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The purpose of this study is to present theory and empirical evidence on whether changes in leverage are systematically associated with changes in the CEO's risk incentives over time.Design/methodology/approach – A model is developed to explain the dynamic relationship between leverage and managers’ risk incentives, and empirically tested with data on executive stock option grants. The model relies on the observation that the risk sensitivity of a call option does not monotonically increase or decrease in the value of the underlying stock.Findings – It is found that changes in the CEO's risk incentives are not systematically correlated with changes in the firm's leverage over time.Research limitations/implications – The near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage, and therefore executives’ incentives to take equity risk are not correlated with firm leverage.Practical implications – For reasonable parameter values, this risk incentive‐maximizing stock price lies very close to the option's exercise price. This finding provides evidence that stock options plans granted approximately at‐the‐money encourage maximum risk‐taking by managers in a dynamic setting.Originality/value – This paper develops theory and evidence to explain why executive stock options are usually granted at‐the‐money.

Until 2005, corporations could choose whether to expense incentive options or to disclose the value in the financial footnotes. During 2004, however, the Financial Accounting Standards Board adopted the revised Statement No. 123, which requires public corporations to measure the cost of stock options on grant‐date and expense that cost over the vesting period of the grant. This study investigates the impact of SFAS 123(R) on the type of executive incentive pay‐option versus restricted stock.

Comprehensive compensation data was collected from Standard & Poors ExecuComp data base for the period 2002‐2006 for two industries identified by SIC codes 73 (business services) and 35 (electronics). The study tracks the percentage of pay in the form of incentive stock options or restrictive stock grants before and after SFAS No. 123(R) was adopted in 2004. A series of multivariate regression models test whether the restricted stock percentage of total compensation can be partially explained by the adoption of SFAS 123(R).

The results show that the average fair value of stock awards is higher and the average fair value of option awards is lower after 2004. In addition, after 2004, stock compensation as a percentage of total pay is positively related to stock price volatility. The data also suggest that those companies substituting restricted stock for options actually increase total incentive pay.

The study's findings may suggest that those companies substituting restricted stock for options increase total executive pay. This would be a side effect from the adoption of SFAS 123(R), in that most companies use the Black‐Scholes model to value executive options. Given the long life of these options and the high volatility in certain industries the option value is quite high. Therefore, the amount of substituted restricted stock is also inflated.

The adoption of SFAS 123(R) was highly contested by executives in industries with high stock price volatility. The authors document that, in the case of two industries, executive incentive pay structure was affected.

Stock ownership and incentive options are used by companies to retain and motivate employees and managers. These grants usually come with vesting features which require grantees to hold the assets for certain periods. This vesting requirement makes the grantee's total wealth highly undiversified. As a result, as shown by previous researchers, grantees tend to value these incentive securities below market. In this case, grantees will have a strong desire to hedge away the firm-specific risk. Facing the restrictions of direct hedges such as shorting the firm's stock, employees may implement a partial hedge by taking positions in an asset highly correlated with the firm's stock, such as an industry index. In this chapter, we investigate the effects of such a partial hedge. Using the continuous-time, consumption-portfolio framework as a backdrop, we demonstrate that the hedging index can enhance the employee's optimal portfolio holding and increase his intertemporal utility. Consequently, his private valuations of these grants are higher than that without the partial hedging. However, because the partial hedge makes the employee's total wealth less sensitive to the firm's stock price, it will also undermine the incentive effects. Therefore, the presumed incentive effects of these restricted assets should not be taken for granted.

This paper aims to analyze the valuation of stock options from the perspective of an employee exhibiting preferences as described by cumulative prospect theory (CPT). In addition, it elaborates on their incentives effect and some implications in terms of design aspects.

The paper draws on the CPT framework to derive a continuous time model of the stock option subjective value using the certainty equivalence principle. Numerical simulations are used in order to analyze the subjective value sensitivity with respect to preferences‐related parameters and to investigate the incentives effect.

Consistent with a growing body of empirical and experimental studies, the model predicts that the employee may overestimate the value of his options in‐excess of their risk‐neutral value. Moreover, for typical setting of preferences parameters around the experimental estimates, and assuming the company is allowed to adjust existing compensation when making new stock option grants, the model predicts that incentives are maximized for strike prices set around the stock price at inception. This finding is consistent with companies’ actual compensation practices. Finally, the model predicts that an executive who is subject to probability weighting may be more prompted than a risk‐neutral executive to act in order to increase the firm's assets volatility.

This research proposes an alternative theoretical framework for the analysis of pay‐to‐performance sensitivity of equity‐based compensation that takes into account a number of prominent patterns of employee behavior that expected utility theory cannot explain. It contributes to recent empirical and theoretical researches that have advanced CPT framework as a promising candidate for the analysis of equity‐based compensation contracts.

The purpose of this paper is to examine if the structure and design of CEO compensation has any effect on firm innovation. It further investigates the effectiveness of each component of portfolio of compensation incentives in encouraging innovation.

This study uses systems of simultaneous equations to model the interdependence between compensation incentives and measures of firm innovation.

Results indicate that the pay‐performance sensitivity of the CEO portfolio of compensation incentives is positively related to investment in R&D expenditures, number of patents and citations. Options in general are more effective than stocks. However, within the options portfolio, recently awarded and unvested options are more effective than previously awarded and vested options. Restricted stock is more effective than unrestricted stock.

Measuring innovation output is difficult as innovation could take different forms, including business model innovation, which does not appear in the patent data.

