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The recent article “Guardians of Knowledge and the Public Interest” was highly critical of the UK audit standard‐setting process. However, it was seriously flawed in several respects: it failed to present a balanced view of the “due process” by which auditing standards and guidelines are developed, it did not develop a coherent formulation of what constitutes the “public interest” and it contained misrepresentations and errors of fact. In reply this article corrects the errors and presents an objective view of the standard‐setting process, including its weaknesses. It does not attempt to formulate a definition of the “public interest”, a task which even the courts are unwilling to undertake.

This study examines the timeliness of quarterly financial reports published by companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). In addition, this study extends prior research by determining the association between timeliness and each of the following company attributes ‐ size, profitability, growth and capital structure. An analysis of 117 quarterly reports ended on 30 September 2001 reveals that all, except one company reported within an allowable reporting lag of two months. However, a large number of companies were making the most of the time given to announce their quarterly reports. The study also provides evidence that there is a significant association between timeliness and each of the four company attributes, and the association is in the hypothesised direction. Plausible explanations for these findings are provided. The findings may provide some implications for future regulations and research regarding the timeliness of financial reporting in Malaysia.

At a time when the auditing profession faces mounting criticism in the wake of corporate and professional scandals, it is not unusual to read caustic commentary in the press. This is not a new phenomenon. The nineteenth century auditing profession had to face similar criticism from the media, but practitioners then had to deal with a weapon more effective than mere prose, satire. This short historical note captures some of the more amusing yet hard‐hitting attacks on the profession. We can only hope that this form of critical writing makes a come‐back.

Explores the issues which concerned auditing practitioners more than 100 years ago and reexamines them in the present day context. These issues include: the role and scope of the audit, audit independence, the auditor’s report, competition between auditors, litigation against auditors, and governance and regulation of the profession. Many of these concerns remain unresolved. Develops an historical perspective which helps to explain the endurance of these issues and informs policy makers in their endeavour to devise permanent solutions. Examines the determination of the profession′s early leaders to discuss the problem and publicly notes the contrast with the deafening silence emanating from their counterparts today.

The purpose of the paper is to present an analysis of the disciplinary action taken against members of the founding bodies of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). This exercise illuminates an aspect of accounting's past which has tended to be overlooked in conventional histories of the profession.

An analysis of the internal records of the ICAEW has been conducted. In addition, the archives of the ICAEW's predecessor bodies, entries in various censuses and contemporary sources have been reviewed for relevant material.

Analysis of the records of the ICAEW and its founding bodies reveals a number of cases where disciplinary action was taken for breaches of ethical principles. The expulsion of a member, however, was always preceded by an external “prompt” such as the member's conviction on criminal charge, his disappearance or bankruptcy. This perhaps suggests that the early professional bodies were more inclined to protect the private interests of their members rather than the public interest.

The paper's findings add to the literature on the professionalisation of the British accountancy profession. By focussing on the less‐celebrated aspects of the founders' behaviour, this paper puts the success of the profession in achieving public acceptance into sharper perspective.

This paper aims to provide evidence to suggest that private social and environmental reporting (i.e. one-on-one meetings between institutional investors and investees on social and environmental issues) is beginning to merge with private financial reporting and that, as a result, integrated private reporting is emerging.

In this paper, 19 FTSE100 companies and 20 UK institutional investors were interviewed to discover trends in private integrated reporting and to gauge whether private reporting is genuinely becoming integrated. The emergence of integrated private reporting through the lens of institutional logics was interpreted. The emergence of integrated private reporting as a merging of two hitherto separate and possibly rival institutional logics was framed.

It was found that specialist socially responsible investment managers are starting to attend private financial reporting meetings, while mainstream fund managers are starting to attend private meetings on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. Further, senior company directors are becoming increasingly conversant with ESG issues.

The findings were interpreted as two possible scenarios: there is a genuine hybridisation occurring in the UK institutional investment such that integrated private reporting is emerging or the financial logic is absorbing and effectively neutralising the responsible investment logic.

These findings provide evidence of emergent integrated private reporting which are useful to both the corporate and institutional investment communities as they plan their engagement meetings.

No study has hitherto examined private social and environmental reporting through interview research from the perspective of emergent integrated private reporting. This is the first paper to discuss integrated reporting in the private reporting context.

This paper reconsiders the criticisms of the most influential theory of the rise of the large corporations, and to see how these criticisms can be met without entirely abandoning the basic elements of the theory.

This problem is approached by first analyzing the weaknesses inherent in Chandler's theory as presented in The Visible Hand, and then by reworking elements of the theory by relying on data generated by other historical accounts.

The author found that the theory could be salvaged by reordering the evolution of managerial practices based on a variety of historical studies, many not considered by Chandler, but even some of his own earlier work. Given these changes in historical order, vital managerial reforms can be placed sufficiently early that organizational techniques existed to solve the problems and exploit the opportunities that Chandler identifies as creating the pressures necessary to generate the large industrial corporation, thus responding to one class of criticism. My approach can also incorporate other factors that critics see as missing in Chandler's account.

What is new in this paper is that it reconciles Chandler's analysis with those of his critics by re‐examining and correcting some of his assumptions. The result is a theory of corporate evolution that is less global but more realistic. Economic and business historians as well as sociologists of organizations will find this reassessment valuable.