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The development of the public accountancy profession in the last 200 years has increased the demand for the labor of professional accountants and enhanced the role and status of the professional public account. This increase in both the demand for the labor of professional accountants and for the professional services, which professional accountants provide, has resulted from the growth of capitalist enterprises, as well as institutional work on the part of members of the organized public accountancy profession. The objective of this chapter is to trace the historical development of the public accountancy professions in the United Kingdom and in France in response to contrasting institutional logics in these two countries. While legal requirements for external audits of company financial statements provided the basis for the development of the public accountancy profession as early as the end of the eighteenth century, differences in institutional logics, including differing conceptions of the relationship between individuals and the state, led to differences in the development of the public accountancy professions in the two countries. The primary argument of this chapter is that contrasting institutional logics have influenced the history of the public accountancy profession, which has evolved into one of the key regulatory structures of modern capitalism.

Nietzsche's and Freud's views of guilt provide a useful theoretical context for understanding the relationship between guilt and Utopia we have outlined in Utopia and Those Who Walk Away From Omelas. Both of them speak of guilt as the internalization of cruelty or the instinct of aggression, and see it as an inward turn that reflects a historical context. Nietzsche views guilt and “bad conscience” as a kind of illness. In The Genealogy of Morals (1887/trans. 1989) he writes, “[I] regard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever experienced – that change which occurred when he found himself finally enclosed within the wall of society and of peace” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 84). In Nietzsche's view, when faced with peace (the absence of an enemy upon whom one might inflict cruelty) and social mores (proscriptions against being cruel to one's fellow citizen) a civilized human is left with only one subject upon whom he may express his aggression and satisfy his appetite for cruelty: himself. “[He] turns himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 85). Deprived of the possibility of expressing his aggressiveness externally, man turns inward and expresses it internally, upon himself. Thus begins the age – and for Nietzsche it is our age – of “man's suffering of man, of himself” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 85).

Increasingly, addressing healthcare's grand challenges requires complex system-level adaptations involving continuously evolving teams and leaders. Although leadership development strategies have been shown to improve individual leader effectiveness, much less is known about how organization-level leadership development affects organization-level outcomes. To begin building an evidence base as well as encouraging evidence-based practices, the US-based National Center for Healthcare Leadership developed a program capitalizing on leaders' demonstrated interest in organizational competitiveness: the biennial Best Organizations for Leadership Development (BOLD) program. In this chapter, we describe the philosophy behind this unique survey program and summarize research to date on relationships between survey dimensions and organizational outcomes such as patient experience and financial performance. We conclude with a description of promising areas for future study.

This chapter offers a reading of the inclusion of Susan Glaspell's short story, A Jury of Her Peers, in the casebook, Procedure. What does it mean that the editors turn to a secular, literary narrative to ground a consideration of “The Problem of Judgment?” How should we read the irony of the reading instructions they provide, which reproduce the blindness to form – to the significance of “trifles” – that the text describes? How do we read literature in the context of law? More specifically, what does attention to the form of the story yield for an understanding of legal judgment?

Rabbinic literature of Late Antiquity encompasses legal and exegetical texts. Whereas legal texts delineate criminal procedures to determine a guilty party and advise appropriate punishment, exegetical texts suggest an almost entirely indeterminate and indeterminable understanding of guilt. This chapter examines rabbinic interpretations of the paradigmatic biblical story of guilt, Cain's murder of his brother Abel, in which Cain's guilt is mitigated and the stable relationship between evidence and guilt is challenged. I argue that these conflicting views of guilt in early rabbinic thought need not be harmonized – that a legal understanding of determinate guilt need not require a philosophical, or theological, counterpart.

This essay addresses the theme of guilt in law and literature from the law side. It argues that the legal academy's flirtation with literature reflects two forms of guilty uneasiness. The first relates to the question whether lawyers should be reading literature at all. This is a methodological anxiety. It presumes a distinctly legal method of analyzing legal issues, in which literature does not have a truly legitimate role. The second anxiety is substantive. It presumes that law has an identifiable content, one that excludes much that appears in literature. Both presumptions are, I argue, questionable and make sense only if law is viewed as primarily doctrinal. Fundamentally, these varieties of uneasiness have their roots in the still unresolved conceptual challenge of figuring precisely what is “interdisciplinary” about the law and literature enterprise. Developing an honest form of “interdisciplinarity” will be difficult if not impossible because it requires an examination of usually unstated assumptions about the uniqueness of law.