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We assess whether smaller investors are more likely to hold shares of closed-end funds that invest more heavily in illiquid securities. We also examine the relationship between the liquidity of the securities held in the portfolios of closed-end mutual funds (portfolio liquidity) and the liquidity of the closed-end funds’ shares (fund-share liquidity). Using a sample of 1,619 fund-years from 2010 to 2012, we find that smaller investors are more likely than institutional investors to own closed-end funds. We also find that the liquidity of closed-end funds’ portfolios is positively associated with the liquidity of the funds’ shares. Our findings are consistent with the “liquidity benefits” notion that closed-end funds are a means for smaller investors to invest in less liquid securities. In addition, our findings are consistent with the “valuation skepticism” notion which indicates that, due to the difficulty of objectively valuing illiquid securities, different perceptions of the value of illiquid securities held in funds’ portfolios may result in greater fund-share liquidity.

Russia's size – both in terms of population and geography, spanning 11 time zones, 89 oblasts (states or regions) and autonomous republics and its privatization program, encompassing some 100,000 small-scale enterprises, 25,000 medium to large firms, and 300 or so of its largest firms, made its privatization program the largest sale/transfer of assets conducted among the transition economies, with the possible exception of China. Comparisons by many of the program's critics, and there are many, to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech republic are invidious, especially the latter two countries whose populations are similar to just that of greater Moscow.

Recent developments in technology and research have brought new innovations into the finance sector. Applying mathematics and computer science into finance has developed a multidisciplinary financial engineering field, where new quantitative and complex financial products are supplied to investors. In this chapter, we describe financial technologies as high-frequency trade; investment vehicles as mutual, exchange-traded, and hedge funds in the finance sector with figures of past 10 years and their impact in international trade volume. Financial derivatives are innovative products where investor may mitigate risk on their domestic and international transactions. The author also discusses cryptocurrencies as an important tool in innovation.

Recent empirical and theoretical developments related to the microprocesses of institutional logics have helped to cultivate a powerful theory of agency. We build on these developments to show how the institutional logics perspective can shed light on important questions related to frame construction and how institutions matter. In particular, we show how the emergence of an economic democracy frame in post-war Sweden generated different efforts to define that frame with concrete ideas and practices linked to different logics – socialism and neoliberalism. We show how socialists tried to define economic democracy as requiring a radical transformation in the nature of ownership and control embedded in the innovative financial practice of wage earner’s funds. In contradistinction, conservatives drew on neoliberal ideas and extant mutual fund practices to construct alternative meanings and practices related to economic democracy that enrolled citizens in Capitalism without challenging extant Capitalist ownership structures. While mutual funds and wage earner’s funds initially existed in a state of parabiosis – existing side by side without much interrelationship – struggles over the meaning of economic democracy led these practices to become competing solutions in a framing contest. Implications for the study of institutional logics, frames and the social organization of society are discussed.

This study groups mutual funds using k-means clustering analysis and compares the k-means clustering process with existing clustering techniques using mutual fund data for equity funds, general fixed-income funds, and balanced open-end mutual funds rated by the Association of Investment Management Companies. Data are from January 2016 to December 2020 for 60 months and includes information on prices, risks, and investment policies. The sample for this study comprises 173 funds from 10 asset management companies with the highest net assets. The tool used for analysis is the k-means technique using a statistical package set for k = 3. The funds can be divided into three groups: Group 1 has 5 mutual funds (2.89%), Group 2 has 24 mutual funds (13.87%), and Group 3 has a total of 144 mutual funds (83.24%). In Group 1, four of the five mutual funds are equity funds with a track record of beating the market, and fund managers have good market timing skills. Moreover, the efficiency of fund grouping using the k-means technique was compared with the existing grouping with close results at 57.23%. This work provides a methodology to obtain a better categorization of mutual funds by using k-means clustering, allowing the investors to know how mutual funds are. This categorization is very useful for improving the formulation of mutual funds, with the goal of further optimizing investment.

We develop our theoretical framework from the viewpoint of the information asymmetry and the agency theory that the Chinese mutual funds exhibit herd behaviour, and provide empirical evidence by using cross-sectional data of all the Chinese mutual funds between 1999 and 2003. We find that the Chinese mutual funds show overall herding, buy herding and sell herding, and the degree of sell herding is higher than that of buy herding. The degree of Chinese herding is higher than their US counterpart from all the three perspectives. This may be largely due to the institutional factors rather than those firm-specific factors that influence the US mutual funds investment decision.

Whether institutional investors monitor corporations and improve firm value is a key question for corporate governance and investment management. I find little empirical support for the hypothesis that institutions undertake monitoring that increases firm quality and valuation. Granger causation tests show that while quality firms do attract institutional investment, institutions do not monitor and firm value subsequently declines. Instead, institutional incentives are critical; some institutions with strong incentives to monitor do, indeed, monitor. Institutions with concentrated portfolios successfully monitor while institutions with a larger percentage stake do not. Pensions and endowments are better monitors than insurers, banks and mutual funds.