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Various problems in the field of children's rights require governments in all countries to take urgent action to establish preventive mechanisms. In this respect, governments are increasingly organising private specialised units on sensitive issues concerning children's rights, which hopefully may prevent further abuse of children. The existence of structures specialising in children's rights is extremely necessary in terms of empowering children to express their problems and wishes. In this study, the duties and functions of the Children's Ombudsman are discussed using examples from different countries.

Since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, focus has shifted to its implementation at national level. In this regard, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that every state party needs an independent human rights institution for children which should, whatever its form, be able independently to monitor, promote and protect children’s rights. Ireland established its Ombudsman for Children in 2004, with a founding law that gives the institution a wide range of powers associated with the duty to promote children’s rights. These include the express duty to advise Government, raise awareness, undertake research, and consult with children about matters that concern them. The Ombudsman for Children also has the power to receive complaints from children and investigate actions of public bodies that have adversely affected a child in areas of social and health services, child protection and education. This chapter considers the exercise by the Ombudsman for Children of these statutory powers against the backdrop of international standards on independent institutions for children. It illustrates how the Ombudsman for Children has advanced children’s rights in Ireland by taking a proactive and strategic approach to its legislative mandate, and notes in particular the role that soft power – derived from the Ombudsman’s independence, legitimacy and influence – has helped to maximize the potential of the institution.

This chapter discusses the adoption by Brazilian companies of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods for individual workplace conflicts. Brazil is an interesting case to study ADR due to its high level of institutionalized individual workplace conflicts and its extensive workplace statutory regulation. Investigating the case of three Brazilian private companies of different sectors and sizes, I found that Brazilian companies are developing their own ADR practices, focusing on ombudsman offices (OOs), instead of using the mediation and arbitration methods that are predominant in the United States. I argue that the adoption of the ombudsman can be explained by institutional and workplace level factors, which include the characteristics of Brazilian industrial relations system, each company’s human resources (HRs) strategy, and the relationship between companies and unions. Furthermore, I discuss how the usage rate of the OOs might vary according to the OO’s internal structure and its functioning rules. The cases provide important insights for scholars interested in ADR in general and in Brazilian industrial relations system, as well as union leaders, HR managers, and other practitioners dealing with workplace conflicts globally.

Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, states have the obligation to implement and monitor children’s rights. A key element thereof is the creation of independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of children rights (independent children’s rights institutions – ICRIs). All over the world a wide variety of such institutions can be found. In this chapter, the authors aim at providing a broader understanding of how to research ICRIs’ capacity to monitor and promote children’s rights. The authors use the case of the Dutch Children’s Ombudsman and an evaluation of this institute to draw out key elements of such research. This chapter shows the importance of studying the political process behind the establishment of an ICRI, and conceptualize and measure the autonomy of an ICRI in a comprehensive way. Moreover, the chapter sketches how an ICRI is part of a wider “children’s rights landscape” engaging with children’s rights actors at different levels. Multidisciplinary research is needed to grasp these elements and conduct a comprehensive assessment of an ICRI.

In Hungary, soon after the democratic transition in 1989/1990, the institution of the general ombudsman was established, based on the Swedish model, possessing broad oversight. Since 2012, with the Fundamental Law (new constitution) and a new ombudsman act entering into force, the defense of children’s rights has become one of the legal obligations of the general ombudsman. In this chapter, the author examines the historical background of this “hybrid” institution¹ and the performance of the last three commissioners based on the child rights approach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC).

The UN CRC represents the “whole child” approach, a holistic view of a child which also informs the work of independent children’s rights institutions (ICRIs). Hence, the four guiding principles of the UN CRC² (the right to non-discrimination; the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and the right to participation) can be seen as analyzable elements of an ICRI’s performance. There are also “informal” factors that can influence the performance of an ICRI – even a stand-alone – for example, social and political recognition of the institution, the societal and legal regard of children (are their rights widely recognized or not, etc.), the personal motivation and drive of the ombudsman, the ombudsman’s own interests and background, the financial constraints of the office and the overall political atmosphere and various political influences around. These factors can play a vital role, but their existence can only be assumed in cases where the institution’s more exact outputs based on the UN CRC guiding principles can be seen: the appearance of children in its work, attention to vulnerable groups and cases related to non-discrimination, the number of complaints submitted to the commissioner (including those by children) and the appearance of best interests of children in cases. The author has found differences between the last three commissioners’ performances based on the guiding principles, which are also not independent from informal factors too.

Chapters 2–6 have dealt in turn with how Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore have been effective in curbing corruption, as manifested in their rankings and scores on the five international indicators of the perceived extent of corruption. In contrast, Chapter 7 focuses on India’s ineffective anti-corruption measures and identifies the lessons which India can learn from their success in fighting corruption. The aim of this concluding chapter is twofold: to describe and compare the different paths taken by these six countries in their battle against corruption; and to identify the lessons which other countries can learn from their experiences in combating corruption. However, as the policy contexts of these six countries differ significantly, it is necessary to begin by providing an analysis of their contextual constraints before proceeding to compare their anti-corruption strategies and identifying the relevant lessons for other countries.

Independent children’s rights institutions as guardians of children’s rights contribute to the implementation and monitoring of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) in several ways. This chapter focuses on their engagement with the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee) during the country-specific monitoring of the Convention: they can provide reliable, precise and up-to-date information about the situation of children’s rights in the field. While considering the state reports, the CRC Committee welcomes submission from any independent children’s rights institutions, but which institutions have taken this opportunity in the past? Based on the public database of reports submitted by national human rights institutions, without looking into the content of their submissions and the impact of their engagement, this chapter intends to draw the profile of the independent children’s rights institutions that actively engage with the monitoring body of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.