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The purpose of this paper is to identify if fraud theory models suggested over the years are applicable to match-fixing and if so, whether the Krambia-Kapardis’ (2016) holistic fraud and corruption prevention model can be used to reduce significantly match-fixing in football.

An online survey was developed by the authors and was administered to football stakeholders in Cyprus, namely, players, referees, coaches and team management.

The research questions, who are the initiators of match-fixing, why is match-fixing taking place and what is the best way to prevent or reduce match-fixing, have been answered, and these findings have enabled the authors to make policy recommendations.

The survey considered match-fixing in only one sport (football) while the number of respondent categories and the 335 usable questionnaires returned did not allow advanced statistical analysis of the data obtained.

The findings point to the need both for ethics and moral values to be installed in all the stakeholders through training and continuing education. It is also suggested that teams/clubs and related associations acting as regulators ought to implement governance principles and ethical programs, including whistleblowing lines and appoint integrity officers to minimize the match-fixing phenomenon. Furthermore, society, as well as government, sport regulators and sponsors, ought to encourage and demand fair play and integrity in sport through improved measures of governance and accountability and the implementation of ethical audits and public disclosure of audited financial statements of teams. Finally, sports integrity ought to be embedded in school curriculum from a very young age.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is an original contribution to knowledge that has impact on the future of sporting fairness and social legitimacy.

The purpose of the current article is to provide an account of the financial crimes that are committed within the football clubs in Greece.

First, ethnographic research with two football clubs in Greece was conducted. Additional information on the issues at stake was obtained through interviews with informed actors from the realm of Greek football. Moreover, the telephone conversations that were available as the result of wiretapping by the Greek National Intelligence Agency, in relation to the latest football match-fixing scandal (2011) were used. Finally, published media sources were used. These provided information not only on the process behind financial crimes within football clubs but also on the key actors involved.

A number of financial (and finance-related) crimes committed within football clubs were identified in the study. These include: ticket “tricks”, fake tax certificates, crimes related to the players’ salary payments, owing money, money laundering and match-fixing. Issues around financial crimes within football clubs must be located within the overall football-related context in the country, which is, of course, an extension of the general financial, entrepreneurial and political landscape in the country.

This is the first article on football clubs and financial crimes in Greece. Although this is a case study from Greece, it constitutes a potential template for research on an international level. By using the case of football and football clubs in Greece, this article adds to understandings of the complexity of the broader motivational context of financial crime.

The purpose of this paper is to report on the aspects of an exploratory investigation into the scale and nature of the financial abuse of adults lacking mental capacity.

It uses mixed-methods study which comprises of: a review of safeguarding adults’ statistics; analysis of court case findings; classification of types of financial abuse, victims and perpetrators; qualitative exploration of professional views of the nature of financial abuse of those lacking mental capacity; and a consideration of policy implications.

It demonstrates the significance of financial abuse within the spectrum of abuse experienced by adults at risk; the wide range of both victims lacking capacity being abused and type of financial abuse; its often hidden nature embedded within the family; and the limitations of processes designed to protect.

The investigation reveals the paucity of statistical data available on the nature of financial abuse and the outcomes of official investigations into reported cases, both of which limit analysis and understanding of the phenomenon.

It demonstrates the need for greater transparency and consistency in the reporting of safeguarding and legal processes to enable practitioners and policymakers to fully understand the nature and significance of this abuse for both victims and society.

It questions the extent to which existing protective processes are sufficient in terms of safeguarding victims and deterring perpetrators.

It involves original research that brings together data from a range of sources involved in the protection of a particular hard-to-reach group of individuals (those lacking capacity) from a particular type of risk (financial abuse) of increasing social significance.

This study aims to draw out the common characteristics of frauds associated with pandemics and to identify any risks unique to them.

It considers the range of frauds and their reporting lags and examines what is known about current frauds against individuals, businesses and government, principally using public and private sector data from Australia and the UK.

The study identifies some novel crime types and methodologies arising during the current pandemic that were not seen in previous pandemics. These changes may result from public health measures taken in response to COVID-19, the current state of technologies and the activities of law enforcement and regulatory guardians. It shows that many frauds would occur anyway, but some specific – mainly online – frauds occur during pandemics, and because of large scale government assistance programmes to businesses and individuals, far more opportunities were created from COVID-19 than in previous eras.

The study concludes with a discussion of the policy implications for prevention, resilience and for private and public policing and criminal justice. It stresses that plans for future pandemics must include provisions for better early monitoring and control of fraud and associated procurement corruption and notes that these require greater political will and organisation. It recommends a more serious analysis of the impact of prevention communications outreach to citizens, businesses and government.

The study uses fresh data on frauds from the private and public sectors and assesses some measures of control in a holistic way.

