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This paper extends our understanding of the concept and global practice of political economy.

The paper sets out the limits of conceptual analysis regarding political economy. It then applies Heidegger’s theory of metaphysics to the cultures of China and the West.

It is possible to construct an account of Confucianism metaphysics which contrasts with modern western metaphysics. The paper suggests some implications of the contrast.

The paper is exploratory and broad-brush. It suggests the potential of further systematic enquiries.

National and business leaders seek to understand the global business environment. This requires insights into the nature of culture and the foundations of cultures. The paper provides a way to make sense of national aspirations and global political/business responses to changed circumstances.

The paper continues a research programme which seeks to explicate Chinese decision-making and relate it to the western decision-making. It is the first paper to use Heidegger’s concept of metaphysics in relation to Confucianism.

This chapter presents two examples of misinterpretation of the philosophical term and historical concept of human dignity in contemporary legal theory and practice. Current legal theories (R. Alexy) still introduce Pico’s concept of dignity regarding the human personality and personal (volitional and rational) abilities. The term ‘dignity’ is marginal for Pico and shows the spiritual way to the status of the original Adam. Pico’s concept of dignity is located in the area of spirit (hyperphysics), not metaphysics (soul) or physics (materials). Günter Dürig in his commentary to Grundgesetz also used the Kantian concept of human dignity. Dürig exaggerated this value and used it also for the area of physics (to protect the human being as a personality). For Kant, the term ‘dignity’ was also marginal, and he used it in the area of metaphysics (soul – especially the moral and rational parts), regarding transcendence for homo noumenon, not for homo phaenomenon. In general, it seems to be problematic to use the ideal of the dignity for the law, which regulates the social relations between concrete phenomenal personalities. There are parallels to Pico. The Kantian starting point was different from Pico, because Kant stays in the area of metaphysics (especially the moral and rational parts). Both consider freedom as a condition of dignity. The concept of autonomy of will is significant for both, but each thinks of it in different ways. For both, human being can become master of oneself, but in a different context.

This article is concerned with the fundamental differences between Landian accelerationism and the tradition that most closely resembles it within organization studies and process organization studies. Accelerationists and process theorists seem to have much in common, since both bear the influence of vitalism, but there are important conceptual differences that need to be brought to light for accelerationist organization studies (AOSs).

This paper is a straightforward comparison of the fundamental philosophical principles orienting both process organization studies, especially those gleaned from phenomenology and speculative metaphysics, and Landian accelerationism.

Process organization studies address a localized disciplinary bias towards stability over change and leverage phenomenology and speculative metaphysics to overcome it. Landian accelerationism is a radical account of the supersession of the human by inhuman forces and abandons phenomenology and speculative metaphysics as vitalist variants of correlationism. The two perspectives are shown to be broadly incompatible.

The introduction of accelerationism into organization studies will invariably see it compared with the vitalist strains of process organization studies. This paper emphasizes some of the important differences that exist between these traditions in preparation for an emerging accelerationist organization study tradition.

A collection of essays by a social economist seeking to balance economics as a science of means with the values deemed necessary to man′s finding the good life and society enduring as a civilized instrumentality. Looks for authority to great men of the past and to today′s moral philosopher: man is an ethical animal. The 13 essays are: 1. Evolutionary Economics: The End of It All? which challenges the view that Darwinism destroyed belief in a universe of purpose and design; 2. Schmoller′s Political Economy: Its Psychic, Moral and Legal Foundations, which centres on the belief that time‐honoured ethical values prevail in an economy formed by ties of common sentiment, ideas, customs and laws; 3. Adam Smith by Gustav von Schmoller – Schmoller rejects Smith′s natural law and sees him as simply spreading the message of Calvinism; 4. Pierre‐Joseph Proudhon, Socialist – Karl Marx, Communist: A Comparison; 5. Marxism and the Instauration of Man, which raises the question for Marx: is the flowering of the new man in Communist society the ultimate end to the dialectical movement of history?; 6. Ethical Progress and Economic Growth in Western Civilization; 7. Ethical Principles in American Society: An Appraisal; 8. The Ugent Need for a Consensus on Moral Values, which focuses on the real dangers inherent in there being no consensus on moral values; 9. Human Resources and the Good Society – man is not to be treated as an economic resource; man′s moral and material wellbeing is the goal; 10. The Social Economist on the Modern Dilemma: Ethical Dwarfs and Nuclear Giants, which argues that it is imperative to distinguish good from evil and to act accordingly: existentialism, situation ethics and evolutionary ethics savour of nihilism; 11. Ethical Principles: The Economist′s Quandary, which is the difficulty of balancing the claims of disinterested science and of the urge to better the human condition; 12. The Role of Government in the Advancement of Cultural Values, which discusses censorship and the funding of art against the background of the US Helms Amendment; 13. Man at the Crossroads draws earlier themes together; the author makes the case for rejecting determinism and the “operant conditioning” of the Skinner school in favour of the moral progress of autonomous man through adherence to traditional ethical values.

