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The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

Although outcome sharing in construction is a well-established concept in the literature, there is still an ongoing debate on the most effective approach for distributing project outcomes between an owner and downstream contracting parties (DCPs). To address this issue, this paper aims to investigate an optimal framework for distributing project outcomes among various levels of subcontracting in construction projects. The framework includes contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors and other related parties.

To formulate the optimization problem, the principal–agent model is utilized. The theoretical development is validated through an experiment conducted with employees from road construction companies.

When distributing outcomes among various levels of subcontracting, the sharing should be determined by their contribution to the outcome, effort costs, level of outcome uncertainty and risk preference.

This paper expands on the existing principal–agent theory by incorporating multiple levels of agents, transforming the conventional view of outcome sharing among downstream subcontracting levels into testable hypotheses and well-defined concepts. The paper has practical implications for industry practitioners seeking to effectively allocate benefits and costs throughout a project's subcontracting chain.

As an alternative to hiring financial specialists or investment consultants, robo-advisors offer financially automated investment services. This study aims to investigate how robo-advisors' service attributes, risk attitude and financial self-efficacy influence customers' choice preferences of adopting robo-advisors.

Two hundred fifty-one online surveys were used to collect data, and choice-based conjoint analysis was conducted.

Results show that increasing annual fees negatively impact customers' choice preferences. Promotion, general investment education and additional human assistance have a positive impact. Furthermore, risk-seeking and risk-averse customers require more human assistance than risk-neutral customer and customers with high levels of financial self-efficacy prefer more general investment education and additional human assistance than those with lower levels. In addition, customers in the older age group prefer promotion, general investment education and additional human assistance, while wealthy customers prefer lower annual fees, higher general investment education and more additional human assistance compared to middle-class and low-income groups.

This study contributes to robo-advisor providers to provide appropriate service attributes for each customer group.

By using higher moments, this paper extends the quadratic local risk-minimizing approach in a general discrete incomplete financial market. The local optimization subproblems are convex or nonconvex, depending on the moment variants used in the modeling. Inspired by Lai et al. (2006), the authors propose a new multiobjective approach for the combination of moments that is transformed into a multigoal programming problem.

The authors evaluate financial derivatives with American features using local risk-minimizing strategies. The financial structure is in line with Schweizer (1988): the market is discrete, self-financing is not guaranteed, but deviations are controlled and reduced by minimizing the second moment. As for the quadratic approach, the algorithm proceeds backwardly.

In the context of evaluating American option, a transposition of this multigoal programming leads not only to nonconvex optimization subproblems but also to the undesirable fact that local zero deviations from self-financing are penalized. The analysis shows that issuers should consider some higher moments when evaluating contingent claims because they help reshape the distribution of global cumulative deviations from self-financing.

A detailed numerical analysis that compares all the moments or some combinations of them is performed.

The quadratic approach is extended by exploring other higher moments, positive combinations of moments and variants to enforce asymmetry. This study also investigates the impact of two types of exercise decisions and multiple assets.

This study considers a contracting problem between a fairness concerned entrepreneur (EN) and a fair-neutral venture capitalist (VC) to explore the effects of asymmetry, agency conflicts and fairness concerns.

The authors construct the model by assuming the EN's risk aversion degree is private information, which is more realistic but ignored in most studies. Under the principal–agent framework, the authors solve the VC's optimal contracting models by identifying the ranges of feasible solution, where the optimal solutions of these models are explicit and nicely reconcile the “private equity” puzzle. Moreover, validity of the optimal solutions is verified by numerical simulations.

In accordance with empirical evidence, information asymmetry lowers the optimal equity share that the VC provides to EN but raises EN's profit due to lower effort disutility and information rent. Moreover, the authors find that the fairness concerns is beneficial for the EN, where it not only increases the EN's optimal equity share, but also enhances the certainty equivalence of the EN's utility regarding its profit. Relative to the benchmark model where the EN's risk aversion degree is common knowledge, the EN's efforts recommended by the optimal contract is less sensitive to the EN's fairness concerns degree when the EN does not actually announce its risk aversion degree.

