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This chapter focuses on policy intervention that has grown in popularity in the UK since the financial crisis of 2008. The focus is on inclusive growth and more specifically, community wealth building. The concept has been picked up by institutions and think tanks at multiple scales from the OECD to local government. We aim to address the tensions in community wealth building and in particular how local authorities in the UK are adjusting their procurements strategies to increase the tendering capabilities of SMEs in their political geography.

We introduce a UK-based study utilising an ESRC-funded case study, desktop research and semi-structured interviews to investigate how well the region of Greater Manchester (GM) ecosystem was equipped to prepare small firms to learn how to compete for public contracts with evidence applicable to other large-scale tenders.

Overall, at the time of writing business support across GM does not create the value proposition of enabling small firms to be capable at tendering and thus undermines community wealth building (CWB) efforts. The advice on offer is sparse; it offers partial or no advice about different capabilities and is often limited to simple guidance stating procurement rules and compliance demands. Information is often abstract and technical support is also fragmented, making it unlikely that small firms will find resources. Advice fails to engage with evidence on how small firms learn and to provide a learning process. In particular, support to raise absorptive capacity and strategic commitment to tendering, build basic tender readiness and develop and refresh tendering capability is not evident. Training, coaching and peer learning are largely absent.

UK appears to be an experimental ground for CWB with dedicated think tanks and several examples such as the ‘Preston Model’. GM is a suitably sized and comparable region to offer transferable knowledge and indicators to support regions to innovate. We offer a ‘Dashboard of Priorities’ to enhance business support to SMEs so they can win at tendering, thus strengthening CWB policy and impact. Furthermore, we are adding clarity to a fuzzy definition of CWB and define inclusive procurement. We assist global policymakers to answer the fundamental question; are we doing all that we can with these significant resources to create an economy which truly benefits the people? By examining the ideas of community wealth building and inclusive procurement from a local authority and SME perspective, we can extrapolate finings for international comparison and offer an in-depth look at how the execution of this policy can be strengthened to deliver maximum benefit to their communities. The implication is to focus attention on how institutions (public or private), by way of better execution, can enhance the economic resilience of their own local ecosystems/places.

In this chapter, the nature and extent of corruption in the construction industry is considered from a worldwide perspective, but particularly in the context of research conducted in South Africa. The definition of corruption is expanded to include conflict of interest and unethical conduct. Corruption in the construction industry is found to be universal and pervasive, occurring in all areas, at all stages, at all levels, and in all forms. A simple triangular model of corruption is replaced by a more complex four-dimensional risk-based model. The challenge for the construction industry, in combating corruption, will essentially require multilateral action in all four dimensions of the enhanced model: eliminating and reducing opportunities where possible; relieving the pressures to commit corrupt acts; rebutting the rationales and arguments used to excuse corruption; and substantially improving and innovating more forensic methods of detection. While the decision to engage in corruption is risk-based, particularly in terms of the capacity to evade detection; in essence corruption is a cultural and moral issue for society.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the developing and emerging economies as a multifaceted challenge from viewpoint of the 10 keys ‘for’ and ‘against’ PPPs: feasibility; planning; optimization; modernization and development; financing; project delivery; project operation; supervision; user satisfaction and accounting issues. The conceptual model and the reasons were formulated by the authors some 10 years ago, based on the literature and case-study reviews. Relevance of those reasons was verified in practice. The knowledge and critical perspective on the above-stated reasons are relevant for the implementation of PPP projects in any national economy – developed, emerging or developing, but it is quintessential for the implementation of PPPs in the economies that are at the early stage of implementation of PPPs. Although for the identification of the above-stated reasons, wide comparative literature and case-studies review was conducted, the reasons were verified in practice in Slovenia only. Slovenia is considered as one of the most advanced transition countries of Central Europe and a developed economy. This chapter can improve public policy, teaching, learning and practice of PPP implementation in developing and emerging economies. The value of this chapter is in the approach which goes beyond the usual defending or renouncing of PPPs. This chapter also clearly identifies the importance of a sincere motive for the implementation of PPPs by the government as a prerequisite for the successful implementation of PPPs.

