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This chapter puts practices of everyday violence at the center of its analysis of colonial order. It examines the micro-mechanisms and manifold forms of threatening and hurting people. While a quotidian part of colonial life, such practices – accepted and normal within the colonial moral economy – are not normally seen as state actions. However, they reveal the workings of a powerful state: one that was built in an improvised fashion by low-level state representatives.

Based on an analysis of everyday police work in German Southwest Africa, this chapter offers a theoretical reframing of the colonial state that aims to provincialize the modern European state. It shifts the perspective away from the legal and institutional aspirations and structures of the state, instead turning attention to less rationalized processes: the idiosyncratic, makeshift, affective procedures of low-ranking officials. On this plane, everyday violence played a key role in generating a new social order. Ultimately, it had constructive effects which were a fundamental and inherent part of the colonial state’s power.

Slovenia has joined the club of peacekeepers in 1997. The decision was made under pressure of foreign expectations that a country which strives for NATO membership should prove its willingness to co-operate in common defence efforts. First military units, sent to UN-led peacekeeping operations, comprised volunteers on an ad hoc basis and were very small (platoon level). There were also a few policemen who joined missions abroad, first under WEU leadership in Albania. The governmental need ‘to show the flag’ in many operations increased the number of soldiers needed for peace operations and the number of policemen. Currently, there are around 200 soldiers and 30 policemen in different operations abroad. In the period 1997–2001 all soldiers and policemen entered the missions on a voluntary basis. In 2002, there was the first contingent of Slovenian SFOR soldiers that used its home military structure (infantry motorised company) in a peace mission. It marked the end of ad hoc units, comprised to serve the goals of the mission only, and the start of more organised, and also more ordered co-operation of soldiers in missions. They could still refuse participation in the mission, but that would have led to risks of losing unit cohesion. In the transition from voluntary peacekeepers to peacekeepers on duty, or by order, the Slovenian Army realised the need to understand what helps soldiers to fully accept the terms of operations abroad.

Media coverage of police activities is substantial and makes for “eye‐catching” headlines. Most people in the UK will remember the riots of 1981 and how policemen battled against overwhelming odds. Equally, the story of the young, brave policeman who attempts, and is injured in the process, to arrest treacherous villains, induces waves of sympathy from a probably, very middle‐class public. Best of all, are the stories of corrupted policemen who, detected and apprehended, generate in us all that slight feeling of insecurity which makes for excellent gossip.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent and impact of corruption on public trust and on the stability of the Colombian police. The effectiveness of public controls, civilian oversight, and overseeing bodies is evaluated to determine the degree of impunity and the level of independence from other agencies of control.

The research in this study is based on data analyses of surveys, interviews, and an observational approach. This paper considers four general surveys, namely: Latinobarómetro, Iberobarómetro, Global Corruption Barometer, Corruption Perception Indexes, and World Values Survey. The observation consisted of accompanying Bogotá police department teams for two months during the evenings between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. This study draws upon 20 interviews with police officers of all ranks. Additionally, an informal observation of police activities during the night was carried out to discover the occurrence of corruption, which was impossible to reveal by a more formal observation.

Although corruption in the Colombian police force is presumably a generalized phenomenon, it is still one of the most appreciated agencies among Colombians. However, scandals have been cleverly mitigated by rhetoric and apparent purges and the setting‐up of inoffensive mechanisms of control. Internal inspection and civilian oversight have been weakened – rendered ineffective by an increasingly powerful police leadership.

Since corruption is a concealed phenomenon, its analysis always causes problems. Police officers are reluctant to talk about the problem and there is an organizational denial of the phenomenon.

The paucity of academic research on police forces in Latin America is still apparent and the field of study lacks a real degree of specialization. Similarly, there has been no empirical examination of issues pertaining to the study of the modern Colombian force. This paper thus attempts to compensate for the lack of empirical research on the Colombian police. It contributes to the overall literature on police corruption by explaining the organizational features of bribing and police corruption on the beat.

The number of reported cases for Japanese Penal Code offenses amounted to 2.5 million in 1997 and increased every year, reaching 3.6 million in 2002 and 2003. However, the number decreased from 2004 to 2008 to 2.5 million. Almost throughout the same period, the number of cases and persons cleared remained comparatively steady between 1.3 and 1.5 million and 1 and 1.2 million respectively, but the latter finally fell below one million in 2011. In this chapter I describe such a rise and fall as a “Mt. Fuji-line” that appears as a mountain-shaped curve on a graph.

The Japanese government reacted to the increase of crimes, which was seen as a reflection of a weakened or broken security and safety. The most effective policy, it was thought therefore, was to increase the number of policemen. This policy followed the strategy of New York City, made famous by its then Mayor Giuliani, who declared “A War on Crimes” and increased the number of police officers by ten thousand to revive New York from “A Crime City.” As criminologists have experienced so-called “labeling shocks” and learned from the approach of symbolic interactionism, criminologists can no longer simply accept that statistical data reflect weakened or broken security issues. Agencies of criminal justice, especially police officers, use such data as statistical evidence to show that the crime situation got worse.

