Search results

Vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystems, systems of inter-related forces that promote and sustain regional entrepreneurship, are increasingly viewed as sources of innovation, economic development and community revitalization. Regions with emerging, underdeveloped or depressed economies are attempting to develop their nascent entrepreneurial ecosystems in the hopes of experiencing the positive benefits of entrepreneurial activity. For nascent entrepreneurial ecosystems to grow requires resources. However, how nascent entrepreneurial ecosystems manage their resource dependencies and the tensions that exist between creating and attracting resources are not clear. The purpose of this paper is to propose a theory of nascent entrepreneurial ecosystem resource dependence.

This conceptual paper analyzes entrepreneurial ecosystems as meta-organizations and builds on resource dependence theory to explain how nascent ecosystems respond to environmental dependencies and their resource needs through internal and external strategies.

Two specific strategies used by nascent entrepreneurial ecosystems to manage resource dependence – bridging and buffer – are explored. It is proposed that there is a positive relationship between the resource dependence of a nascent entrepreneurial ecosystem and its use of bridging and buffering activities. Two ecosystem characteristics that influence the pursuit of bridging and buffering – ecosystem size and the presence of collaborative values – are also identified. In addition, it is theorized that resource dependence strategies influence a key, system-level characteristic of entrepreneurial ecosystems: resilience, the ecosystem’s ability to respond and adapt to internal and external disruptions.

The theory presented generates insights into how nascent entrepreneurial ecosystems create and obtain resources when ecosystems are unmunificent, resource-constrained or underdeveloped. The theorizing addresses which resource dependence strategy – buffering or bridging – has a stronger link to resource dependence (and resilience) and under what conditions these linkages occur. The theoretical model generates insights for research on entrepreneurship in emerging and developed economies and produces practical implications for ecosystem participants, policymakers and economic development organizations.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of board characteristics on the financial performance of listed firms in Tanzania. Board characteristics, including outside directors, board size, CEO/Chair duality, gender diversity, board skill and foreign directors are addressed in the Tanzanian context by applying two corporate governance theories, namely, agency theory and resource dependence theory.

The paper uses balanced panel data regression analysis on 80 firm-years observations (2006-2013) from annual reports, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 key stakeholders. The study uses also a mixed methods approach and applies a convergent parallel design (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011) to integrate quantitative and qualitative data.

It was found that in terms of agency theory, while the findings support the separation of CEO/Chairperson roles, they do not support outside directors-financial performance linkage. With regard to resource dependence theory, the findings suggest that gender diversity has a positive impact on financial performance. Furthermore, the findings do not support an association between financial performance and board size, PhD qualification and foreign directors.

The study contributes to the understanding of board-performance link and provides academic evidence to policy makers in Tanzania for current and future governance reforms.

The findings contribute to the literature by providing new and original insights that, within a developing setting, extend current understanding of the association between corporate governance and financial performance. This is predicated, also, on the use of uncommon mixed methods approach.

With boards of directors playing both monitoring and guidance roles, the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of board structure on firm value in large US and UK firms using the lenses of agency and resource dependence theories.

Using a sample of firms in the USA and the UK from 2000 to 2007, the paper conducts a panel data analysis of the impact of board structure on firm value and examine the nuances of different governance environments.

The paper finds distinct differences in the impact of board independence, board size, and outside director busyness on firm value between UK and US firms. Specifically, the paper finds that board independence, board size, and board busyness all have a significant positive impact on firm value in the UK. However, the paper finds no significant relationship between board independence and firm value among US firms. Both board size and board busyness are found to be positively associated with firm value in the USA.

The paper finds strong support for resource dependence theory in the UK but limited support for agency theory in the USA.

This paper takes a multi-country approach to examining the impact of board structure on firm value.

The purpose of the study is to explore the board of directors in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) as a distinct source of value creation and to conceptually investigate the going‐private transaction via LBO as a response to deficient governance structures as well as the post‐buyout board restructuring.

The paper provides a review of the literature on LBOs boards, and relies on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop testable propositions. The work suggests that the board as a particular source of efficiency gains in LBOs warrants further empirical research.

The paper gives strong credence to the argument that boards represent a unique source of value creation in LBOs. Previous agency‐theoretic work is complemented by focusing on the monitoring function of the board, but resource dependence theory introduced to suggest the importance of a strategic service and support function. The work is conceptual in nature and thus requires subsequent empirical testing to verify assertions set forth in this study.

