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Prior studies show that accounting considerations related to executive compensation impact managerial incentives, which in turn can impact real investment. These studies, however, largely omit the role of one key incentive: the duration of executive compensation. This study addresses this gap by examining the impact of accounting costs on duration. The findings have important implications not only for the determinants of duration but also the potential role duration plays in incentivizing corporate investment.

This study exploits a plausibly exogenous increase in the accounting cost of option compensation under accounting rule FAS 123R to determine the impact of accounting considerations on managerial incentives and particularly the duration of executive compensation. Heterogeneity in firm-level exposure to the rule is exploited under a difference-in-difference framework. The sample comprises S&P 500 firms for the years 2002–2008.

The analysis shows that under FAS 123R, which increased the accounting cost of option compensation, duration is impacted more for affected firms than are delta and vega, two other key incentives highlighted in the literature. While duration, delta and vega are all highly intertwined making disentangling the individual impact of each incentive difficult, cross-sectional evidence suggests changes in research and development (R&D) spending are more likely attributable to changes in duration rather than vega or delta.

The evidence in this study shows how accounting considerations shape managerial incentives, particularly duration, and provides new insights into the relationship between duration and R&D spending.

The authors study stock and option grants around abrupt performance declines for continuing CEOs and find that firms facing abrupt financial declines grant more options than stock, while firms facing operational decline grant more stock than options. Firms making these adjustments just prior to performance declines outperform those that do not for three years following the decline and are less likely to engage in asset restructuring. To establish causality, the authors exploit compensation changes instigated by FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing. The result is robust to numerous tests, including rebalancing of incentives and CEO turnover. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

To establish causality, the authors exploit compensation changes instigated by FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing.

Firms making these adjustments just prior to performance declines outperform those that do not for three years following the decline and are less likely to engage in asset restructuring. The result is robust to numerous tests, including rebalancing of incentives and CEO turnover.

Several studies examine the relationship between poor performance and compensation of newly appointed CEOs. But firms regularly employ retention or incentive plans when experiencing distress to prevent critical employees from leaving when they are most needed (Goyal and Wang, 2017). Employee turnover results in a loss of continuity coupled with high search and training costs for replacement personnel. Beneish et al. (2017) find that 57 percent of CEOs associated with intentional misreporting retain their jobs, implying the costs of removing CEOs is high, especially if the incumbent CEO has a strong track record relative to industry peers prior to the period before the misreporting begins. The board fires the CEO if future firm value under the CEO is expected to be lower than under the best alternative CEO less adjustment costs (e.g. search costs, severance pay).

The fundamental change in accounting rules for equity-based compensation (EBC) instituted by SFAS 123, SFAS 123r, and IFRS 2 has allowed for new insights related to a variety of research questions. This paper discusses the empirical evidence generated in the wake of the new regulation and categorizes it into two broad streams. The first stream encompasses research on the changed use of EBC and the incentives provided. The second stream addresses how firms account for EBC, including the underreporting phenomenon and how it was affected by the mandatory recognition of EBC expenses. I discuss where research delivers unanimous findings versus contradictory results. Using these insights, I make recommendations for further research opportunities in the area of EBC.

Recent developments in accounting for stock options have increased interest in the analytical techniques used to value them. Techniques used to value the options of publicly traded companies have been extensively discussed. In contrast, there has been almost no discussion of the valuation procedures of the options for non‐publicly traded companies. This paper addresses this gap. The paper suggests that a straightforward income capitalization model can be used to develop reasonable surrogates for the variables of the Black‐Scholes option pricing model. The paper also discusses how to adjust the income apitalization model for both lack of marketability and lack of control discounts.

The purpose of this paper is to identify means of better associating executive remuneration with managerial decision making and firm performance.

The authors evaluate the influence of conditional accounting conservatism on CEO compensation. The authors focus particularly on the ex ante pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO stock option grants. The empirical method used is panel data regression.

The authors find that accounting conservatism is positively related to the PPS of CEO option-based compensation. The effects of accounting conservatism on the PPS of options are more significant for firms with relatively weaker corporate governance and for the period before the introduction of FAS 123R. The findings suggest that directors reward CEOs for adopting accounting conservatism, both in general terms and incrementally, and that rewards are channelled through incentive-linked compensation. The results are also consistent with the view that accounting conservatism compliments other mechanisms, such as corporate governance, in reducing information asymmetry and agency problems between managers and shareholders and other stakeholders.

This paper provides a number of important contributions to the literature. It is the first to identify a relationship between accounting conservatism and option-based CEO compensation, which has important potential contracting and enforcement implications due to the incomplete nature of option contracts and the reward and risk attributes of CEOs. This paper is also the first to analyse the association between conditional accounting conservatism and CEO compensation at the firm–year level, by employing the firm–year conservatism score approach proposed by Khan and Watts (2009). This provides for greater insight regarding the interaction between accounting conservatism and other firm-specific elements than is otherwise obtainable from an overall firm or year interpretations derived from the traditional Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness model approach. Furthermore, this paper also provides a comparison of the relative association of accounting conservatism on both explicit and implicit forms of CEO compensation for the same firm sample. This allows for the assessment of whether accounting conservatism relates differently to incentive-based CEO remuneration relative to ex post CEO compensation outcomes.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether innovation effort is lower for firms exhibiting signs of higher chief executive officer (CEO) dominance and whether such CEOs can be incentivized to pursue risky ventures such as innovation projects in line with shareholder's interests that are geared toward the long-term growth of the firm.

