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Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the international community took vigorous, unprecedented steps to curb Saddam Hussein's military ambitions. The central component of these actions was a set of comprehensive arms, aviation, maritime, and economic sanctions, each imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). When the multinational coalition forces ousted Iraq from Kuwait the following year, the UNSC made these sanctions and embargoes a component of the armistice agreement. Over time, these sanctions were subsequently used as leverage to press for Iraqi compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions calling for Iraqi disarmament.¹

Marc von Boemcken is a senior researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, Germany. His areas of expertise include the international arms trade as well as the privatization of security provision.

Collective sanctions have long been a contested instrument of international politics, especially since 1990, when United States and large power use of the technique increased to the point where Richard Haass declared that a “sanctions epidemic” had emerged (Haass & O'Sullivan, 1999). Regional bodies, most notably by the European Union (EU), paralleled this trend through a dramatic increase in their own resort to sanctions (Kreutz, 2005). The imposition of sanctions by the United Nations (UN) reached the point that, in comparison to pre-1989 behavior, the 1990s were labeled “the sanctions decade” (Cortright & Lopez, 2000).

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how lawyers in two of the largest European economies manage the contradictory requirements set by anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) legislation on the one hand and professional codes of ethics on the other hand.

The study is based on qualitative interviews with French and German lawyers. It asks “How do European lawyers handle the conflicting demands ensuing from their roles as frontlines workers?” The paper uses lawyers’ day-to-day practices and variations in member states’ transpositions of the European Union directives as a starting point to study AML/CTF in the miniscule.

The article shows that contextual institutional restraints and cultural factors have significant impact on the possibility to enlist for-profit actors in the fight against terrorism an organised crime.

This research highlights several factors inherent in AML/CTF regulation that warrant further research. Not only should further work be carried to broaden the understanding of lawyers but also other actors included in this policy area.

The study explains why French and German lawyers do not comply as expected by the legislator. If increased compliance is required, then the paper provides input into what measures can be taken, by policy, enforcement and supervision.

The study focusses on a hard-to-reach group of actors in AML/CTF regulation that has never before been studied in detail. As recent scandals have shown, lawyers are key actors in global finance but have rarely been scrutinised in their AML compliance norms and routines.