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The discussion about public sector performance is still present today, despite the profound research that has already tried to address this subject. Furthermore, theory links negative effects on organizational performance with increased levels of organizational complexity. However, literature thus far did not succeed to put forward a successful theory that explains why and how public organizations became increasingly complex. To answer this question, we argue that increased organizational complexity can be explained by viewing public organizations as the hybrid result of different institutional logics, which are shaped by various management views. However, former research mainly concentrated on the separate study of management views such as traditional public management (TPM), NPM, and post-NPM. Although appealing, research that approaches hybridity from this perspective is fairly limited.

We conducted a literature review in which we studied 80 articles about traditional public management, NPM, and post-NPM.

We found that these management views essentially differ on the base of three fault lines, depending on the level of the organizational culture. These fault lines, according to the management view, together result in nine dimensions. By combing dimensions of the different management views, we argue that a public organization becomes hybrid. Furthermore, in line with findings of contingency theory, we explain the level of hybridity might depend on the level of tight coupling for a given organization. Finally, we developed propositions that explain hybridity as the result of isomorphic forces, organizational change, and organizational resistance to change and that link hybridization with processes of selective coupling.

The value of this chapter lies in its real-life applicability.

Recent corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, and others suggest a failure of corporate governance, that is, of the allocation of power and its lawful use and accountability within the corporation.

This chapter presents a game theoretic model for analyzing the power dynamics among the three groups responsible for oversight in the Anglo-American corporate model – namely the Board of Directors through its audit committee, corporate management, and the external auditors.

The chapter shows, among other findings, that the current governance structure results in an extreme imbalance of power among the three groups that not only permits but even induces management to conceal necessary financial data and often to ignore the long-term interests of the firm.

The chapter also derives changes in principles of governance that can right such imbalances and prevent defalcations from taking place through institutionalizing effective ex-ante checks and balances of power in addition to the ex post measures that come into play only after a wrong has been committed and which are the case with recent exchange rules and Congressional enactments.

None.

No prior analysis along these lines.

This chapter examines corporate governance–related financial reporting issues in the context of globalization. Over the past few decades, the process of globalization has substantially altered the fields of corporate governance and accounting. More specifically, Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting have received increasing momentum in emerging economies, including China. However, a review of relevant studies suggests that there is limited research examining the implementation of Anglo-American concepts in various countries regardless of their growing acceptance. This monograph extends the existing literature by comprehensively investigating the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards in China, the largest transitional economy that has different institutional context from Anglo-American countries. In addition, the review has a number of implications for developing the theoretical framework, and determining the research methodology for the monograph.

Defaults in corporations, financial institutions and semipublic organizations have resulted in (corporate) governance Codes and Law provisions that aim to improve governance, risk management and policy making by executive and non-executive directors of involved boards in The Netherlands and across the globe. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how semipublic organizations deal with public interest and the contribution of multiple stakeholder team production theory (MSTP) to effectively deal with the issue of how to include interests of different stakeholders and the general public interest in the governance of and policy making by boards of semipublic organizations. This includes the identification, raising awareness and analysis of various interests and their implications.

The authors use a literature review and their own experience.

Based on our literature review and experience converging in a case study design, we hold that a semipublic organization’s exposure to public interests and how it deals with that will remain a critical issue.

We develop a research approach for dealing with stakeholders’ and the public interest and conclude that a governance perspective grounded in team production theory allows for a much better focused incorporation of possibly conflicting stakeholder interests, including public stakeholder interests and stakeholder commitment and cooperation than the dominant control perspective that is currently prevailing.

We contribute to the literature by arguing that the combined MSTP approach offers a pre-eminent approach to influence and shape board behaviour, an increased awareness of interests of different stakeholders coalescing in the public interest and an alternative, complementary view on decision-making by boards viewed as a team.

Although researchers and multilateral agencies recognize that no single model of corporate governance exists, this has not stopped the push for a one best corporate governance model. Research recognized institutional factors, including culture, affects the nature of corporate ownership structure and consequently on disclosure, transparency and enforcement practices. Drawing on East Asian examples, the chapter argues that a focus on ‘market’ principles alone fails to account for the contextual effects of Asian political, historical and institutional forms which moderate corporate governance systems and practices. This chapter suggests that there is the need to consider the extant effects of ‘culture’ on corporate governance.

The literature of ethnic ownership economies descends from middleman minority theory, a subject it continues to include. However, ethnic economy literature now more broadly addresses the economic independence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in general, not just of middleman minorities (Light & Bonacich, 1991, pp. xii–xiii).¹ This expansion releases the subject from narrow concentration upon historical trading minorities, and opens discussion of the entire range of immigrant and ethnic minority strategies for economic self-help and self-defense. Partial or full economic independence represents a ubiquitous self-defense of immigrants and ethnic minorities who confront exclusion or disadvantage in labor markets. Ethnic economies permit immigrants and ethnic minorities to reduce disadvantage and exclusion, negotiating the terms of their participation in the general labor market from a position of greater strength. Unable to find work in the general labor market, or unwilling to accept the work that the general labor market offers, or just reluctant to mix with foreigners, immigrants and ethnic minorities have the option of employment or self-employment in the ethnic economy of their group. Although ethnic and immigrant groups differ in how well and how much they avail themselves of this defense (Collins, 2003; Light & Gold, 2000, p. 34; Logan & Alba, 1999, p. 179), none lacks an ethnic economy.²

One of my major research thrusts over the past 40 years – and particularly since the mid-1970s – has been to construct, and regularly update and refine, an eclectic paradigm (EP) which seeks to identify and evaluate the determinants of international business (IB) activity. Within this activity, a range of operationally testable and specific economic and business theories might be accommodated.