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In the last few decades, the obesity rate has increased along with the increasing of away-from-home food consumption at restaurants (Wei & Miao, 2013), especially the food consumption at quick-service restaurants (QSRs). Previous research stated that the main factors that influence the customers’ food selection are found. Price and quality of food are the most significant things that mostly concerned customers when they are in decision-making process. There is a controversial argument between several studies that identified calorie labelling on menu influences consumers on food choice, while others said vice versa. However, several studies argued that calorie information does not have as much impact on customers’ food purchasing as other factors such as food’s quality, ranges of food, price of food, restaurant’s atmosphere, and speed of food service (Carey & Genevive, 1995). The aim of this chapter is to examine the importance of representing calorie information on menu and its effects on customer decision-making especially at QSRs. Therefore, the following questions have been addressed in this chapter:

What are the factors that influence consumer choice at QSRs?

Does calorie labelling on menus impact customer purchasing at QSRs?

This chapter starts with the introduction of the topic and reviewing previous research on menu labelling and calorie information at QSRs. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of customer decision-making when ordering a food with regard to calorie information on the menu and the customer preference.

Experts respond to the same incentives as people in other areas of human action, and in the same ways. This insight is a truism: Experts are ordinary people, not otherworld creatures. The disciplined pursuit of this common sense observation helps us to reach conclusions about experts that might be surprising or counterintuitive.

Does the classical liberal emphasis on freedom of association provide an intellectual cover for bigotry? We formulate this question in economic terms using James Buchanan’s economic approach to ethics, according to which moral values can be understood as preferences about other people’s behaviors. We discuss two possible market failures associated with freedom of association: inter-group externalities and Schelling-type emergent segregation. We show that the classical liberal position about freedom of association, as elaborated in Buchanan and Tullock’s Calculus of Consent, is fully equipped to deal with the first one, but not with the second. The progressive view that some preferences are so offensive that they should be dismissed rather than engaged or negotiated with can be reframed as an attempt to solve the emergent segregation problem, but it is vulnerable to political economy problems of its own, in particular to an inherent tendency to over-expand the meaning of “bigotry.”

Our approach is largely historical, argument by example. We leave it to the theoreticians and empiricists to take the argument in a more technical direction.¹ Throughout, we suppose that germs are self-interested and they have a research question, for example, how might our species improve the chances of survival, the answer to which might potentially benefit germs (or, harm them by less).

Can we model politics as exclusively based on self-interest, leaving virtue aside? How much romance is there in the study of politics? We show that James Buchanan, a founder of public choice and constitutional political economy, reintroduces a modicum of romance into politics, despite claiming that his work is the study of “politics without romance”: Buchanan’s model needs an ethical attitude to defend rules against rent-seeking.

We claim that Adam Smith, more than David Hume, should be considered one of the primary intellectual influences on Buchanan’s public choice and constitutional political economy. It is commonly believed that Hume assumes in politics every man ought to be considered a knave, making him an influence on Buchanan’s idea of politics without romance. Yet, it is Smith who, like Buchanan, describes rent-seeking and suggests that public virtues may be the remedy through which good rules maintaining liberty and prosperity can be generated and enforced. Smith, like Buchanan, rejects sole reliance on economic incentives: the study of politics needs some romance.