The paper utilizes panel data of US publicly listed companies (2007–2016) to address the influence of CEO dominance on firm innovation effort and the moderating effects of incentives in this relationship through ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. A two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique is also employed to address possible endogeneity. As a robustness check, further analysis is conducted utilizing an alternative proxy for CEO incentive as well as Tobit analysis (with panel-level random effects).

Results from both OLS and Tobit estimations offer two key findings. First, there is a significantly negative relationship between CEO pay slice and firm research and development (R&D) intensity. Second, the interaction effect of CEO incentives and CEO dominance is significant and positive.

When provided with the right incentives, such as those that reward long-term performance, dominant CEOs can be incentivized to go after risky ventures like innovation projects that are crucial to promoting the long-term growth of the firm.

This paper utilizes R&D instead of patent outputs as proxies for innovation where the former enables studying R&D efforts for more recent periods compared to prior studies that utilize patent data.

We investigate the impact of the creation of a new incentive structure for CEOs resulting from firms introducing equity-based compensation (EBC) as a means of paying top executives on policy decisions. Contrasting a firm’s stock and operating performance in the period the CEO is compensated with EBC (EBC period) and the period when EBC is not a component of the same executive’s pay (No EBC period) leads us to conclude that awarding stock options and restricted shares to executives is not associated with improved firm performance. However, firms initiate EBC after superior performance suggesting that CEOs are awarded compensation in this form as a reward for past performance. Firms have higher unsystematic and total risk levels in the EBC period suggesting EBC influences CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and reduces agency costs arising from managerial risk aversion. While there is no change in R&D expenses and cash ratios there is a decrease in capital expenditures in the EBC period, which is consistent with reduced overinvestment agency costs. Finally, leverage and payout ratios are similar in both periods implying that firms’ financing policy is not influenced by changes in CEOs’ compensation structure.

This study investigates how a firm's regulatory focus (i.e. promotion and prevention foci) affects growth- and efficiency-oriented strategic change, highlighting the role of organizational-level regulatory focus as a cognitive frame within which to interpret performance feedback and its subsequent effects on strategic decisions.

The authors collected longitudinal data on 98 S&P 500 manufacturing firms for a seven-year period. The panel data, which includes texts from the firms' 10-K filings, were then analyzed using a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression estimator to test the authors’ hypotheses.

A firm's strategic change orientation is affected by its regulatory focus and performance feedback: a promotion focus increases the magnitude of growth-oriented strategic change, while a prevention focus favors efficiency-oriented strategic change. Furthermore, both foci moderate the effect of performance feedback on the strategic change orientation: under negative performance feedback, a promotion (prevention) focus increases (decreases) the magnitude of growth-oriented strategic change relative to that of efficiency-oriented change. The findings provide robust evidence that regulatory focus can influence how organizations learn from feedback and formulate strategic change.

The authors’ examination of regulatory focus and organizational learning process relied on large manufacturing firms in the USA. However, learning process could be quite different in small and/or young firms. Future work should expand to a wider range of organizational types, such as nascent entrepreneurial ventures. In addition, the authors’ measurement of regulatory focus using corporate text has inherent weakness and could be supplemented with alternative research methods, such as surveys, interviews or experiments. All in all, however, the findings of this study offer a novel behavioral perspective while demonstrating that a regulatory focus is an important antecedent of organizational learning.

This study highlights the importance of motivational characteristics of the top managers in the process of organizational learning from performance feedback. Furthermore, recruitment of a new top manager should be aligned with the organizational context, values and goals. In addition, corporate governance systems such as managerial compensation schemes need to be carefully designed so as to maximize organizational resilience, especially in the context of performance downturn or environmental change. Establishing a constructive organizational culture so that strategic decisions are not overly swayed by the performance outcomes would also be crucial to the organizational learning process.

This study highlights the importance of understanding the motivational orientations of top managers in organizational learning. In terms of managerial compensation, for instance, an optimal incentive system should reflect the desired performance output by encouraging managerial behavior that corresponds to its objective. Furthermore, motivational orientation of new recruits should be considered in the context of the composition of the top management team members in order to achieve “optimal fit.” In addition, this study suggests that top executives' regulatory focus can be a key factor for organizations in balancing goals of different value orientations.

The findings of this study demonstrated that a firm-level regulatory focus has a significant effect on organizational learning and strategic change following performance feedback. The authors hope this study provides an impetus for future discussions on the microcognitive mechanisms of organizational learning by exploring the relations between organizations' regulatory foci, performance feedback and strategic change orientations.

This study empirically examines, from the first quarter of 1981 until the fourth quarter of 2017, the relations across customary domestic issuer credit ratings (long-term, short-term and subordinate) and three popular corporate risk-taking measurements (the variability of operating profitability, net profitability, and research and development expenses).

The author deploys categorical regressions and robustness tests with control variables, interaction terms, fixed effect variables, lag variables and delta variables.

The author documents that both short-term and subordinate domestic credit ratings are key determinants of the volatility of operating profitability. The author also identifies long-term credit ratings as secondary factors, yet they do affect broader corporate risk-taking behavioral features (along all three measurements). Furthermore, the author finds that the higher (lower) the credit ratings assigned, i.e. the superior (inferior) the credit quality externally judged, the more (less) overall risk firms tend to undertake.

It is the first research to examine both the inclusive influence and the granular effects of credit ratings on corporate risk-taking (CRT) behavior. It is also the only enquiry to inspect the specific relationships along three types of domestic issuer credit ratings: long-term, short-term and subordinate ratings.