Search results

The purpose of this study is to investigate why “financial fragility” carries different definitions in the economic literature. This is a useful task as the detection of “financial fragility” depends, in part, upon how one defines it. According to Post Keynesian economists, financial fragility is a process that can culminate in financial instability (an event). For mainstream or New Keynesian economists, financial fragility has been traditionally defined as a state in which a shock can trigger instability. More recently, however, mainstream economists have recast their definition as a particular form of financial instability – an event. Each definition of financial fragility is intimately linked to the theoretical foundation upon which it rests. This carries important implications for the ability of policymakers to assess and manage the health of an economy.

The different approaches to the definition and detection of financial fragility are compared using corresponding sets of indicators. Indicators for the Post Keynesian approach are derived from a simple cash‐flow accounting framework, in the spirit of Hyman Minsky. The economy selected for study is New Zealand.

According to the Post Keynesian approach, New Zealand has been in a financially fragile state for over three years, a period during which policymakers could have been creating ways to make New Zealand more resilient to the onset of instability. According to the New Keynesian approach, New Zealand may just now be experiencing fragility, giving policymakers much less time to react.

This study traces the definitions of financial fragility to their underlying theoretical frameworks and draws the implications for the methods of detecting financial fragility.

Using recent literature, examines developments in seven macroeconomic schools of thought: orthodox Keynesian, monetarist, new classical, real business cycle theory, new Keynesian, Austrian and post‐Keynesian. Describes all of these and classifies them as orthodox, new or radical. After setting out the differences, discusses the degree of agreement between the schools of thought. Concludes that macroeconomics is constantly evolving, resulting in new disagreements requiring a new consensus.

Looks at the impact John Maynard Keynes and the movement (Keynesian) he started had on the theory and practice of economics in the 1930s and onwards. Identifies respective problems about capitalism and discusses them in depth. States that the monetary and fiscal policies recommended by Keynes have helped the West escape severe social consequences in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Goes on to show how economists after Keynes carried his work forward and upward in the 1940s and 1950s. Closes by stating there is a further, third revolution in economic thinking on the rise.

The economic science is again in a crisis and a new solution prolegomena to any future study in economics, finance and other social sciences has just been published by the International Institute of Social Economics in care of the MCB University Press in England. The roots of the major financial and economic problems of our time lie in an open conflict between theory and practice. In the 1930s and before the conflict was between classical theory and given realities. In the 1990s the conflict appears between the now prevailing modern, Keynesian theory and the actual realities. In addition during the twentieth century a great argument developed between the two schools of thought, argument which is not yet settled. In one sentence, the prolegomena tried and was successful to solve the conflict between theory and practice and the big doctrinal dispute of the twentieth century. It was a struggle of research and observation over half a century between 1947 and 1997.

This analysis attempts a comparative specification of certain aspects of the country studies contained in this volume. The point of departure is the banking crises of the early 1990s (deep in Finland, Norway and Sweden, mini-crisis in Denmark and absent in Iceland) and the contrast to Iceland's financial meltdown in 2007/2008 (no crisis in the three, a new mini-crisis in Denmark). Detailed process tracing of the Icelandic crisis is provided. The case account is then used to shed light on the different roles of neoliberalism, economics expert knowledge and populist right-wing party formation in the five Nordic political economies.

Alvin Hansen and John Williams’ Fiscal Policy Seminar at Harvard University is widely regarded as a key mechanism for the spread of Keynesianism in the United States. An original and regular participant, Richard A. Musgrave was invited to prepare remarks for the fiftieth anniversary of the seminar in 1988. These were never published, though a copy was filed with Musgrave’s papers at Princeton University. Their reproduction here is important for several reasons. First, it is one of the last reminiscences of the original participants. Second, the remarks make an important contribution to our understanding of the Harvard School of macro-fiscal policy. Third, the remarks provide interesting insights into Musgrave’s views on national economic policymaking as well as the intersection between theory and practice. The reminiscence demonstrates the importance of the seminar in shifting Musgrave’s research focus and moving him to a more pragmatic approach to public finance.

One of the most significant changes in monetary economics at the beginning of the twenty-first century has been the virtual disappearance of what was once a dominant focus, the role of money in monetary policy, and parallelly, the disappearance of the liquidity preference-money supply (LM) curve. Economists used to consider monetary policy with the help of the LM curve as part of the analytical framework which captures the demand for money. However, the workhorse model of modern monetary theory and policy, the New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework, only comprises the dynamic investment-savings (IS) curve, the New Keynesian (NK) Phillips curve, and a monetary policy rule. The monetary policy rule is generally known as the Taylor rule. It relates the nominal interest rate to the output-gaps and inflation-gaps, but typically not to either the quantity or the growth rate of money. This change in the modern monetary model reflects how the central banks make monetary policy now. This study provides a detailed discussion on the role of money in monetary policy formulation in the context of the NK and the New Monetarist perspectives. The pros and cons of abandonment of money or the LM curve from monetary policy models have been discussed in detail.