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We examine whether loan securitization has an impact on bank efficiency. Using a sample of large US commercial banks from 2002 to 2012, we find that bank loan securitization has a significant and positive impact on bank efficiency, and this relationship is stronger for banks with higher capital ratios, higher default risk, and lower level of liquidity and diversification. Our results are robust to Heckman self-selection correction and difference-in-difference (DID) analysis. In addition, these results are found mainly in non-mortgage loan securitizations but not in mortgage loan securitizations. Finally, we show that loan sales also have a positive impact on bank efficiency.

This paper aims to evaluate the business activities, financial reports, and management compensation practices of Countrywide Financial Corporation (Countrywide) in the period preceding the company's financial distress and leading to its eventual takeover by Bank of America in 2008. This analysis provides a number of insights into the risks that Countrywide was exposed to which may guide future research and financial management.

Case study evaluating the failure of Countrywide Financial Corporation.

First, Countrywide was highly reliant upon the securitization of mortgage loans to finance its activities and this was apparent in the financial reports. Second, these securitization transactions exposed Countrywide to significant financial risks, including the risk inherent in the uncertain values of residual interests and warrantees. Problematically, these risks were not transparently reflected in the financial reports, as confirmed by the lag in the timing of stock price responses. This untimely market response suggests the equity market was not aware of Countrywide's risk exposures until shortly before the company's solvency crisis. Third, the compensation practices of Countrywide encouraged and rewarded management for exposing the firm to significant risks.

This paper provides insights into financial management that are relevant for researchers and professionals.

This paper provides insights for researchers and practitioners relating to the impact of asset securitization on business risk and how these business activities and risks are disclosed in the financial reports.

Bank securitisation is deemed to have been a major contributing factor to the 2007/2008 financial crises via fuelling credit growth accompanied by lower banks’ credit standards. Yet, prior to the crisis a common view was that securitisation activity makes the financial system more stable as risk was more easily diversified, managed and allocated economy-wide. The purpose of this paper is to review the extant literature to explore the so far generated knowledge on the impact of securitisation on banking risks. In particular, the authors examine the theoretical arguments and empirical studies on securitisation and banking risks before and after the global financial crisis of 2007/2008.

Review and discussion of the literature.

Theoretical literature univocally accentuate the undesirable consequences of securitisation, which may promote retention of riskier loans, undermine banks’ screening and monitoring incentives and enhance banks’ risk appetite. However, empirical evidence does not uniformly support the theoretical conclusions. If banks are securitisation active they lend more to risky borrowers, have less diversified portfolios and hold less capital, retain riskier loans and are aggressive in loan pricing. Others argue that securitisation reduces banks insolvency risk, increases profitability, provides liquidity and leads to greater supply of loans. Mortgage securitisation is an area where there is consistent evidence of bank risk taking via securitisation.

The paper identifies open issues for future research.

The concept of state-corporate crime developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s in a series of papers authored by Michalowski and Kramer (Kramer, 1990; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990; Michalowski & Kramer, 1987). They specifically define state-corporate crime as:Illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution. (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006a, 2006b, p. 15)

As financial markets move toward increased globalization, it becomes worth considering whether inherent differences in financial markets across different countries will diminish. For two countries more similar than different in terms of geography, location, government and culture, Canada and the USA remain strikingly different in terms of housing finance. Public policy objectives toward housing followed quite different paths over the past 70 years and fundamental differences in banking practices have led to considerably different outcomes in terms of mortgage finance instruments in the two countries. Examines some of the differences in policy and in competitive practices between Canada and the USA in an attempt to illuminate why differences in rates and terms across the two countries still exist. While a part of the difference remains due to legal constraints concerning the finance of the domestic housing sector, focuses on the economics and public policy choices that have led to the observed differences rather than on an analysis of the legal structure.

