Search results

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how executive stock options help in reducing agency costs in the firm and to address problems experienced by the firm when stock options are used as incentives.

The paper initially discusses types of agency problems caused by company managers and then explains why stock options can reduce the problem of excessive risk aversion displayed by some managers. It then addresses the problems that may occur with the introduction of executive stock options by the firm and finally offers methods to reduce these problems.

The paper explains the methods available to reduce the problems caused by executive stock options such as indexing the stock options to the S&P 500 index and structuring the Board of Directors in a manner that helps ensure the stock options are used appropriately.

This paper is valuable to firms using executive stock options as incentives to managers. It outlines the problems stock options can help solve and the problems which may occur by their use. In addition, the ways to reduce the problems produced by executive stock options in the firm are discussed.

The interpretation and valuation of real options by means of options pricing theory can be regarded as a relatively new paradigm of investment theory. Option pricing theory based investment valuation represents a sound theoretical basis and offers principally a simple decision base. The approach recognises entrepreneurial flexibility and risk explicitly. It implies a positive correlation between flexibility respectively uncertainty and the value of options. Traditional deterministic‐dynamic standard methods of valuation are not able to value flexibility or risk effectively so that option values are adequately reflected. As property investors gradually embrace modern financial concepts it is clear that real estate valuation theory will have to change. One of the most promising areas that could have an important implication on the further development of valuation is the application of the real options paradigm. The author investigates the transfer of general real options theory through an examination of academic results in the field of real estate development. He comes to the conclusion that current research generates highly academic‐abstract results with limited practical value. So far a limited number of quantitative studies regarding the valuation real estate projects with the real options method have been conducted. Practical valuations have yet to be comprehensively carried out. For doing so, further research concerning the basic prerequisites of real options theory has to be undertaken.

Stock options, once exclusive to executives, are now becoming more broad based to include middle management and non‐management employees. In 2000 an estimated 10 million workers’ compensation packages contained stock options. In today’s competitive environment, firms are looking for ways to attract and retain workers, reward outstanding performance, and return value to shareholders while minimising costs. Stock options provide such a vehicle. The paradox is that while stock options are intended to tie pay to performance, many employees lack the knowledge of how the options actually work. Employees need to be educated as to the different types of plans and how it affects their total compensation. A contentious debate exists over whether firms actually benefit from stock options plans and the reasons why some prosper while others fail. Researchers and experts agree that the success of a stock option plan lies largely in how effective firms are at managing the plan and communicating it to its employees.

The purpose of this paper is to test for and model non‐linearities in option price deviations from the Black Scholes (BS) model in FTSE 100 index options over the time period 1997‐2006.

The economic specification and estimation methodology is outlined, the data are discussed, and the empirical results are analysed.

The tests reject the linearity hypothesis and the paper shows that the exponential smooth transition autoregressive model is capable of capturing the non‐linear behaviour of option price misalignments. The paper finds that even though FTSE 100 index options are heavily traded, transaction costs prevent rapid adjustments of option prices from their “optimal” value.

The paper presents new empirical evidence, which explicitly allows for the possibility that option price misalignments from the BS price can be characterised by a non‐linear mean reverting process.

The concepts of real options analysis, which transfer options analysis for financial investments to those involving real properties, such as land and plant facilities, have already existed for 30 years. However, the actual application of real options analysis to technology portfolio planning has not been as widespread as expected. Among others, a major barrier to such applications appears to be a lack of appreciation and acceptance of real options by technology executives. This case study aims to present a successful application experience of real options analysis to technology portfolio planning and highlights the lessons learned in overcoming such lack of acceptance and other barriers.

The paper uses a case study approach. The methodology focuses on describing the key issues and solutions for applying real options analysis in the technology portfolio‐planning process of a company.

The findings in this paper showed that considerable barriers exist in the acceptance of real options analysis for technology portfolio planning. However, the experience in the case study provides successful approaches for overcoming these barriers.

The paper shows that few studies are available on the difficulties of introducing real options analysis in practical applications. This paper provides a valuable case study for such applications.