I argue that the rise and fall of crimes, especially the increasing and decreasing number of reported cases, reflects changes of crime control policies. I analyze the Mt. Fuji-line from 1998 to 2011. The increase of crimes as well as the weakened or broken security and safety functioned as evidence that justified the reinforcement of police power and a new criminal justice shift for a lay judge system in the rising phase (1998–2003). Since the concept of a bigger justice system needs, however, lots of personnel and material sources, the Japanese government eventually gave up sustaining it. Agencies used their discretion to skip petty crimes and divert suspects because of a reduction of excessive burdens and inappropriate prison population, but they stepped into a new stage to adjust their burdens, keeping their own empowered framework of criminal justice system. These changing policies resulted in the reduction of crime in a falling phase (2004–2011).

These phenomena are explained from the viewpoint of Jürgen Habermas’ crisis theory. I conclude that the framework and capacity of the Japanese criminal justice system grew far bigger and that original functions of crime control through criminal procedure became weaker by being outsourced to other peripheral social systems and agencies. Thus the crime control system has been successful in bringing about a net-widening effect.

Sizing system is a fundamental topic in garment fitting. The purpose of this study was to assess the fit of existing police uniforms (shirt, jacket, overcoat and trousers) and develop a sizing system for upper and lower body uniforms of Amhara policemen in Ethiopia.

In total, 35 body dimensions of 889 policemen were taken through a manual anthropometric survey following the procedures in ISO 8559:1989 after each subject was interviewed on issues related to garment fit. The anthropometric data were pre-processed, key body dimensions were identified by principal components analysis and body types were clustered by the agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm and verified by the XGBoost classifier in a Python programming environment. The developed size charts were validated statistically using aggregate loss and accommodation rate.

About 44% of the subjects encountered fit problems every time they own new readymade uniforms. Lengths and side seams of shirts, and lengths and waist girths of trousers are the most frequently altered garment sites. Analysis of the anthropometric measurements resulted in 13 and 15 sizes for the upper and lower bodies, respectively. Moreover, the comparison of the developed upper garment size chart with the existing size chart for a shirt showed a considerable difference. This indicates that inappropriate size charts create fit problems.

The study considers the analysis of fit problems and sizing system development in a less researched country. Moreover, the proposed data mining procedure and its application for size chart development is unique and workable.

The policeman's lot is not a happy one! Or so the saying goes. However, it is probably more accurate to state that little is known about the policeman's lot in general. Even though the “office of constable” is as old as the monarchy, the modern police officer tends to have missed the academic scrutiny and analysis that people in most other occupations have undergone. It is for this reason that I have written the following text.

The ability of the police to decrease victimization rates, protect human rights and social capital, to generate feelings of safety and to respond to citizens’ calls helps generate positive citizen feelings about the legitimacy of police as a law enforcement institution. Police approaches to reduce crime and violence are based mainly on objective measures, neglecting to assess its performance based on subjective perceptions. The conception that the citizens’ fear of being victims is not always reflective of the actual prevalence of crime highlights the importance of social surveys to assess the public’s perception of police performance. It is also important to assess employee satisfaction, since research indicates that the performance of first-line employees is influenced by their satisfaction. The purpose of this paper is to provide the first comparative study of both citizen and police officer satisfaction and evaluates their relationship.

This paper is based on a dyadic survey that measures citizens’ evaluation of police service quality as well as policemen’s job satisfaction. The data were analysed using the multicriteria methodology of multicriteria satisfaction analysis.

The results showed that policemen seem to be unsatisfied with their jobs, while citizens are quite satisfied with police performance. Specifically, policemen’s ability to be available for patrol is currently hampered by bureaucracy and other typical obligations. The tangibles criterion, which refers to buildings, offices and surveillance equipment, were characterized as inadequate by both policemen and citizens. It was also observed that police officers are not very satisfied with their amount of work may be the reason why citizens report median satisfaction levels in terms of police responsiveness.

This survey adds to management literature on job satisfaction and service quality, providing some additional findings regarding the police population. In addition, it combines related constructs supporting the claim that citizens can be satisfied with police services provided that police officers are satisfied with their jobs.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing the problem of police corruption and to identify the six lessons which other Asian countries can learn from Singapore's experience.

The paper analyzes the causes of police corruption in Singapore during the British colonial period and describes the measures adopted by the People's Action Party government after assuming office in June 1959 to curb police corruption. The effectiveness of these measures is assessed by referring to Singapore's perceived extent of corruption according to three international indicators and the reported cases of police corruption from 1965 to 2011.

The Singapore Police Force has succeeded in minimizing police corruption by improving salaries and working conditions, cooperating with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, enhancing its recruitment and selection procedures, providing training and values education for its members, and adopting administrative measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Other Asian countries afflicted with rampant police corruption can learn six lessons from Singapore's success.

This paper will be of interest to those policy makers, scholars, and anti-corruption practitioners, who are interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in curbing police corruption.

The position of these Irish agitators is illogical and untenable; the remedy they propose is no remedy at all – nevertheless they are talking about the tenure of land and the right to land; and thus a question of worldwide importance is coming to the front.³