The salience of money laundering as a social and economic issue merits some modest scepticism. First, most crime is and will remain for the foreseeable future local and ill‐organised. The only connection that most of the young people and adults who come before most judges most of the time have with international organised crime is the remote supply of the ganja that they smoke, and the fact that drugs — mostly heroin, cocaine and amphetamines — increase their rate of offending and make it harder for them to give up crime. Although there is room for debate about the proportionate and creative ways of dealing with drug use among the young, it remains the case that there is a heavy‐end crime problem with which judges, law officers and politicians have to deal. It is difficult to write rationally about trends in organised crime and about rational international responses to it. The only people who are really on top of this particular market are the successful criminals themselves, including the professionals — accountants and lawyers — who knowingly assist in laundering the proceeds of crime, and who are increasingly required by the front‐line criminals as our controls on cash deposits get tighter. Nevertheless, this paper discusses the relevance to money laundering and proceeds of crime of corporate criminal liability and analogous forms of imposing ‘due diligence’ penalties.

Cressey’s Fraud Triangle has been referenced in 8,584 studies and academic papers [1] and is a stalwart of training courses for accounting and audit practitioners and fraud investigators. The Fraud Triangle has endured for three decades in the academic and practitioner worlds. This study aims to explore the origins of Cressey’s Fraud Triangle and challenge its practical value to a fraud investigator.

This study has developed from analysis of a targeted literature review carried out as part of a wider study into occupational fraud and corruption.

Cressey’s name is intrinsically linked to the Fraud Triangle, although he never used the expression during his lifetime. Two of the three motivational factors identified by Cressey (1953) were developed from the earlier work of Svend Riemer (1941), who it is suggested should have equal billing with Donald Cressey for the concepts that led to the creation of the Fraud Triangle.

The paper illustrates the limitations of Cressey’s Fraud Triangle for practitioners.

Many academics and researchers have either misunderstood Cressey’s role in the development of the Fraud Triangle or been unaware of its true origins. Although the pioneering work of Riemer is referenced in a 2014 study on the Fraud Triangle by Alexander Schuchter and Michael Levi, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to identify the influence of Riemer on Cressey’s thinking and the development of the Fraud Triangle.

This paper aims to map out multi-agency partnerships in the UK information assurance (UKIA) network in the UK.

The paper surveyed members of the UKIA community and achieved a 52 percent response rate (n=104). The paper used a multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) technique to map the multi-agency cooperation space and factor analysis and ordinary least squares regression to identify predictive factors of cooperation frequency. Qualitative data were also solicited via the survey and interviews with security managers.

Via the quantitative measures, the paper locates gaps in the multi-agency cooperation network and identifies predictors of cooperation. The data indicate an over-crowded cybersecurity space, problems in apprehending perpetrators, and poor business case justifications for SMEs as potential inhibitors to cooperation, while concern over certain cybercrimes and perceptions of organisational effectiveness were identified as motivators.

The data suggest that the neo-liberal rationality that has been evoked in other areas of crime control is also evident in the control of cybercrimes. The paper concludes divisions exist between the High Policing rhetoric of the UK's Cyber Security Strategy and the (relatively) Low Policing cooperation outcomes in “on the ground” cyber-policing. If the cooperation outcomes advocated by the UK Cyber Security Strategy are to be realised, UKIA organisations must begin to acknowledge and remedy gaps and barriers in cooperation.

This paper provides the first mixed-methods evidence on the multi-agency cooperation patterns amongst the UKIA community in the UK and highlights significant gaps in the network.

China has a bad reputation — justified or not — for corruption: in a recent Transparency International survey, it was listed by US and European businesspeople as one of the three most corrupt countries in Asia, though its ranking fell slightly in 1996. A national survey revealed that ordinary Chinese regard corruption as the most serious problem after inflation, though 52 per cent expressed doubt that the Government could do anything about it. In 1995, in Beijing alone, 1,085 cases of corruption were uncovered. In 1996, in the Working Report of the Supreme Peoples's Procuratorate, the Chief Procurator Zhang Siqing observed:

Assesses the arguments for and against the establishment of an Economic Crime (or Fraud) Commission and relates these to the Roskill Committee Report’s recommendation for an independent body to monitor the effectiveness of how fraud case were conducted. Surveys the changes in the fraud scene in the fifteen years since Roskill: for instance, England and Wales have the Serious Fraud Office, a Fraud Czar was appointed for the health service, and high‐volume fraud and money laundering control have both developed. Contends that the arguments for a Fraud Commission are less clear than in 1986, partly because there is more auditing and reporting on fraud investigations, prosecutions and prevention, although there is no one body covering the whole picture.