First, the authors incorporate asymmetry to study a two-period contracting problem and explore how it affects the equity shares allocated to the contractual parties. Second, the authors incorporate fairness concerns and analyze its effect regarding the decision-makings and profits.

Disruptions at ports may destroy the planned ship schedules profoundly, which is an imperative operation problem that shipping companies need to overcome. This paper attempts to help shipping companies cope with port disruptions through recovery scheduling.

This paper studies the ship coping strategies for the port disruptions caused by severe weather. A novel mixed-integer nonlinear programming model is proposed to solve the ship schedule recovery problem (SSRP). A distributionally robust mean conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) optimization model was constructed to handle the SSRP with port disruption uncertainties, for which we derive tractable counterparts under the polyhedral ambiguity sets.

The results show that the size of ambiguity set, confidence level and risk-aversion parameter can significantly affect the optimal values, decision-makers should choose a reasonable parameter combination. Besides, sailing speed adjustment and handling rate adjustment are effective strategies in SSRP but may not be sufficient to recover the schedule; therefore, port skipping and swapping are necessary when multiple or longer disruptions occur at ports.

Since the port disruption is difficult to forecast, we attempt to take the uncertainties into account to achieve more meaningful results. To the best of our knowledge, there is barely a research study focusing on the uncertain port disruptions in the SSRP. Moreover, this is the first paper that applies distributionally robust optimization (DRO) to deal with uncertain port disruptions through the equivalent counterpart of DRO with polyhedral ambiguity set, in which a robust mean-CVaR optimization formulation is adopted as the objective function for a trade-off between the expected total costs and the risk.

The Public–Private Partnership (PPP) modality plays an important role in the procurement of global infrastructure projects. Regarding PPP's complex transaction structure, pricing of a PPP project is critical to both parties where the government pursues a high value for money (VFM) and the investor strives to maximize its financial gains. Despite the straightforward win–win principle, a formidable compromise is often the case to end up with a fairly acceptable price, subject to many determinants such as the risk profile, expected return, technological innovation and capacities of both parties. Among them, this study chooses to examine the “managing flexibility” (MF) capacity of investors in pricing of a PPP project, in light of the widely recognized importance of a real-option perspective toward the long term, complex and uncertain PPP arrangement. This study addresses two major questions: (1) how is MF in PPP projects to be valued and (2) how are PPP projects to be priced when considering a project's MF value.

A binomial tree model is used to evaluate the MF value in PPP projects. Based on the developed MF pricing model, net present value (NPV) and adjusted VFM value are then calculated. Finally, a multi-objective decision-making method (MODM) was adopted to determine the optimal level of returns based on invested capital (ROIC), return on operation maintenance (ROOM) and concession period.

The applicability and functionality of the proposed model is investigated using a real project case. For a given return, extended NPV and adjusted VFM value were calculated and analyzed using sensitivity analysis. Factor influence is shown by the model to be dependent on factor impact on cash flow. Subsequently, a multi-objective decision-making (MODM) model was adopted to determine the optimal level of returns, where the solution approximates the real-world bidding price. Results confirm that the pricing model provides a reliable and practical PPP proposal pricing tool.

This study proposes an integrated framework for valuing MF in PPP projects and thus more accurately determine optimal pricing of PPP projects than revealed in extant research. The model offers a practical tool to aid in the valuation of PPP projects.

Numerical literature shows that agricultural insurance can affect pesticide investments, but few of them are devoted to explain how agricultural insurance affects farmers’ selection on green or traditional pesticides. This paper aims to develop a theoretical model about how agricultural insurance influences on green pesticides selections and tests our conclusions by using the data from China land economic survey (CLES) from 2020 to 2021.

We employ probit model to capture the effects of agricultural insurance on green pesticides adoption.

