through issuing comment letters is effective in enhancing the quality of firms’ disclosures (Asthana & Boone, 2009; Johnston & Petacchi, 2017). With a total of 27 comment letter cases (34 comments based on the topics) regarding climate change disclosure, we do not find clear evidence strongly supporting that the SEC implements its oversight process through systematic procedures and that SEC comment letters enhance the quality of firms’ climate change disclosure. Although some firms responded to the comments proactively, qualitative analysis reveals that the firm’s revisions were not sufficient to provide useful information for market participants in general. The overall finding suggests that the current oversight mechanism for climate change disclosure needs to be significantly improved to enhance the quality of firms’ climate change disclosure.
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In July 2008 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published three proposals relating to the use of credit ratings in its rules and forms. The proposals were designed…
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In July 2008 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) published three proposals relating to the use of credit ratings in its rules and forms. The proposals were designed to address concerns that the misuse of credit ratings may have contributed to the current crisis. The SEC sought market feedback regarding the effect the removal of credit rating references may produce on the markets.
This article examines the use of ratings by various market constituents, analyzes the details of the SEC proposals, and reviews the provided feedback. The main finding is that the majority of the market participants opposed the SEC proposals. Fiduciaries and regulated entities are looking to regulators to offer a common measure of risk, stable, accurate and free of conflict of interests.
The debate over an auditor's ability to remain independent while simultaneously providing nonaudit services to the audit client has a long history. In recent years, several…
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The debate over an auditor's ability to remain independent while simultaneously providing nonaudit services to the audit client has a long history. In recent years, several factors have combined to heighten regulators’ concerns about this issue. This study uses a case methodology research design to analyze the testimonies given by financial statement users at the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e) Independence Hearings in relation to this debate. The analysis is framed by the principle of user primacy. Findings indicate that changes from the SEC's initial proposal to final rule on independence are more closely aligned with preparers’ than users’ preferences, despite claims to the contrary.
Ricardo Colón and Héctor G. Bladuell
This paper aims to help auditors manage the risk of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations of the companies that they audit, particularly those with operations in Latin…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to help auditors manage the risk of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations of the companies that they audit, particularly those with operations in Latin America.
Methodology/approach
First, the paper describes the relevant provisions of the FCPA. Second, it identifies the common schemes and transactions associated with heightened risk of FCPA liability in Latin America and provides recommendations to minimize this risk. Third, it discusses the responsibilities of auditors under U.S. securities laws and regulations with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. Finally, it describes the sanctions that auditors could face if they fail to fulfill their responsibilities regarding these FCPA violations. The paper is based on data collected from various documents including laws, cases, accounting and auditing standards, litigation releases, press releases, deferred prosecution agreements, and enforcement actions.
Findings
Auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(a) of the Exchange Act to design procedures that provide reasonable assurances of detecting the FCPA violations of their clients, which are illegal acts with direct and material effects on the financial statements. In addition, auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act to report the violations of the FCPA that they detect during the audit to the appropriate level of management. If management does not take the necessary remedial steps, auditors must report FCPA violations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In order to reduce their FCPA-related liability and fulfill their responsibilities under U.S. securities laws and accounting standards, auditors should closely scrutinize transactions with a high risk of FCPA liability. An analysis of FCPA cases occurring in Latin America reveals six categories of transactions with heightened FCPA risk.
Originality/value of paper
While there is much literature regarding a company’s compliance with the FCPA, there has not been much literature about the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. This paper attempts to start bridging this gap by providing guidance to auditors regarding their responsibilities to detect and report FCPA violations.
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