The paper examines the overall results achieved in the area of privatization in Serbia, as the largest part of the Serbian-Montenegrin economy. The privatization process in Serbia during the 1990s is described in some detail, including the various pieces of privatization legislation (adopted in 1989–1990, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997), and the overall results achieved, which have been extremely poor: by late 2000, less than 40% of the country’s Gross Material Product was produced by the private sector. The main problems of corporate governance are also discussed in some detail, having in mind the specific situation in Serbia characterized by the maintenance of the ambiguous system of “social property.” The most recent privatization phase started after the political changes in late 2000, and marked a fundamental change in the approach, away from sales at privileged terms to insiders implemented throughout the 1990s, towards commercial sales to strategic owners, at tenders and auctions. The main achievements and shortcomings of the new strategy are discussed.

This chapter is a case study on Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Colombia. The choice is justified by the significant progress of the country in this field and its ambitious plans to provide infrastructure and services through PPPs in the coming years. The infrastructure deficit and the evolution and current status of PPPs in Latin America frame the theme of the chapter. The case study itself explains the adoption of the PPP model in Colombia, describes the new legal and institutional framework and presents the most relevant PPP programmes and projects. The review carried out allows us to conclude that, despite the developments in recent years, PPP schemes continue to be very concentrated in the transport sector. For the effective development of the PPP model in the country, Colombia should extend such schemes to other fields, including the provision of social infrastructure and services. It should also improve some institutional aspects and project attractiveness to investors in order to increase the private capital required to finance PPP projects that currently are in the government portfolio. This chapter offers a general perspective on Colombian PPP, gathering and analyzing information for a better understanding of the current situation and the prospects for the future.

Nowadays, social and environmental reporting is approached in different ways, paths and fields by either large-, small-, or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, as demonstrated by previous scholars, SMEs have been critically discussed because they provide lack of proper sustainability disclosure. The fact that the predominant approach of SMEs toward social responsibility is often “sunken” and not “explicit” can drive the lack of disclosure. Furthermore, unstructured communication practices create difficulties in measuring and reporting the sustainability reporting phenomenon in SMEs. The aim of our study is to shed light on the activity of SMEs’ sustainability reporting and disclosure, specifically, by addressing the variables that influence the choice of the guidelines used to prepare sustainability reports.

The research has been carried out by using qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The empirical evidence is based on all the Italian companies, mostly SMEs, that were certified in 2011 as having adopted both environmental (i.e., ISO14001 or EMAS) and social (i.e., SA8000) management systems. A multivariate linear regression model has been developed to address the influence of several variables (i.e., financial performance, size, time after achievement of the certifications, group/conglomerate control, etc.) on the guidelines’ choice for preparing sustainability reports.

Our findings demonstrate that SMEs prefer to use simple guidelines such as those guidelines that are mandatory under management system certifications. However, the sustainability disclosure driven by the adoption of international guidelines may be more complex if the SME is controlled within a group of companies or if a significant amount of time has passed since the certification date. As such, we developed a taxonomy of their different behavioral drivers according to a legitimacy theory approach.

At this stage, our study didn’t focus on the contents’ quality of the disclosure and reporting practices adopted by SMEs, which is obviously a worthwhile and important area for further research. Furthermore, the analysis took into account the impact of a number of easily accessible variables; therefore, it can be extended to investigate the effect on disclosure of other relevant variables (i.e., nature of the board of directors, age, and industrial sector in which the company operates) as well as contexts prevailing in other countries.

The study represents an important contribution for understanding how and why managers might use externally focused disclosure on social and environmental issues to benefit the company’s legitimacy.

Our study provides interesting insights for policy makers who require social or environmental certification when calling for tenders or specific EU contracts, in order to put aside the “brand” or “symbol” and really focus on the disclosed practices.

Previous studies have provided only a few evidence about reporting practices and related influencing features of SMEs’ sustainability actions. As such, the study wishes to make a significant contribution to the existing literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) by providing relevant insights about the factors which influence the guidelines used by SMEs in preparing their sustainability reports.

This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0%:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels. Cartel overcharges are positively skewed, pushing the mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 43.4%. Convicted cartels are on average as equally effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels, but bid-rigging conduct does display somewhat lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels. These findings suggest that optimal deterrence requires that monetary penalties ought to be increased.