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This chapter surveys papers and the related literature on the relationship between banks’ creditor structure and bank risk during the period of liquidity crises. Departing from the conventional banking literature, which points to deteriorating asset quality to be the culprit for the amplified bank risk in the midst of financial crises, the studies in the aftermath of the global financial crisis look into the liability side of the bank balance sheet as a potential source for the augmented bank risk during the financial crisis when there is a liquidity contraction. Recent studies theorize and provide empirical evidence that banking institutions with a greater share of large lenders and an economy with high noncore bank liabilities in the banking sector may experience heightened bank risk or country risk. We also search for policy implications from this survey.

The composition of bank liabilities has captured a lot of attention especially after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. It is argued that a compositional change in non-core liabilities reflects the different stages of financial cycle. Banks usually fund their credits with core liabilities, which grow with households’ wealth, but when there is a faster growth in credits compared to deposits, the banks often resort to non-core liabilities to meet the excess demand for loans. This chapter analyses the relationship between non-core liabilities and credits in a small open economy, namely Turkey. It investigates the relationship under alternative settings and presents consistent evidence on a robust relationship between credits and non-core liabilities under all frameworks. The study also verifies that elevated demand for credit may induce some increase in non-core liabilities. Finally, the relationship between non-core liabilities and credit growth is also affirmed in the long run.

In 2009 and 2010, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) adopted new accounting standards for nonprofit mergers and acquisitions. The new accounting standards are an example of the constitutive role accounting can play in how people think about economic events, since the FASB defined a new concept (the “inherent contribution”) and required valuation of intangible assets that were often previously unrecognized.

The FASB’s stated goals included minimizing “pooling” accounting and maximizing transparency regarding fair value information, acquired identifiable intangible assets, and the relation between consideration paid and the fair values of identifiable assets acquired. The FASB expected many combinations would involve little or no consideration. It also expressed concern that some organizations would undervalue assets acquired, especially intangible assets.

For a sample of 2012–2017 nonprofit hospital combinations, we find general agreement with the FASB’s expectations. Almost all combinations were accounted for as acquisitions, not mergers, even though there was frequently no consideration paid. More acquirers recorded “inherent contributions” than goodwill, because the net fair value of the acquired hospital’s identifiable assets exceeded the consideration paid. Acquirers ascribed value to assets, such as intangible assets, that would have gone unreported under the prior accounting rules, although lower levels of intangible assets were recognized in nonprofit business combinations, relative to total non-goodwill assets acquired, than in public companies’ acquisitions.

Before the September–October 2008 Financial Crisis, investment banks were hooked on debt. In 2007, a year before its failure, Lehman Brothers held equity just 3.3% of its balance sheet (that is, its debt/equity ratio well exceeded 29); virtually all the rest was financed by borrowing. Leverage is an elixir that makes profits soar when times are good but magnifies losses when the economy sours. Currently in India, several companies have seen their balance sheet out of shape because of overleverage, but banks continue to be benevolent, often forced by political interventions (see Cases 6.1 and 6.2). Most of these business groups are nearly dead, with their equity almost wiped out. There is little chance they will survive but for their banker’s largesse. Ever-greening of loans is keeping them alive, but what could be the end game? For instance, just a year before economic liberalization in India, few enterprising men invested in the steel business. They borrowed monies from the banks and banks continued to finance their operations, and now they are realizing that the promoters cannot meet with their debt obligations. The banks, however, did not want to accept financial loss and hence commonly agreed to ease the payment obligations so that the loans remained good and not degenerate to NPAs. This is tantamount to refinancing to service your loans. But now the banks overwhelmed with accumulated NPAs are trying to sell debt. How do you legally, ethically, morally, and spiritually (LEMS) justify share-market concentration in the hands of very few promoter investors? What are their long-run unintended economic, legal, ethical, and moral consequences, and why? This chapter studies this market turbulence and the role of bankruptcy laws and court systems in bringing about some change in the debt-overleveraged corporations.

We employ three systemic risk measures of banks, including the systemic risk index (SRISK) and marginal expected shortfall (MES) of Brownlees and Engle (2017) and the conditional Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR) of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), to analyze bank's exposure and contribution to systemic risk in the banking system when a financial crisis occurs. We find evidence that time-varying systemic risk exists, and systemic risk exposures escalate with the interconnectedness of banks. We also find revenue diversification is another significant factor that reduces a bank's exposure to systemic risk but not for banks in Taiwan and Singapore.

In the spring of 1995, the Electronics Bureau of Shanghai [Shanghai Dianziju] changed its name to “Shanghai Electronics State-Owned Asset Management Company” [Shanghai dianzi guoyou zichan jingying gongsi]. As one official in the former Bureau explained, it had changed its name and its function: It was no longer set up to “govern” or “manage” [guan] Shanghai's electronics sector; instead it was now an asset management company whose function was to manage the assets of the firms that it owned.¹ At the time, the transformation seemed purely cosmetic. Calling itself an asset management company instead of a government bureau was one thing, but actually acting like an asset management company was quite another. Would firms under this former Bureau be any more productive as a result of the change? Would the work-life experiences of the people actually working in these firms change at all as a result?

Russia is one of the leaders in outward FDI from emerging market economies and at the same time Russian MNCs have their specific features. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze characteristics of Russian MNCs by researching relationship between specificities of Russian economic and political model, on the one hand, and specific features of Russian MNCs, on the other hand.

For these researches, traditional instruments of neoclassical theory are basically used.

The principal finding is that specific characteristics of Russian MNCs reflect specificities of Russia’s economic and political model. To some extent, they correlate with characteristics of MNCs of other two leading emerging economies – China and India.

Russian MNCs operate in line with principal theories of FDI, that is, on the basis of their country and firms’ comparative advantages. However, they possess specific features: many of them are state-controlled MNCs; private MNCs are controlled by oligarchs; all of them have tight relations with offshores and offshore conduit countries. The comparison with China and India shows that some of these specific features are typical of Chinese and Indian MNCs to more or less extent.

The empirical part of the chapter analyzes scope, industrial and geographical profiles of Russian MNCs, their motivation and management, impact on Russian economy and regional integration.

National MNCs with their offshore affiliates are the leading tax evasion economic agents in Russia. Moreover, stable FDI outflow reduces gross capital formation in Russia which is insufficient (19–25% of GDP) for substantial economic growth by standards of emerging economies in this decade (from 4.3 to −3.8 in Russia, from 6.8 to 9.5 in China, from 5.1 to 7.3 in India).

The principal value (originality) of the chapter is its comparatively detailed review of main aspects of Russian MNCs’ worldwide activity made from the point of view of its connection to Russia’s economic and political model.