The paper shows that incentives of managerial equity participation and the discipline of debt are gradually losing their distinctiveness in today's buyout industry. To compete in an increasingly crowded environment, LBO specialists need to identify new sources of value to generate attractive returns for their investors.

The paper extends the existing LBO literature by introducing resource dependent as a complementary framework. Given that the traditional LBO literature examines the discipline of debt and managerial ownership that explain their efficiencies, the role of LBO boards as a distinct value creation mechanism in buyouts is introduced.

While the literature on multitier supply chain management traditionally assumes that first-tier suppliers belong to the visible proportion of the supply base, intermediaries might limit focal firms' visible horizon already at this stage. High power asymmetries promoting centrality and complexity in the supply network are seen as a particular root cause that limits the impact of governance mechanisms for sustainability. To map the space for governance mechanisms in a network-sensitive context more comprehensively, the study analyzes supply network characteristics from a power perspective.

This research is conceptual. To better understand power imbalances and mutual dependencies from network centrality and complexity, network configurations were constructed drawing on resource dependence theory. These configurations allow deducing the impact of (non-)mediated governance mechanisms for a sustainable development in the supply network. An agenda to stimulate future empirical and model-based research is accordingly presented.

The research shows that those networks with densely interconnected first-tier suppliers promote network centrality and complexity, leading to an inverted U-shape relationship between the focal firm's exertion of coercive power and the sustainability performance in the supply network. The findings allow a more comprehensive theoretical grounding for mapping governance approaches in a network-sensitive context and provide insights on how to avoid negative effects from power asymmetries.

The findings suggest the need for accompanying, indirect governance mechanisms already at the stage of first-tier suppliers based on non-mediated forms of power, such as referent power, also promoting disintermediation. Purchasing companies may also consider using digital platform technologies that foster disintermediation, such as blockchain technology.

By studying intermediaries from a power and network perspective, the conceptualization adds to the discussion on governance in multitier sustainable supply chain networks in various industries. Furthermore, it contributes to the increasing efforts of middle-range theorizing in logistics and supply chain management. The results partially challenge previous assumptions on the moderating role of specific network characteristics.

This study aims to examine the governance structure of the firm undergoing a complete buyout cycle (reverse leveraged buyout). Its purpose is to empirically explore the evolution of corporate board structures as a unique source of value creation, in addition to the agency mechanisms of the discipline of debt and incentives of equity participation.

The authors rely on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop sets of hypotheses that examine changes in the board composition of 65 R‐LBOs and 65 matched continuing firms spanning a 25‐year period (1979‐2004).

The empirical results reveal numerous insights about why R‐LBOs go private, to what extent boards restructure during the buyout phase, and how those changes relate to firm performance. Taken together, the findings give strong credence to the argument that boards represent a supplemental source of value creation in the buyout process.

For scholars, the study presents a platform for further inquiry into the role of boards of directors in R‐LBOs as well as the inclusion of resource dependence theory to inform on the phenomenon.

The study helps to address this new source of value creation for practical interest. It offers a benchmark for buyout firms to compare their board characteristics by establishing linkages between pre‐buyout deficiencies, post‐buyout modifications, and post‐SIPO performance.

The results shift scholarly attention away from the structural governance tools to the group dynamics of the board. The findings call into question the restricted attention given by buyout researchers to leverage and ownership as value drivers by prompting a closer evaluation of the relationship between buyout board structures and related structuring of debt and managerial equity participation. Furthermore, the inclusion of the resource‐dependency perspective alongside agency theory as an explanatory theory allows for a richer account of the LBO phenomenon and its sources of value creation.

This study aims to compare the impact of board characteristics on the performance of listed non-financial firms to the impact of board characteristics on the performance of listed financial firms (commercial banks) in Ghana.

The fixed and random effects models with generalized least square specifications are used in estimating regressions to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Additionally, this study uses lagged models of the board variables to address the possibility of the presence of endogeneity and to generate robust estimates.

