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Research on layoff victims reports that interactional justice judgments influence important work‐related attitudes, such as organizational commitment. In this paper, we build on this emerging literature through an examination of the role that both interactional justice and organizational support have in explaining the organizational commitment of 147 layoff victims at a major manufacturing plant. The results of structural equation analyses supported our hypothesis that organizational support mediates the relationship between interactional justice and organizational commitment.

This paper proposes that the development of a layoff policy gives an organization a competitive advantage over organizations without such a policy. How an organization communicates concern to employees is often through procedures and policies developed by the human resource department. Survey questionnaires were mailed to 1,400 vice presidents of human resources that held membership and whose names were provided through the Society of Human Resource Management. Over half of the organizations surveyed (57%) did not have layoff policies. By type of organization, healthcare had the greatest number of policies in their organizations with 70% affirming their existence. The study concludes with the following five proposed reasons why layoff policies do not exist: (1) “It can't happen here” syndrome (2) The cover‐up syndrome (3) If you plan for it, people will panic, (4) Managers are trained to focus on growth and to avoid decline, (5) There would be loss of control, and accompanying organizational sabotage, and (6) More policies equal less humane treatment.

This paper analyzes five characteristics associated with the overall decision‐making process that are necessary to achieve a high degree of perceived procedural justice within four strategic contexts of focal subsidiaries. Strategic contexts are based on the role of subsidiaries as defined by the flow of knowledge between these subsidiaries and the global network of MNCs. Propositions are developed that relate the five characteristics, the four strategic contexts, and high perceived procedural justice. The propositions represent a template for managers and researchers interested in the successful implementation of global strategic decisions and the improvement of the performance of individual subsidiaries as well as the global competitiveness of multinational corporations.

This is an empirical study of a business ethics issue. It examines the question of when an untrue statement in a negotiations context is considered unethical behavior. Four types of untrue statements are considered. A questionnaire was used to determine (1) if the types of untrue statements were distinct, (2) if they formed a continuum, and (3) whether the collective perspective of reasonable people was able to “draw a line” in such a continuum between ethical and unethical behavior. The results showed a consensus of moral intuition and the ability to draw a line between ethical and unethical behavior. Implications and future research directions are discussed.

Suggests that theories of procedural fairness can offer insights into the effectiveness of complaint‐handling strategies. Discusses complaint‐handling strategies, equity theory, distributive fairness, procedural fairness, interactional fairness and how marketers can best satisfy complainers. Concludes that firms need to have complaints procedures which consumers feel treat them fairly; which involves appearing genuinely responsive, rather than offer apologies by rote.

States how marketers have been traditionally advised to allow unhappy customers to voice their opinions freely, offering apologies. Suggests that theories of procedural fairness such as equity theory can provide understanding of the effectiveness of such complaint‐handling strategies. Argues that an apology cannot compensate for lack of a tangible outcome such as a refund. Concludes with a consideration of how marketers may be able to satisfy their complainers more effectively.

Current research on justice has found that perceptions of injustice are reduced when harm‐doers provide an explanation or “account” of their actions. We question whether these findings generalize to everyone in organizations. In particular, we predict that responses to unjust acts and social accounts about them will differ for those in organizations who have less power and for those who are “in‐group” to the victim. We test this prediction by replicating Bies and Shapiro's study of causal accounts, using union subjects as well as managerial subjects, and constructing a scenario in which the victim is a worker and another in which the victim is a manager. As expected, union subjects were more angry about unjust acts than were managers. Counter to our expectations, all subjects perceived an act to be more unjust when the victim was a worker than when the victim was a manager. As in previous studies, an account reduced feelings of injustice, except in one situation: among those of lower power (union reps) who evaluated acts that hurt members of their own group (i.e., a worker), an account did not reduce their sense of injustice for the victim, even though it did reduce blame at the harm‐doer.

Misunderstanding, or misconstrual, is a major exacerbating factor in conflict escalation and an impediment to negotiation and resolution. Laboratory work has identified characteristic errors of construal which partisans make in assessing the views of their opponents. This paper examined whether these same phenomena could be observed in a traditional real‐world conflict, that between trade unions and management. In two studies, union representatives and managers reacted first (in Study 1) to an actual contract negotiation that the two sides were involved with, and then to a hypothetical unjust act. Results revealed that the two sides indeed display many characteristic errors of construal. Specifically, union representatives underestimated management concern for harmful acts against workers, or management's sincere wish to negotiate in good faith within financial constraints, and were generally highly suspicious of management motives and intentions toward workers. Managers saw union representatives as unreasonable, and greatly overestimated union militancy and unwillingness to accept extenuating circumstances. Negotiations will be greatly improved if such misconstruals can be exposed and debunked prior to, or during negotiations.

The purpose of this paper is to adapt research conducted on subclinical psychopaths and Machiavellians to conceptualise false agents in transaction cost economics (TCE). Both opportunism and information asymmetry provide a means to manipulate contractual relationships, pursuing existing loopholes for self-interest, while uncertainty and small-numbers bargaining allow false agents to exploit existing agreements during periods of rapid change, growth, and development. Considering differences in contract length preference may inform our understanding of subclinical psychopaths and Machiavellians. Contextually, the rise of “quasi-governmental” hybrid organisations may produce an ideal prospect for “natural born” opportunists to reap self-interested benefits through contractual loopholes.

This theoretical paper addresses social norms and blind trust in contractual relationships. In turn, blind trust may provide clues about the environmental conditions that facilitate manipulation by subclinical psychopaths and Machiavellians during negotiations of contract term length.

Williamson’s (1975) TCE framework provides a novel approach to subclinical psychopathic and Machiavellian behaviour by agents. Assumptions about behavioural norms may differ between the contracting party and the agent, leading to positive behavioural expectations of trust such as confidence, reciprocity, and history. The length of the contractual relationship may distinguish subclinical psychopaths from Machiavellians. The subclinical psychopath is more likely to behave opportunistically in short-term contracts, while Machiavellians more likely amass goodwill to behave opportunistically in long-term contracts. The role of uncertainty, small-numbers bargaining, information asymmetry, and opportunism is particularly relevant in quasi-governmental organisations when agents are “natural born” opportunists.

This theoretical paper adds to discussion of TCE related problems in organisations. “Natural born” opportunistic agents are more likely to take advantage of principals who extend trust as a goodwill gesture in a contractual relationship. Trust often represents a mental shortcut, based on “gut” reactions to save time, especially in dynamic environments. Hybrid organisations represent one such environment, in which contracting of goods and services renders comprehensive monitoring impracticable. Yet, scholarship adheres to legal mechanisms as safeguards against opportunism without acknowledging social norms that guide blind trust. Finally, contrasting motives between principals and false agents creates an inherent relationship asymmetry.

The following classified, annotated list of titles is intended to provide reference librarians with a current checklist of new reference books, and is designed to supplement the RSR review column, “Recent Reference Books,” by Frances Neel Cheney. “Reference Books in Print” includes all additional books received prior to the inclusion deadline established for this issue. Appearance in this column does not preclude a later review in RSR. Publishers are urged to send a copy of all new reference books directly to RSR as soon as published, for immediate listing in “Reference Books in Print.” Reference books with imprints older than two years will not be included (with the exception of current reprints or older books newly acquired for distribution by another publisher). The column shall also occasionally include library science or other library related publications of other than a reference character.