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Rotational‐translational addition theorems for the vector spheroidal wave functions Ma(i)mn(h; ξ, η, φ) and Na(i)mn(h; ξ, η, φ), i = 1,2,3,4, are derived from those for the corresponding scalar spheroidal wave functions ψ(i)mn(h; ξ, η, φ). A vector spheroidal wave function defined in one spheroidal coordinate system (h; ξ, η, φ) is expressed in terms of a series of vector spheroidal wave functions defined in another spheroidal coordinate system (h′; ξ′, η′, φ′), which is rotated and translated with respect to the first one. These theorems allow a rigorous treatment of boundary value problems relative to time‐harmonic vector field waves in the presence of a system of spheroids with arbitrary orientations. As a special case, general rotational‐translational addition theorems for vector spherical wave functions are also presented.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between corruption and government debt through a regime-based approach.

The empirical analysis makes use of a panel of 120 countries, spanning the period 1999–2015. The study makes use of the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) methodological approach, as well as two alternative measures of corruption.

The empirical results document that the relationship between corruption and debt is non-linear, while a strong threshold effect was present as well. Public debt appears to respond faster to a high corruption regime compared to a low corruption regime, while an increase in the size of the shadow economy, government expenses, the inflation rate, interest payments on debt and military expenditure all increased the debt to GDP ratio. By contrast, an increase in GDP per capita, the secondary school enrollment ratio and the ratio of tax revenues to GDP led to a fall in the debt to GDP ratio. The findings survive certain robust checks when the role of the 2008 financial crisis is explicitly considered, as well as when two separate country samples were considered, i.e. developed vs developing countries.

Governments should aim to control both corruption and the size of the shadow economy if they really wish to reduce any high levels of their public debt. As debt levels respond faster to high corruption regimes, it is necessary that measures to reduce corruption are complemented by higher GDP per capita growth rates, enrolment rates and higher tax revenues.

The novelty of the paper is that it investigates for the first time, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the presence of non-linearity between corruption and government debt. It proposes non-linear panel cointegration and causality tests, as well as a non-linear panel error correction model that allows for smooth changes between regimes, hence, examining causal relationships in each regime separately.

A central goal of strategic management is to understand why some organizations outperform others. Based on the literature, we test the links among strategic resources, firm’s strategic orientation, and performance using data from 1,201 Spanish small and medium‐sized enterprises. The results can guide managers to invest in the appropriate resources since there is evidence that technology, innovation, quality, and human resource management leads to better company performance. It is also shown how strategic resources varies according to strategic orientation.

This paper aims to assess the asymmetric impact of corruption on financial development in BRICS economies context.

The authors have adopted the novel panel non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (PNARDL) model of Shin et al. (2014), covering the period 1991–2018.

The findings confirm that corruption asymmetrically impacts financial development in BRICS economies. More precisely, long-run negative shocks of the control of corruption index have significant negative impacts on financial development. However, long-run positive shocks of the control of corruption index are insignificant. Moreover, both positive and negative shocks of corruption in short-run results are insignificant. Generally, the findings are robust having carried out several robustness checks and in favor of “sand in the wheels” hypothesis.

This study makes a novel contribution by developing insight on how corruption asymmetrically impacts financial development. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to use the PNARDL, which decompose the main independent variable (corruption) into positive and negative shocks. The PNARDL approach is a dynamic robust estimate that controls for the problem of endogeneity, which is a common phenomenon in such studies. Additionally, it is believed that the findings are important for policy makers, scholars and practitioners. Finally, the authors used the most recent available dataset covering the BRICS context.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of financial inclusion (FI) on control of corruption in selected African countries.

The study employs secondary data spanning over a period of 2005–2016. These data are sourced from IMF's International Financial Statistics, World Bank Development Indicators, Global Financial Development Database, Transparency International and International Country Risk Guide. The author uses Sarma (2008) approach to construct the FI index for 13 countries in Africa. The author applies random effect, robust least square and instrumental variable (IV) estimations to examine the impact of FI on control of corruption in Africa.

The author finds that financial inclusion improves the control of corruption. The author tests for possible FI threshold to avoid the case of extreme FI in Africa. The results show that there is a threshold level if reached, FI would have negative impacts in the control of corruption. This may likely happen mainly due to weak institutions in Africa. The results are robust to alternative proxy for control of corruption and various alternative estimation techniques.

The finding indicates that FI can serve as part of toolkits for reducing corruption in Africa.

This study stresses the important role of FI in the economic system. It is the first paper that empirically suggests the role of FI in controlling corruption in Africa.

A full Edgeworth cycle of deposit rate is divided into two phases: an “overcutting cycle” in which the banks battle for deposits, and a “relenting cycle” in which the banks cease battling and instead choose to restore a temporarily low deposit rate. Such strategies have two testable implications on overall market movements. First, deposit rate decreases are more likely to be initiated when the deposit rate is near the upper bound of a cycle. Second, deposit rate decreases are more sensitive than increases to market interest rate changes. This chapter empirically confirms this pattern and shows strong evidence for the presence of Edgeworth cycles in deposit rates after Hong Kong’s interest rate deregulation.