The empirical results show some similarities and differences on the impact of board characteristics on the performance of listed non-financial firms and banks. On similarities, for both non-financial firms and banks, board size is seen to have a significant non-linear impact on Tobin’s q. Also, the proportion of foreign board members shows a positively significant relationship with firm performance for both listed non-financial firms and banks. The effect of the proportion of board members with higher educational qualifications on firm performance appears to be negative and statistically significant for both sample of firms. On the other hand, the impact of board composition and board gender diversity on firm performance differs from listed banks and non-financial firms.

The panel regressions for the listed banks were run on 63 observations because of the small sample size for the listed banks. Though enough for estimation purposes, inferences from results should be made with caution.

This paper, unlike most corporate governance – firm performance studies, focuses not only on listed non-financial firms but also on listed banks. From a multi-theoretical perspective, this paper provides a comparative analysis on the impact of board characteristics on financial performance of listed non-financial firms and banks.

This study aims to examine the significance of the non-linear relationship of board size and board independence on the financial performance of listed non-financial firms in India.

The study draws the sample of the listed non-financial firm in the Indian market from the year 2011–2018 and applied panel least squares regression with and without industry fixed effects on the model with quadratic equation. Quantile regression is also used to test the robustness of the results. The financial performance is measured through one accounting measure (i.e. return on assets [ROA]) and one market-based measure (i.e. Tobin’s Q). The empirical model also controls firm-specific variables which are expected to have an impact on financial performance.

The study found that the relationship of board size and board independence with the financial performance of a firm is in a non-linear inverted U-shape. The results are qualitatively similar for both ROA and Tobin’s Q after controlling industry fixed effects.

This is the first study in India which tests the non-linear relationship of board size and board independence with the financial performance of the firm. The study contributes to the limited literature on the implications of board characteristics on the performance of the firms in India.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the revised Code of Corporate Governance 2017 (CCG-2017) clauses pertaining to board independence, mandatory inclusion of female directors, audit committee (AC) chair independence and directors’ expertise on earnings manipulation.

Using an unbalanced panel of 323 listed companies from 2015 to 2019, this study uses panel data regression models with a robust methodology called difference-in-differences to tackle the potential endogeneity.

This study’s findings show that, as compared to the pre-CCG-2017 period, board- and AC-related variables increased significantly in the post-CCG-2017 period. Furthermore, financial experts on the board and board independence have a negative effect on discretionary accruals (DAs), whereas female directors and DAs are positively related, as is real activity manipulation. The AC-related variables, such as AC independence, expertise in AC, and AC chair independence, are significantly different from the preperiod to the postperiod, whereas their relationship is not according to the hypotheses of the study. Moreover, these results are robust to additional analysis of the alternative proxies for female directorship and the endogeneity problem.

The findings of this study have implications for regulators and practitioners who are concerned with the functions of the board of directors (BOD). The findings of this research study show that earnings management (EM) may be reduced by independent and expert directors. However, board gender diversity is not reducing the EM. Therefore, the decision to appoint female directors to the board should be based on their business and professional attributes rather than simply filling quotas or blindly adhering to regulations. Moreover, the findings of this research may assist the regulator in encouraging listed firms to enhance board governance via independence, diversity and competency, which are useful for effective monitoring.

This study fills a gap in the literature by providing the first evidence of country-specific regulation (CCG-2017), concerning the BOD and AC-related clauses on EM in Pakistan, which is missing in the relevant literature general and in Pakistan in particular.

How do business groups manage their internal processes? The purpose of this paper is to explore how board interlocks between members serve as control and coordination mechanisms within business groups. The authors propose that centrality of groups’ affiliates in the group network of interlocking directorates is shaped by agency and resource dependence forces. In particular, the authors examine the role of international board ties as a resource and information conduit.

This study leverages proprietary information on firm-to-firm transaction ties among all 155 affiliates belonging to a large Italian business group. The authors use network analysis to develop multiple measures of the centrality of each group member, and link these to resource transactions, ownership patterns and geographic distributions. The authors test the hypotheses in a structural equation model using LISREL.

The results demonstrate that both resource exchanges and the presence of cross-national relations increase an affiliate’s central position in the group’s network of board ties. In contrast, ownership ties between members were unrelated to affiliate centrality.

Internal governance mechanisms of business groups are rarely studied. While groups are often portrayed as inefficient or value-destroying, the analysis of proprietary firm data suggests a very different scenario: inter-unit ties are much more supportive of a model of business groups as strategic portfolios, using internal ties to share information and resources.