We indicate that green pesticides have a stronger effect on stabilizing yield and increasing income than traditional pesticides, but there are still risks disturbing farmers’ decisions on green pesticides usage. By providing premium subsidies after the farmers are affected by natural risk, agricultural insurance improves the farmers’ expected income and encourages farmers to use green pesticides. Further, we further confirm these conclusions by considering different scenarios such as climate risks, farmers’ entrepreneurship and credit constraints. We find that the effects are more salient if croplands are under higher natural risks and, farmers are equipped with entrepreneurship and formal credit. This paper implies that the agricultural insurance decoupled with green technologies also have salient positive effects on agricultural pollution control.

The potential contributions of this paper can be outlined in three aspects in detail. Firstly, this paper aims to revel the effects of agricultural insurance on pesticide selection by structuring a general theoretical model. By using the CLES data from 2020 to 2021, we confirm that agricultural insurance increases the probability for adopting green pesticides. Secondly, this paper discusses the effects of farmers’ characteristics on the results and finds that if farmers have entrepreneurship, the effects of agricultural insurance on green pesticide usage will be more salient. Thirdly, it uncovers some practices in China, which will supply experiences for other developing countries. For example, this paper further demonstrates that “insurance + credit” plan the present Chinese government carried out will be an important measure for strengthening effects of agricultural insurance on green pesticides usage. Moreover, it shows that decouple agricultural policies will also guide farmers to use green technologies eventually if the technologies are reliable and farmers can afford.

As the complexity and uncertainty of megaprojects make it difficult for traditional management models to address the difficulties, this paper aims to design a performance incentive contract through IT applications, thereby promoting the formation of an information-based governance mechanism for megaprojects and facilitating the transformation and upgrading of the construction management model of megaprojects to informatisation.

This paper introduced IT applications into the performance assessment and used the proportion of IT applications replacing traditional manual management as a variable. It analysed different replacement ratios to obtain the optimal solution for the change of contractors behaviours and promote the optimal performance incentive for the informatisation in megaprojects.

The results show that under the condition of the optimal replacement ratio, achieving the optimal state of a mutual win-win situation is possible for the benefit of both sides. The counter-intuitive finding is that the greater the replacement ratio is not, the better, but those other constraints are also taken into account.

This study enriched the research of the performance configuration incentive from a practical perspective. It extended the research framework of IT incentive mechanisms in the governance of megaprojects from a management theory perspective. It clarified the role of IT applications in incentive mechanisms and the design process of optimal incentive contracts under different performance incentive states. The incentives made the contractors work harder to meet the owner's requirements, and it could improve the efficiency of megaprojects, thus better achieving megaproject objectives.

Asymmetric cost information exists between a supplier and a manufacturer regarding the manufacturer's process innovation for remanufacturing (PIR), which may hurt the supplier's profit. The authors therefore seek to develop a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts for channel information sharing.

Based on principal–agent theory, the supplier, acting as a Stackelberg leader, designs a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts to impel the manufacturer to disclose its private cost information on PIR (i.e. PIR efficiency). In addition, the authors compare the equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric and symmetric information to examine the effects of asymmetric PIR information on the production policies and profits of the supplier and the manufacturer.

The proposed contract menu encourages th4e manufacturer to spontaneously share PIR efficiency information with the supplier. Asymmetric PIR information may distort the output of new products upward or downward, but the output of remanufactured products may only be distorted downward. In addition, the manufacturer with high PIR efficiency gains information rent, and interestingly, the increase in the probability of low PIR efficiency amplifies its information rent. Finally, an asymmetric information environment may increase the threshold for the manufacturer to enter remanufacturing.

The authors probe the issue of the supplier's contract design by jointly considering remanufacturing, process innovation and information asymmetry. The paper expands the influencing mechanism of process innovation information in the remanufacturing field. The authors also observe new results that may offer guidance to decision makers.