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The purpose of this paper is to conduct a literature review on framework agreements, an instrument for demand aggregation adopted in the UK, to recommend improvements to the price registration system (SRP), a mechanism often used with reverse online auctions in Brazil envisaged to promote more flexibility in centralized tenders, allowing public bodies to establish contracts when the need arises, based on registered prices.

A literature review was undertaken to analyze the UK framework agreement approach and the Brazilian SRP. In addition, in-depth interviews with civil servants from the Brazilian Ministry of Economy were conducted to examine the SRP.

The experience with framework agreements in the UK reveals at least four ways to improve the Brazilian SRP: i) extending the legal maximum duration of a price registration minute (ARP) ; ii) allowing the registration of additional suppliers in the ARP, instead of only the first lowest bidder; iii) conducting mini-competitions when a contracting authority decides to use the ARP to enter into a contract; and iv) including additional criteria for awarding suppliers, in line with the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) approach.

The flow of government financial resources into procurement accounted for approximately 16.5% of gross domestic product in Brazil and for an average of 12% in OECD countries in 2017 (OECD, 2019: 135). Public procurement is a strategic function for enabling an efficient public services delivery and infrastructure deployment. It is, therefore, relevant to examine instruments of demand aggregation to improve the outcomes of public procurement.

Framework agreements are currently not used in Brazil. This paper examines the UK experience with framework agreements to propose potential improvements to the Brazilian SRP, a procurement instrument vastly used in the country.

The goal of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of an loyalty program (LP) introduction and termination, accounting for simultaneous effects of LP designs, cross-customer effects and competition effects. Despite firms across the globe spend billions of dollars on LPs, it is not clear: whether these programs enhance customer loyalty, what happens if a program is terminated and which LP design elements enhance effectiveness of LPs.

The authors empirically investigate to what extent the effects of introducing and terminating a LP depend on: its monetary and non-monetary design elements, customer characteristics and competition. The empirical evidence is based on a bivariate hierarchical linear model, using a large-scale dataset involving 9,783 consumers rating 24 different LPs across eight industries.

While the characteristics of LP are more important in influencing customer behavior when they join the LP, the competitive environment and the duration of membership in an LP are the primary drivers of customer reactions to LP termination. Non-monetary discrimination between members and non-members is a more powerful tool in creating customer loyalty than offering higher discounts or saving points. The effect of discrimination on loyalty sustains when an LP is terminated.

This is the first research to empirically investigate the effect of an LP termination, accounting for simultaneous effects of LP designs and competition effects. The authors measured behavioral intentions in a hypothetical case of LP termination. Future research could assess the effects of LP termination and the moderating role of both monetary and non-monetary design elements on other behavioral loyalty variables based on, e.g. household panel data, when such data on LP terminations across industries becomes available.

When a firm considers the introduction of an LP or changing an existing one, non-monetary discrimination between members and non-members seems to be the most effective tool in building sustainable customer loyalty. Further, offering a relatively low saving rate is a viable way to keep costs down because the savings percentage does not significantly affect loyalty. For the same reason, firms can also consider reducing or eliminating LP-based discounts. The competitive environment and the duration of membership in an LP are the primary drivers of customer reactions to LP termination.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, the potential effects of LP termination have not been addressed in the current literature. The authors empirically assess the effects of LP termination and effects of those programs at the introduction. Understanding the factors that moderate the potential negative impact of terminating an LP is of crucial importance to managers and researchers alike. The paper is of great value for firms that consider introducing, modifying or terminating an LP.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

There is a long-standing debate about the relationship between land title registration and tenure security. Studies in the developing world point to a tenuous link between land registration and stable land tenure. The reason why people continue to register therefore becomes a mystery if tenure security is not entirely assured. This article focuses on the increase in property value as one such factor that induces title registration. Previous studies have quantified the economic impact of title registration on property values. However, the impact varies from city or country to another. The authors seek to investigate the extent of property value increment in Accra attributable to land title registration.

The authors statistically analyzed a data set from two institutions (First National Bank and the Lands Commission) in Ghana using a quantitative technique.

The authors discovered that, holding all other factors constant, the value of the land in Accra increases by 22.6% due to land title registration. This shows that lessees must register to enhance property values, even though the essential due diligence must be done to make sure the acquisition is free from liens and legal disputes.

This article highlights the implication of the findings for land administration as well as the practice of property valuation, development and brokerage in Ghana and Global South more broadly.

This is one of the first studies in Ghana to investigate the specific premium that housing markets put on land title registration.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

This paper aims to study the pricing problems on the two-sided market for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition, specifically investigating the impact of platform service quality on the market. Theoretical analysis and computational studies are conducted to investigate the impact of different parameters on the system outcomes.

Mathematical formulations are proposed for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition. For monopolistic market, the optimal pricing and service quality strategies are obtained using mathematical programming method. For duopolistic market, the equilibrium outcomes are derived by game theory. Sensitivity analysis and numerical studies are also adopted to investigate the impact of different parameters.

For monopolistic market, the platform will provide a low service quality when the service cost parameter is large. However, when the cost parameter is small, the platform provides a higher service quality and higher registration prices. Furthermore, the sum of the optimal prices is proportional to the service quality and inversely proportional to the user price sensitivity. For duopolistic market, the competitive equilibrium prices exist under a certain condition. The determinants of equilibrium prices are the gap between the service qualities of two platforms and the cross-group externalities.

For monopolistic market, this paper specifies the role of platform service quality in determining the platform’s pricing strategy. For duopolistic market, this paper presents a market sharing mechanism between two platforms and explores the equilibrium pricing strategies for platforms with different service quality level.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐17; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐17; Property Management Volumes 8‐17; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐17.