Stock options encourage investment in value‐increasing innovations and should remain a significant part of managerial compensation. If the firm awards stock, it should only award restricted stock.

This study uses comprehensive measures of compensation incentives and firm innovation. It views incentives as a portfolio of stock and options and uses incentives in their entirety. It examines the effectiveness of each component of the portfolio in encouraging innovation. It measures innovation as investment into the innovation process (R&D expenditures) and the resulting success of that investment (patents and citations).

With the accelerated technological advancement, innovation has become a critical factor, which affects the core competitiveness of a company. However, studies about the relationship between internal stock option mechanisms and innovation productivity remain limited. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the impact of stock options and their elements design on innovation output from an internal mechanism perspective.

Using a sample of 302 stock option incentive plans announced and implemented between 2006 and 2016, this study uses the propensity score matching and difference-in-difference model to find out whether the implementation of stock options improves the innovation outputs of enterprises.

Based on the statistical analysis, it is concluded that: stock options can stimulate corporate innovation; a stock option may drive innovation outputs through two ways, performance-based incentives and risk-taking incentives, with the latter one playing a more dominant role and the risk-taking incentives of stock options, could be optimised when the non-executives granting proportion is larger, the granting range is limited, the incentive period is longer, the exercisable proportion is increasing, the price-to-strike ratio is lower and relatively loose performance assessment criteria are applied.

The conclusion reached in the study may provide valuable information to listed firms in designing and implementing the stock option plans.

This paper seeks to evaluate the cost of repriceable options, and to investigate whether repriceable employee stock options (ESOs) cost more than standard ESOs in providing incentives to employees.

This paper develops an intensity‐based model, reflecting the special features of repriceable ESOs. The model is used to assess shareholder cost of repriceable ESOs, to explore their early exercise pattern and to compare their incentive effect with standard ESOs.

Two main conclusions arise. First, option holders of repriceable ESOs postpone their exercise before repricing. But, once the exercise price has been reset, option holders are more likely to exercise ESOs early. Second, option repricing is less cost‐effective than standard options in providing incentives.

This research finds that issuing new options proves more efficient than option repricing in providing incentives. In turn, this research offers a practical guideline to companies confronted with underwater options.

Constructing and applying a more accurate valuation model than those previously developed, this paper investigates several important questions about ESOs repricing. Chiefly, this research helps academics and practitioners better understand the cost of repriceable options, how repricing influences employees’ early exercise decisions, and whether option repricing is cost‐effective in providing incentives. These are important questions to ask, filling gaps in the existing literature.

The purpose of this research is to contribute to the development of an effective incentive policy implementation model, through an in-depth analysis of the stock option and/or stock grant schemes adopted by the major Italian banking groups.

Out of the 77 banking groups operating in Italy on 30 June 2011, The paper selected 12 banking institutions that implemented either stock option or stock grant plans over the years 2007-2010. The documentary analysis was carried out on 22 stock option and/or stock grant schemes and based on the examination of corporate governance reports, as well as information memoranda on incentive plans.

The results show a limited implementation of equity-based incentive plans in the Italian banking sector during the investigation period (2007-2010) and clearly demonstrates that, as far as these types of incentives are concerned, there is ample room for improvement as well as substantial adjustments.

The research covers a limited period of time. Therefore, further extending the scope of its survey will definitely be of great academic interest in the light of the latest regulatory changes made to the banking sector remuneration regime.

By giving a clear indication of the critical points that should be addressed to improve the policies in force, this research study aims to provide greater knowledge about the remuneration practices adopted by Italian banks, in terms of equity-based incentive plans.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the risk‐incentive effect of CEO stock options in the banking industry.

For a sample of industrial mergers, Williams and Rao find that the risk‐incentive effect of CEO stock options is associated with higher post‐merger risk. This result indicates that stock options may be effective in mitigating the agency problem of Jensen and Meckling wherein managers take too little risk on behalf of shareholders. The authors extend the method of Williams and Rao to the banking industry. In particular, they are interested in determining whether the same relationship holds for these highly regulated and leveraged firms.

Using a sample of 131 bank mergers that took place between 1993 and 2002, the authors determine that the risk‐incentive effect of CEO stock options is positively related to the post‐merger level of equity risk. The results of this study also show that the interaction of size and the risk‐incentive effect is negatively related to volatility following the merger, which agrees with the original study.

This paper extends the literature by examining an industry that is largely ignored because of its highly regulated nature.

Prior studies show that accounting considerations related to executive compensation impact managerial incentives, which in turn can impact real investment. These studies, however, largely omit the role of one key incentive: the duration of executive compensation. This study addresses this gap by examining the impact of accounting costs on duration. The findings have important implications not only for the determinants of duration but also the potential role duration plays in incentivizing corporate investment.

This study exploits a plausibly exogenous increase in the accounting cost of option compensation under accounting rule FAS 123R to determine the impact of accounting considerations on managerial incentives and particularly the duration of executive compensation. Heterogeneity in firm-level exposure to the rule is exploited under a difference-in-difference framework. The sample comprises S&P 500 firms for the years 2002–2008.

The analysis shows that under FAS 123R, which increased the accounting cost of option compensation, duration is impacted more for affected firms than are delta and vega, two other key incentives highlighted in the literature. While duration, delta and vega are all highly intertwined making disentangling the individual impact of each incentive difficult, cross-sectional evidence suggests changes in research and development (R&D) spending are more likely attributable to changes in duration rather than vega or delta.

The evidence in this study shows how accounting considerations shape managerial incentives, particularly duration, and provides new insights into the relationship between duration and R&D spending.