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The contribution of the present case lies in the critical view that every business actor should exercise – be it general manager, middle management, supervisor or executive – when building a strong organizational culture in corrupt political environments.

The purpose of this case study is to explore the dilemma in which Marcelo Odebrecht, once CEO of Odebrecht, found/determined whether to continue with the business model established by the founders of Odebrecht or take a new path for the organization. After exploring the corrupt acts of Odebrecht and the scope of Operation Lava Jato, the reader can reflect on the importance of organizational culture (according to the three levels proposed by Schein) in the face of the emergence of corruption. By generating discussions about organizational culture, business ethics, political culture and corruption, the organizational culture of Odebrecht is problematized in relation to its real behavior.

Students of administration, business and international business undergraduates and graduates, as well as members of senior management in companies in the infrastructure sector. Also, given the plurality of possible readings, it is recommended that the case also be used in courses or specializations in organizational psychology, organizational sociology or organizational anthropology.

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CSS 5: International Business.

Family businesses have several distinct features that distinguish them from other businesses. This aspect makes it imperative that scholars investigate issues with an additional focus on the interplay of family business dynamics. In this chapter, we explore the issues of power and corruption within family business, with the understanding that prior examinations of this phenomenon were primarily restricted to large public corporations that are not family owned. The key contribution of this chapter is to shed light on the dark side of family business, namely power enabled corruption. We do so by considering three dimensions that are unique to family firms, namely, ownership and control, generations, and governance. In particular, we highlight how these dimensions can facilitate corruption. It is possible that they may also challenge family business that try to detect, deter, and control corruption within their ranks. The lack of objective external evaluation, the ineffectiveness of internal checks, generational issues, family control, and the restricted nature of governance appear to contribute to exacerbating tensions that promote corruption becoming entrenched within family businesses. Following a case method approach, several illustrative examples of cases of power and corruption within family firms are provided, representing different geographic regions of the world, to showcase the widespread nature of this phenomenon. The three family business cases we illustrate (Grupo Odebrecht in Latin America, Sahara Group in South Africa and Foremost Maritime Group in China) represent multiple countries, continents, and geo-political frontiers. Each case illustrates how both corruption and power reinforce each other in family businesses. Implications of the magnifier effect of power on corruption in family business are discussed in terms of its impact, scale, and its enabling effect by providing a road map to corruption.

Brazil and Chile have nearly similar recent political histories. Emerging from protracted military dictatorships at roughly the same time, both developed presidential and representative democratic processes, though with contrasting individual national emphases. Military dictatorships in both countries originated in anti-corruption rationales, among others, and both have emphasized anti-corruption practices since regime changes. Brazil impeached two presidents, ostensibly for corrupt practices. Yet, Chile has managed a corruption level, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, that is among the lowest in Latin America, while Brazil’s is among the highest. This study compares and contrasts the two nations’ experiences with a view to uncover key causal, or at least explanatory, variables in this striking contrast in levels of perceived corruption.