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This study aims to examine the governance structure of the firm undergoing a complete buyout cycle (reverse leveraged buyout). Its purpose is to empirically explore the evolution of corporate board structures as a unique source of value creation, in addition to the agency mechanisms of the discipline of debt and incentives of equity participation.

The authors rely on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop sets of hypotheses that examine changes in the board composition of 65 R‐LBOs and 65 matched continuing firms spanning a 25‐year period (1979‐2004).

The empirical results reveal numerous insights about why R‐LBOs go private, to what extent boards restructure during the buyout phase, and how those changes relate to firm performance. Taken together, the findings give strong credence to the argument that boards represent a supplemental source of value creation in the buyout process.

For scholars, the study presents a platform for further inquiry into the role of boards of directors in R‐LBOs as well as the inclusion of resource dependence theory to inform on the phenomenon.

The study helps to address this new source of value creation for practical interest. It offers a benchmark for buyout firms to compare their board characteristics by establishing linkages between pre‐buyout deficiencies, post‐buyout modifications, and post‐SIPO performance.

The results shift scholarly attention away from the structural governance tools to the group dynamics of the board. The findings call into question the restricted attention given by buyout researchers to leverage and ownership as value drivers by prompting a closer evaluation of the relationship between buyout board structures and related structuring of debt and managerial equity participation. Furthermore, the inclusion of the resource‐dependency perspective alongside agency theory as an explanatory theory allows for a richer account of the LBO phenomenon and its sources of value creation.

The purpose of this paper is to identify specific drivers of value creation in secondary buyouts. While this type of private equity deal has risen in importance in recent years, it is not yet well understood. Through an in-depth analysis of the acquisition of Brenntag by BC Partners, we develop propositions on the value creation profile of secondary buyouts.

We use a single case study design to explore the information-rich context of a secondary buyout. The Brenntag case epitomizes the development of a company from forming part of a large conglomerate to being private-equity owned after the primary and secondary buyout, to its final disposition of public listing. Our analysis is based on ten semi-structured interviews with key protagonists and observers, as well as analysis of primary company data and additional secondary data sources.

We propose that even if the investment management and monitoring skills of the primary and secondary private equity group are similar, there is still potential to realize operational improvements in a secondary buyout, due to either early exit of the primary private equity group or measures that further enhance management incentives. In addition, the Brenntag case shows that low information asymmetries can lead to higher leverage and that opportunities for multiple expansions are limited in secondary buyouts.

While a secondary buyout has become a common exit route in recent years, we are the first to undertake an in-depth case analysis of a secondary buyout. Our study helps researchers and practitioners enhance their understanding of drivers behind the value creation profile of secondary buyouts.

This paper reviews economic studies on the effects of various aspects of finance on labour market outcomes.

The paper is a systematic literature review that reviews the weight of the evidence on the relationships between specific elements of finance and labour outcomes. The review is divided into three major sections: (1) job quantity and job quality; (2) distributional effects; and (3) resilience and adaptability.

Finance interacts with labour market institutions to jointly determine labour outcomes. Firm financial structures influence their labour practices – highly leveraged firms show greater employment volatility during cyclical fluctuations, and leverage strengthens firm bargaining power in labour negotiations. Bank deregulation has mixed impacts on labour depending upon the state of prior bank regulations and labour markets. Leveraged buyouts tend to dampen acquired-firm job growth as they pursue labour productivity gains. The shareholder value movement may contribute to short-termism among corporate managers, which can divert funds away from firm capital accumulation toward financial markets, and crowd out productive investment. Declining wage shares of national income in most OECD countries since 1990 may be driven in part by financial globalisation. The financial sector contributes to rising income concentration near the top of the distribution in developed countries. The availability of finance is associated with increased reallocation of labour, which may either enhance or impede productivity growth. Finally, rising interest rate environments and homeowners with mortgage balances that exceed their home's value may reduce labour mobility rates.

This review contributes to the understanding of the effects of finance on labour by reviewing and synthesising a large volume of literature.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the research on private equity by studying the drivers of leveraged buyout (LBO) operating performance in Latin America. The authors consider a large set of candidate drivers (financial, governance, macroeconomic and industry variables) and study their effects on performance over short- and long-terms.

To conduct this study, the authors used Capital IQ as a database as well as a hand-collected data set covering LBO in Latin America from 2000 to 2008.

The empirical results show that macroeconomic variables have an important impact on LBO value creation. Governance variables show also that LBO transactions reduce information asymmetries between existing and new management teams. Consequently, a concentrated shareholder structure has a better impact on performance than diluted stockholders. Financial variables present significant effects after the delisting.

The characteristics of the debts included in the balance sheets (maturity for example) are not available in the authors' data basis. A test including this information could bring other elements of explanation. The measure of cumulative abnormal returns around going-private announcements and their impacts on shareholder’s value could also be of interest. This last study has been published for the UK (Wright et al., 2006). Further research should introduce other continents and particularly Asia in the analysis but also comparisons between the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) countries.

