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This paper looks at a resource allocation technique used in the public sector reforms of Indonesia, a developing country, which involves decentralisation of fiscal responsibilities. The decentralisation occurred to quell secessionist aspirations of resource‐rich regions. To enable all regions to participate in regional autonomy, an elaborate system of equalisation grants was introduced to compensate for regional inequities. These grants rest on notions of ‘Western rationalism’ which value the role of calculative apparatus to achieve a sense of objectivity. We demonstrate that the equalisation formula used to determine grants is calculated using a series of estimates, proxies and indices. Hence, the formula, which determines the resource allocation for a region, obfuscates several compounding subjectivities. In this way, the politically contentious resource allocations can be perceived as objective so that the outcomes can be afforded legitimacy and authority necessary to assuage regional disputes.

Identifies critical accounting researchers′ apparent indifference to the transformatory needs, wants and entitlements of accounting students. After expressing a lack of understanding about this phenomenon, reconstructs a variety of responses from researchers, as well as possible subtexts, to tease out a feminist ethical perspective. Believes this perspective to be useful in exposing some of the silences, inconsistencies and contradictions that need to be addressed in accounting education and research. Offers an explanation for accounting researchers′ reticence in transferring their critical research skills to their teaching – the superficial adoption of the tenets of critical practice, which in turn reproduces phallocratic models of moral philosophy. Students are seen as “generalized others”, and “an ethic of care” necessarily regarding students as fully sensate human beings as “concrete others” is silenced. Concludes that this is consistent with the silencing of emotion exposed by feminist theorists, and serves to perpetuate and reproduce patriarchal and phallocentric discourses in university and accounting education.

Accounting and water industry experts are developing general‐purpose water accounting (GPWA) to report information about water and rights to water. The system has the potential to affect water policies, pricing and management, and investment and other decisions that are affected by GPWA report users' understanding of water risks faced by an entity. It may also affect financial returns to accounting and auditing firms and firms in water industries. In this paper the authors aim to examine the roles of the accounting profession, water industries and other stakeholders in governing GPWA. Recognising that the fate of GPWA depends partly upon regulatory power and economics, they seek to apply regulatory theories that explain financial accounting standards development to speculate about the national and international future of GPWA.

Official documents, internal Water Accounting Standards Board documents and unstructured interviews underpin the authors' analysis.

The authors speculate about the benefits that might accrue to various stakeholder groups from capturing the GPWA standard‐setting process. They also suggest that internationally, water industries may dominate early GPWA standards development in the public interest and that regulatory capture by accounting or water industry professionals will not necessarily conflict with public interest benefits.

Accounting for water can affect allocations of environmental, economic, social and other resources; also, accounting and water industry professional standing and revenues. In this paper the authors identify factors influencing GPWA standards and standard‐setting institutional arrangements, and thereby these resource allocations. The paper generates an awareness of GPWA's emergence and practical implications.

This is an early study to investigate water accounting standard‐setting regulatory influences and their impact.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the varied concerns of delegates at an international accounting conference.

The methodology takes the form of a prose article and accompanying fictional poem.

Accounting conferences gather many different voices and points of view, but with a degree of commonality in themes.

The paper encourages the use of creative expression to represent areas of research and enquiry.

A review of some of the proceedings of a major conference is structured in a novel manner, combining the use of the cento (a composite, “found” poem) with prose.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the controversial repeal of legislation requiring UK companies to disclose an Operating and Financial Review (OFR). After a lengthy period of consultation and the preparation of a reporting standard, legislation was passed in March 2005 requiring UK listed companies to disclose a separate statement of management commentary, an OFR. In November 2005 the Chancellor unexpectedly and controversially announced the repeal of the OFR during a speech to the largest business lobbying group in the UK.

The analysis draws upon internal, private governmental documents prepared by the Treasury ministry to brief the Chancellor, publicly disclosed as a result of a legal challenge against the repeal decision.

The paper describes how Treasury officials were motivated to seek deregulatory opportunities in order to gain political support for their head, Prime Minister-in-waiting, Gordon Brown. The analysis reveals how the repeal of the OFR was identified as an example of corporate deregulation, and how this perception proved to be misplaced following the reaction to the repeal decision which led to the government reinstating many OFR requirements in an enhanced Business Review in 2006.

The paper draws on the conception of “3-D” power to analyse how a political ideology prevalent in the pre-financial crisis environment came to influence accounting technology with unexpected consequences. Using data rarely disclosed in the public domain, it illuminates the “black boxed” processes underlying regulatory decision making. The paper details how the Treasury were politically motivated to influence corporate reporting policy in the absence of concerted political lobbying, and why this episode of government intervention led to an unanticipated regulatory outcome.