This study examines whether the volatility risk premium is reflected on the prices of the KOSPI200 index options. By applying the empirical method of Bakshi and Kapadia (2003), we analyze the performance of delta-hedging strategy in the KOSPI200 index market. They showed the existence of the negative volatility risk premium in the S&P 500 index options as well as derived theoretical positive relationship between the volatility risk premium and delta-hedging gains. However, in the results of this study, contrary to those in the S&P 500 index options market, we do not observe the volatility risk premium. Delta-hedged gains of ATM options are not significantly negative. Delta-hedged gains are not more negative as historical volatility increases and as options' vega and remaining maturity increase. However, the notable finding of this study is that delta-hedged gains of OTM options and put options are negative and signigicant. This results can be caused by the phenomenon of overpriced puts or by market microstructure factors, such as relatively wide bid-ask spread and high tick size. In a simple examination of comparison between changes in traded option prices and changes in the Black-Scholes option prices during delta-hedging period, negative delta-hedged gains seem to be attributed to too small changes in call option prices and too large changes in put option prices. In conclusion, by analyzing the delta-hedged gains, the volatility risk risk premium seems not be observed in the KOSPI200 index options market.

The objective of this research is to examine the effect of a broad‐based option program on voluntary employee turnover.

The paper examines the effect of a broad‐based stock option program in a Fortune 100 company during the 1990s and uses logistical analysis.

Employee turnover is an issue due to the costs involved in recruiting and training replacements. Voluntary turnover can be reduced if a cost can be imposed on the departing employee. This cost need not be an explicit cost, but can take the form of a benefit forgone when the employee departs. Along these lines, stock option grants to employees, if properly structured, have the ability to reduce voluntary employee turnover. The paper finds that voluntary turnover is lower during the periods in which the option cannot be exercised, i.e. the vesting period. This effect is strongest for employees approaching retirement, but also holds for employees leaving the company for other reasons.

The finding that unvested options reduce or delay voluntary turnover, which while intuitive, has not to the author's knowledge been shown previously, and is important for those involved in the compensation plan design process.

The purpose of this study is to present theory and empirical evidence on whether changes in leverage are systematically associated with changes in the CEO's risk incentives over time.Design/methodology/approach – A model is developed to explain the dynamic relationship between leverage and managers’ risk incentives, and empirically tested with data on executive stock option grants. The model relies on the observation that the risk sensitivity of a call option does not monotonically increase or decrease in the value of the underlying stock.Findings – It is found that changes in the CEO's risk incentives are not systematically correlated with changes in the firm's leverage over time.Research limitations/implications – The near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage, and therefore executives’ incentives to take equity risk are not correlated with firm leverage.Practical implications – For reasonable parameter values, this risk incentive‐maximizing stock price lies very close to the option's exercise price. This finding provides evidence that stock options plans granted approximately at‐the‐money encourage maximum risk‐taking by managers in a dynamic setting.Originality/value – This paper develops theory and evidence to explain why executive stock options are usually granted at‐the‐money.

Since the early 1980s, currency options have become a popular means for hedging foreign currency positions or speculating on anticipated movements in exchange rates. Yet, they can also be used to enhance the forecasting of exchange rates. Corporate forecasts of exchange rates involve two tasks: (1) a point estimate of a currency's exchange rate, and (2) a confidence interval that suggests the degree of uncertainty associated with the point estimate forecast. A currency forward or futures price is often used as the point estimate required. The confidence interval is commonly developed by using the historical volatility of exchange rate movements. However, an alternative method is to use the market's anticipated volatility in developing the confidence interval. Scott and Tucker (1990) have shown that the volatility implied from contemporaneous currency option prices is a better forecast of future volatility than historical measures. Therefore, a confidence interval implied by currency options should also be more reliable. Our objective is to illustrate how confidence intervals can be developed from currency option information. Given the degree of difficulty in forecasting exchange rates, more reliable confidence intervals could greatly improve managerial decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of option choice reversibility on the number of options chosen, total spending, and upset/regret from actions/inaction, using 124 Singaporean adults.

The experiment employs two levels of option choice reversibility: fully reversible without a penalty vs strictly irreversible. Participants add options to a base model or delete options from a full model and are either allowed or not allowed to change options in a condominium purchase scenario.

Compared to participants in the irreversible choice condition, those in the reversible choice select more options and end up with higher total spending. In the irreversible option choice condition, participants anticipate more upset (one aspect of regret) when they take actions than inaction, but in the reversible option choice condition, the reverse is true.

The study uses only one decision stimulus, which is a condominium purchase, and the purchase scenario might not be as realistic as an actual purchase decision.

Refunds and option change permission policies make consumers feel they can reverse their buying decisions, making them feel the decisions are less risky and thus inducing them to buy more than when no refunds or option change is allowed after purchase. To drive consumers to take actions, marketers should allow consumers to change their mind after making decisions and assure them of such policy.

The paper shows the effect of decision reversibility on the total spending (i.e. the total costs of choices made) and extends the theory about omission biases by demonstrating that regrets from actions/inaction depend on decision reversibility.