This study makes five main contributions. First, the authors construct an LBO sample with emerging markets and specially Latin America. It is the first time that an academic article has been realized. Data are very difficult to obtain to do empirical tests. Latin America is a part of emerging markets, which is an interesting study subject due to their attractiveness in terms of growth of private equity funds. Second, to understand clearly how LBOs create value, the authors construct a sample control to highlight the key factors. Criteria of size, sector of activity and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes were strictly enforced. Third, the authors do not focus on the moment where the transaction is realized like many studies but before and after the delisting. Indeed, they observed, on the one hand, the operating performance between year −1 and year +1 and, on the other hand, the operating performance between year −1 and year +3. Generally, only the market reaction around the acquisition announcement is examined. Post-performance is not considered due to lack of data. Fourth, the authors take into account the macroeconomic effects on performance of LBOs. It is the first examination of the impact of macroeconomic factors on performance of LBOs in Latin America. And fifth, they analyze the impact of going-private decisions on employees.

Increases in stockholder wealth around leveraged recapitalization (recap) announcements are related more to reductions in the firm's financial slack than improvements in operating efficiency. Moreover, while recaps significantly reduce the firm's workforce and asset base, they do not improve operating profitability. These results support the argument (often espoused by non‐finance writers) that the market for corporate control is inefficient and, in many cases, outright destructive. Alternative systems of corporate governance should be explored.

The purpose of this exploratory study is to gain a better understanding of the motivations behind private equity (PE) activities in Australia.

This paper reports findings arising from face‐to‐face semi‐structured interviews with individuals representing stakeholders in the market for private equity; namely, PE partners and finance professionals. Interviews were conducted in two stages, during the pre‐Global Financial Crisis (GFC) period (2007‐2008) and the post‐GFC period (2012).

In general, the stakeholders interviewed perceive that the motivations behind PE bids are not well understood, and they highlight the need for more education. They state that PE enables a company's management to make decisions more promptly; capture opportunities more effectively; reduce paperwork for executives; provide no accountability to a broad investor base; and most importantly create value for a business, as the ownership is more closely involved with the management in the day‐to‐day operations of the business. According to the interviewees, since the GFC, PE firm reputation and track record are considered to be even more crucial than before the GFC, as debt providers in particular have become more wary when lending.

The findings have implications for the agency relationship model. The principals' role might appear to be more tightly aligned with that of the agent, and so are their motivations, thus reducing monitoring costs, but post‐GFC interview responses indicate that this might not necessarily be the case. Concerns over empire building and gains through transaction costs were raised. The paper concludes by drawing from the insights gained by the authors from the interview data. Although it is only a small part of the economy's Gross Domestic Product, PE activity has helped Australia become a more competitive business economy.

Corporate finance is under attack. Commentators mention that corporate managers have enriched themselves and shareholders, and in the process have failed to consider the interests of all stakeholders (Hennessy, 1989, Alkhafaji, 1989, Newton, 1989, Dunfee, 1989, Steidlmeier, 1989, Jones and Hunt, 1991). They cite the active corporate control market that produced hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and corporate restructuring activity, all presumably causing a reduction in social welfare. This view is now beginning to permeate itself into the financial education debate. For example, Hawley (1991) suggests that financial educators are abdicating their responsibility of helping prepare corporate managers to recognize and deal with business ethics‐social responsibility effectively. Hawley proposes that the shareholder wealth maximization model for corporate management rationalizes the commission of unethical or socially irresponsible actions. Because of this ongoing criticism being levied against the practice of corporate finance, financial educators are now moving to incorporate ethics in the finance curricula. Although this move may be welcomed, we suggest that financial educators proceed with caution.

The management of a diversified corporation needs to be able to recognize new opportunities for profitable growth. And it also needs to know when one of its businesses is no longer compatible with long‐range growth plans. The symptoms may be a short‐term or long‐term lack of profit, a lack of fit, a need for cash, or a business with volatile year‐to‐year earnings that make it unattractive to Wall Street. However, once divestment comes into the picture, the first thing management needs to consider is, can the unit be sold without materially affecting its continuing lines of business.

The paper aims to look at the growth of private equity and to consider the concerns that the public and media have raised, as well as the response to these concerns.

This article is an opinion piece based on current and recent trends.

It is difficult to ascertain whether the publics’ concerns are real or are media lead. The tax changes have also caused concern in the private equity business with a belief that they will drive investors out of the UK market and reduce the competitiveness and attractiveness of the UK for the private equity investor.

The key may involve more transparency in the private equity industry as this may help resolve some of the growing public and political distrust. The paper also suggests that to attain a better understanding in this area, the competitive position of the UK market needs to be recognised.

The purpose of this paper is to review and analyze policies where employee share ownership might be relevant to the inequality debate in the USA.

Description and analysis of policy alternatives designed to increase the prevalence of employee ownership in the USA economy.

Since 1974, Congress has passed many provisions to encourage employee ownership, all with widespread bipartisan support. Additional policies would have an even greater impact. Congress could “level the playing field” for corporate divestitures and sales of companies by private equity firms; create Employee Ownership Investment Corporations, modeled after Small Business Investment Corporations, to provide capital for sales to employees; and create an Employee Equity Loan Program to guarantee loans for employee-ownership transactions. Such measures would have no budgetary impact. It could also create tax incentives to encourage corporate and private-equity sales to employees and establish regulations to ensure that employee-owned companies are eligible for the full benefit of recent opportunity zone legislation. Legislation could also encourage publicly traded companies to offer stock to employees at a discount and require companies that receive various forms of special treatment from the government to establish employee stock-ownership programs.

The academic journal literature has virtually no policy analyses on employee share ownership.