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Intellectual humility and religious conviction are often posed as antagonistic binaries; the former associated with science, reason, inclusive universality, and liberal secularism, the latter with superstition, dogma, exclusive particularity, and rigid traditionalism. Despite popular images of white American evangelicals as the embodied antithesis of intellectual humility, responsiveness to facts, and openness to the other, this article demonstrates how evangelicals can and do practice intellectual humility in public life while simultaneously holding fast to particularistic religious convictions. Drawing on textual analysis and multi-site ethnographic data, it demonstrates how observed evangelical practices of transposable and segmented reflexivity map onto pluralist, domain-specific conceptualizations of intellectual humility in the philosophical and psychological literature. It further argues that the effective practice of intellectual humility in the interests of ethical democracy does not require religious actors to abandon particularistic religious reasons for universal secular ones. Rather, particularistic religious convictions can motivate effective practices of intellectual humility and thereby support democratic pluralism, inclusivity, and solidarity across difference. More broadly, it aims to challenge, or at least complicate, the widespread notion that increasing strength of religious conviction always moves in lockstep with increasing dogmatism, tribalism, and intellectual unreasonableness.

With the rise of alternate discovery services, such as Google Scholar, in conjunction with the increase in open access content, researchers have the option to bypass academic libraries when they search for and retrieve scholarly information. This state of affairs implies that academic libraries exist in competition with these alternate services and with the patrons who use them, and as a result, may be disintermediated from the scholarly information seeking and retrieval process. Drawing from decision and game theory, bounded rationality, information seeking theory, citation theory, and social computing theory, this study investigates how academic librarians are responding as competitors to changing scholarly information seeking and collecting practices. Bibliographic data was collected in 2010 from a systematic random sample of references on CiteULike.org and analyzed with three years of bibliometric data collected from Google Scholar. Findings suggest that although scholars may choose to bypass libraries when they seek scholarly information, academic libraries continue to provide a majority of scholarly documentation needs through open access and institutional repositories. Overall, the results indicate that academic librarians are playing the scholarly communication game competitively.

Throughout their histories the Evangelical and Catholic communities have been traditional opponents. Seldom have they agreed, and never have they joined to work as one within the US society and polity. However, beginning in the early 1990s some small, self‐identifying élites from each religious community sought out in the other visible persons of similar ideological and moral commitment. Advances the context of that dialogue between these micro‐élites, proposes the application of classical élite theory to explain the dialogue better. Generates a seven‐postulate hypothesis to answer the question posed by the context and the application of élite theory: can self‐selected micro‐élites maintain their alliance and accommodation for a significant period of time? Given that these are integrative and pattern maintenance élites (not the more usual ruling and adaptive ones) the application of élite theory offers an unconventional understanding of alliance building, as well as an uncommon insight into religious co‐operation and political accommodation by micro‐élites in contemporary US politics.

David Buckingham (1998, 2000) has recently argued against rigid dichotomies in the contemporary study of commercial artefacts and childhood culture. On the one hand, children are seen as easy victims of commercial exploitation from big companies, and on the other, they are seen as highly competent agents, immune to any outside influence. Both views feature different types of romanticism. The view of children as victims is partly created around Victorian ideas of childhood innocence, whereas the romantic view of the active child sees children as open, creative, and competent learners, who effortlessly acquire new literacies, including media literacies. Such a view is partly implicitly inscribed into the Swedish School Curriculum (1998) (Läroplan för det obligatoriska skolväsendet, förskoleklassen och fritidshemmet. Lpo 94. [Curriculum for the compulsory school, the pre-school class and the after-school centre. Lpo 94]). In his criticism of the passive-active dichotomy, Buckingham argues in favour of studies of actual practices, that is, what young people actually do with artefacts and media, instead of empty speculations, far away from children’s play arenas. Buckingham’s own studies are mainly based on group interviews with children in the U.K., where he has analysed what was said on a micro level. A fundamental principle in his research is that children’s agency can be seen in their language use. Also, he advocates that we contextualize children’s activities by analysing the social processes of which they form a part. One way of doing this is to relate a study of children’s everyday interactions to media debates and to changes in our views of children as social agents (Buckingham, 1994).

This chapter examines the University of Connecticut (UConn) Neag School of Education's efforts to improve the recruitment of students of colour through an Early College Experience (ECE) Programme. During the pandemic, the School of Education and the ECE Programme collaborated to train and certify high school teachers to instruct the UConn's lower level undergraduate courses. The programme exposed many students of colour to teaching as a career.

The purpose of this paper is to present a perspective on need that derives from a personalism which is grounded in Catholic social thought and runs counter to the individualism of mainstream economics, focusing on need in the context of three economic activities: consumption, work, and leisure.

Three strands of Christian personalism emerged in twentieth‐century Europe: in Paris, Munich, and Lublin. The author's comments derive from the Lublin strand.

Mainstream economics regards consumption as satisfying human material wants. Need is disregarded except when poverty is addressed. Personalist economics insists that there are needs of the human spirit which are addressed through consumption. Personalist economics views work as having two effects. First, by producing goods and services it provides income to purchase those goods and services. Second, it provides opportunities to associate with others in the workplace, and to apply creative talents and energies. Mainstream economics regards the first but not the second as within the domain of the discipline. Mainstream economics defines leisure negatively as time spent not working. Personalist economics sees it positively as an activity crucial to personal development.

The reader is asked to consider two questions. Will economic theory continue to be constructed on an economic agent who is represented by the passive and predictable homo economicus of mainstream economics that is based on the individualism of the seventeenth‐to‐eighteenth century enlightenment? Or, will it turn to the active and unpredictable acting person of personalist economics based on a personalism that emerged in the twentieth century?

Debates in US politics over abortion, homosexuality and other socio‐moral issues are increasingly explained by sociologists, politicians, policy advocates and the media as the result of a “culture war” in American society. Contained in this explanation is a theory that explains the moral value attitudes driving these debates as the product of conflicting worldviews. Since the worldviews that ultimately drive these debates cannot be compromised, the debates are said to be insoluble using normal democratic processes. The widespread dissemination of the hopeless aspect of this theory generates concern of self‐fulfilling prophesies. In this paper I outline the “culture war” and traditional “status group” theories and offer a critique. I conclude with an explanation of how the traditional “status group” explanations of these conflicts offers a more accurate — and more hopeful — vision of US society that avoids potentially self‐fulfilling prophesies of war.