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This study examines how local governments and enterprises can implement ecological restoration of abandoned mines based on ecology-oriented development (EOD), which will be more beneficial to local environmental protection and economic development under the central government’s policy of outcome incentives or process subsidies.

We construct a dynamic differential game model to simulate the interactions between local governments and enterprises during the ecological restoration of abandoned mines from an EOD perspective.

The findings suggest that under the central government’s outcome incentive policy, cooperation between local governments and enterprises is an optimal strategy. Under the process subsidy policy, while neither cooperative nor non-cooperative models significantly affect the investment levels of local governments and enterprises, a cooperative approach ensures optimal investments from both without solely relying on the process subsidy. Additionally, incorporating altruistic preferences can lead to Pareto improvements in economic and environmental results under central government outcome incentives.

This research offers a policy foundation for governments to encourage the EOD model in the ecological restoration of abandoned mines. It provides theoretical support for achieving environmental sustainability and high-quality economic development, and is particularly significant for resource-depleted cities seeking to transform their development strategies.

Through a dynamic differential game model involving government agencies and enterprises to simulate decision-making in the ecological restoration of abandoned mines, incorporating altruistic preferences into this restoration process, and identifying optimal strategies and policies for ecological restoration.