Subprime mortgage was a kind of high-risk and high-interest lending, especially targeted at low-income and minority borrowers. The majority of subprime mortgage loans were made to non-affluent, low-income and poor borrowers who were previously unable to buy properties and might have poor credit histories (Pitcoff, 2003; Schwarcz, 2009). Why did mortgage lenders compromise their lending standards and dare to take obviously huge risks in mortgage lending? It is clear that the origin of the aggressive subprime mortgage practices were linked to the US Government's policy for increasing national homeownership and encouraging lenders to provide mortgage loans and other credits to low-income and minority borrowers, as a specific stakeholder group.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model to hedge annuity portfolios against increases in life expectancy. Across the globe, and in the industrial nations in particular, people have seen an unprecedented increase in their life expectancy over the past decades. The benefits of this apply to the individual, but the dangers apply to annuity providers. Insurance companies often possess no effective tools to address the longevity risk inherent in their annuity portfolio. Securitization can serve as a substitute for classic reinsurance, as it also transfers risk to third parties.

This paper extends on methods insurer's can use to hedge their annuity portfolio against longevity risk with the help of annuity securitization. Future mortality rates with the Lee-Carter-model and use the Wang-transformation to incorporate insurance risk are forecasted. Based on the percentile tranching method, where individual tranches are aligned to Standard & Poor's ratings, we price an inverse survivor bond. This bond offers fix coupon payments to investors, while the principal payments are at risk and depend on the survival rate within the underlying portfolio.

The contribution to the academic literature is threefold. On the theoretical side, building on the work of Kim and Choi (2011), we adapt their pricing model to the current market situation. Putting the principal at risk instead of the coupon payments, the insurer is supplied with sufficient capital to cover additional costs due to longevity. On the empirical side, the method for the German market is specified. Inserting specific country data into the model, price sensitivities of the presented securitization model are analyzed. Finally, in a case study, the procedure to the annuity portfolio of a large German life insurer is applied and the price of hedging longevity risk is calculated.

To illustrate the implication of this bond structure, several sensitivity tests were conducted before applying the pricing model to the retail sample annuity portfolio from a leading German life insurer. The securitization structure was applied to calculate the securitization prices for a sample portfolio from a large life insurance company.

The findings contribute to the current discussion about how insurers can face longevity risk within their annuity portfolios. The fact that the rating structure has such a severe impact on the overall hedging costs for the insurer implies that companies that are willing to undergo an annuity securitization should consider their deal structure very carefully. In addition, we have pointed out that in imperfect markets, the retention of the equity tranche by the originator might be advantageous. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that by this behavior, the insurer is able to reduce the overall default risk in his balance sheet by securitizing a life insurance portfolio; however, the fraction of first loss pieces from defaults increases more than proportionally. The insurer has to take care to not be left with large, unwanted remaining risk positions in his books.

In this paper, we extend on methods insurer's can use to hedge their annuity portfolio against longevity risk with the help of annuity securitization. To do so, we take the perspective of the issuing insurance company and calculate the costs of hedging in a four-step process. On the theoretical side, building on the work of Kim and Choi (2011), we adapt their pricing model to the current market situation. On the empirical side, we specify the method for the German market. Inserting specific country data into the model, price sensitivities of the presented securitization model are analyzed.

A financially distressed homeowner considers bankruptcy filing, either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, to delay foreclosure. On one hand, Chapter 13 filing takes longer processing time, spreads mortgage arrearages over the debt repayment period, and increases the possibility of loan modification. On the other hand, Chapter 7 filing discharges unsecured debt, which provides additional disposable income for mortgage payments. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The author uses fixed-effects (within variation), random-effects, and generalized estimation equation models with time dummies on the panel data of US counties.

The results show that mortgage delinquency increases Chapter 7 filings, while it has positive but statistically insignificant effect on Chapter 13 filings. In addition, a county’s mortgage debt to income and proportion of mortgage borrowers increase its Chapter 7 filings.

The contribution of the paper is to assess the effect of mortgage credit on the bankruptcy chapter choice using the county-level data.