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1 – 6 of 6Kazumichi Iwasa, Raymond Riezman and Koji Shimomura
Purpose – We ask how far the Kemp–Wan Pareto-improving result can hold without inter-country transfers.Methodology/approach – Assuming that the standard revenue and expenditure…
Abstract
Purpose – We ask how far the Kemp–Wan Pareto-improving result can hold without inter-country transfers.
Methodology/approach – Assuming that the standard revenue and expenditure functions exist, we consider tariff adjustments for some group of countries such that they makes member countries better off without affecting non-member countries (a la Kemp–Wan).
Findings – Any group of countries can engage in a Pareto-improving non-discriminatory tariff reform without income transfers, if (i) there are more than two tradable goods and (ii) the initial tariff vectors of the member countries satisfy the non-proportionality condition. We then show that if these two conditions hold then countries can form a Pareto-optimal customs union. Depending on initial conditions, transfers may be necessary for the customs union to be Pareto-improving.
Originality/value of paper – The Pareto-improving result of this chapter is based on tariff reform only.
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Didier Laussel and Raymond Riezman
We develop a simple two-country model of international trade that assumes that there is a fixed cost of doing international trade. We show that this leads to multiple equilibria…
Abstract
We develop a simple two-country model of international trade that assumes that there is a fixed cost of doing international trade. We show that this leads to multiple equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked. We examine the stability properties of these equilibria.
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Purpose − Instances of refusal to trade stand in contrast to the theorems on the gains from trade. Two paradigms, second-best and political economy, have been used to explain…
Abstract
Purpose − Instances of refusal to trade stand in contrast to the theorems on the gains from trade. Two paradigms, second-best and political economy, have been used to explain refusal to trade. Murray Kemp (1962) provided a foundation for the political economy paradigm when he noted that, in the absence of lump-sum redistribution, the theorems on the gains from trade are “true but irrelevant”. This chapter takes Murray Kemp's observation as a point of departure for a consideration of the relation between individual and group gains from trade. Paradigms in explaining refusal to trade are distinguished.
Methodology/Approach − This chapter examines ideas underlying explanations for refusal to participate in international trade.
Findings − Two different approaches are identified in modeling and explaining why the gains from trade are compromised by refusal of governments to allow free trade. The second-best approach suggests a justification for refusal to trade while the political economy approach with public-choice foundations proposes an explanation.
Practical implications − Ideology expressed in how governments are viewed can influence economic analysis.
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This chapter provides a formal analysis of the economic welfare effects for large and small partners to free trade agreements. Michaely (1998) has demonstrated that large country…
Abstract
This chapter provides a formal analysis of the economic welfare effects for large and small partners to free trade agreements. Michaely (1998) has demonstrated that large country welfare is U-shaped in the small country's size. I derive the welfare for the large country for all possible small country sizes, and show that the maximum possible loss for the large country is twice its tariff revenue. I identify the data necessary to estimate the welfare effects and consider how initial trade volumes, tariffs, and international price differences affect the large country's welfare.
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