South African scholars, like most scholars in the developing world, have sold the idea that social constructivism is the gold standard of qualitative management research. In this chapter, we caution against this subordination to unquestioned conventions and offer a process relational ontology as an alternative to social constructivism that is often punted by most qualitative research programmes and textbooks. We also debunk the idea that ‘grounded theory’ exists by delving into epistemology and showing how science is ‘self-correcting’ rather than ‘tabula rasa’. Instead of boxing business ethics knowledge, as has been done by the case study gurus, we encourage business and organisational ethicists to own their indigenous heritage through storytelling science based on the self-correcting method underpinned by Popperian and Peircian epistemological thought. This chapter encourages business management researchers to move towards more profound ethical knowledge by refuting and falsifying false assumptions in each phase of the study, in a sequence of self-correcting storytelling phases. This is what Karl Popper called trial and error, and what C.S. Peirce called self-correcting by the triadic of Abduction–Induction–Deduction. We offer a novel method for accomplishing this aim that we call ‘Conversational Interviews’ that are based on antenarrative storytelling sciences. Our chapter aims to evoking the transformative power of indigenous ontological antenarratives in authentic conversation in order to solve immediate local problems ad fill the many institutional voids that plague the South(ern)-/African context.

Popularly, metaphysics is considered to be the antonym for physics. Argues that this attitude is a hangover from outdated forms of empiricism and positivism. In the light of cybernetic epistemology, scientific theories are linguistic structures which help to produce predictions of events. These structures are not directly deduced from experience, but guessed and then justified a posteriori. Metaphysics provides a basis for such structures. Proposes the principle that the ultimate reality we find in the physical world is that of action. Modifies Schopenhauer's formula as the world is action and representation, with action taking ontological precedence, and not to the space‐time picture of the world. For a picture is only a picture, a representation which changes from one subject to another, from one theory to another; while action is an irrefutable reality. Thus the concept of action in abstracto is taken and on this basis an attempt is made to interpret the fundamental concepts of knowledge: what are objects, what is objective description of the world, what is space and time?

Argues that the philosophical debate in marketing, led by Shelby Hunt and Paul Anderson, is no longer providing new insights and is symptomatic of the anthropocentrism of the social sciences. This anthropocentrism has had consequent implications for meta‐theoretical frameworks that describe the field and has limited the breadth of philosophical discussion in marketing. Also argues that this discussion should now move beyond the subject‐object debate and identifies writers who have variously tried to transcend the paradigm. Argues that the debate should move from epistemological to ontological and metaphysical issues and that marketing′s philosophical discussion should also be broadened to include debate on aesthetics, theology and technology.

Considers some of the puzzles and inconsistencies associated with Maturana’s metaphysics. We argue that such puzzles and inconsistencies largely arise out of difficulties of method and that the clue to their resolution is to be found in Aristotle’s solution to the same problem. Maturana’s claims are reconstructed in this light and in a way which does not materially affect their underlying theoretical grounds, i.e. autopoiesis theory, and dissolves the puzzles and inconsistencies referred to.

Understanding the differences in the Islamic and Christian view of interest requires coming to terms not with the acts constitutive of the practice but the meaning of the practice in two different views of what an economy produces and delivers. The difference in the norms that govern interest transactions differ because the metaphysical foundations about what the practice means differ. The Islamic norms are broader via public accountability for the good produced by an economy as a social good than the normative regulation of interest transactions in Christian cultures that focuses on the goods delivered by an economy to more or less independent individuals participating in an economy. However, some reconciliation of the Christian and Islamic view is possible when we recognize that the ethical accountability of interest rests on a view of economic justice as increasing the degree of economic participation in an economy as an economic and social good. When this view is taken, we see that the range of potentially illicit practices in Christian economies is larger than is actually the case in the actual regulation of interest transactions.

In this paper, I compare Theodore Schatzki’s practice theory, the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger upon whom Schatzki drew in its formation, and my own theory of institutional logics which I have sought to develop as a religious sociology of institution. I examine how Schatzki and I both differently locate our thinking at the level of practice. In this essay I also explore the possibility of appropriating Heidegger’s religious ontology of worldhood, which Schatzki rejects, in that project. My institutional logical position is an atheological religious one, poly-onto-teleological. Institutional logics are grounded in ultimate goods which are praiseworthy “objects” of striving and practice, signifieds to which elements of an institutional logic have a non-arbitrary relation, sources of and references for practical norms about how one should have, make, do or be that good, and a basis of knowing the world of practice as ordered around such goods. Institutional logics are constellations co-constituted by substances, not fields animated by values, interests or powers.

Because we are speaking against “values,” people are horrified at a philosophy that ostensibly dares to despise humanity’s best qualities. For what is more “logical” than that a thinking that denies values must necessarily pronounce everything valueless? Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” (2008a, p. 249).