Search results

In March 1998, the first major revision of the European Merger Control Regulation (MCR) came into effect with particular implications for the demarcation of authority for merger control between member states and European level competition authorities and for the treatment of joint ventures. The overall balance of the reform is mixed. Changes to the threshold test, for example, ensure that the MCR will capture proposed concentrations which have a Community dimension but which were missed by the original test. However, the cost of the revision is greater complexity and, with this, greater opacity. Both tests are form‐based and deal with aggregate turnover and are insufficiently sensitive to capture the competition effects of the merger in individual product markets. Article 9 implicitly recognises this flaw by providing a second decentralisation test. Again, the revision of Article 9 has added to the complexity of the operation of the MCR. An alternative would be to dispense with Article 9 altogether. The revisions improve the consistency of the MCR by introducing a “one stop shop” for the treatment of joint ventures, some of which were previously dealt with under Article 85. However, the codification of joint venture provisions creates a situation in which the Commission is required to investigate aspects of a joint venture which are national rather than European in nature.

Examines, with special regard to business, the operation of certain aspects of the Merger Control Regulation (MCR), particularly the “one‐stop‐shop‐approach”, that is likely to be reappraised at the forthcoming inter‐governmental conference or the scheduled review of the MCR. Uses the critical concepts of certainty, uniformity and transparency, to explore the scope and effectiveness of the “one‐stop‐shop‐approach” with regard to: definition of a community dimension; distinct markets (Article 9 MCR) and parallel EC/member state enforcement (Article 21 MCR and Article 223 Treaty of Rome). Looks at the role of subsidiarity. Addresses the questionable interpretation by the Commission of the MCR’s applicability to oligopolistic dominance. Considers the proposal for an independent cartel office, particularly with regard to enhancing transparency and certainty in decision making. Concludes by proposing an alternative definition of community dimension, not based on the size of the parties measured by aggregate turnover of all their products, but rather on the competition spillover effects on the specific product markets affected by the concentration.

Notes that the notion of a “substantial part” of the Common Market (European Union) has significance in terms of European competitive regulation and policy. Points out that without this term European competition policy would be limited to cases involving the whole of the Community. Examines a range of competing interpretations of this key term and reveals that the European Court and the European Commission have adopted different interpretations in dealing with the issue of a “substantial part”. Considers the reasons for this divergence and suggests that proposals for revisions to Article 9 of the Merger Control Regulation may end the divergence.

The European Commission’s competence to vet mergers at the Community level is primarily derived from the Merger Control Regulation (MCR) 1989, amended 1997, which established a concentration architecture based on separate, non‐overlapping jurisdictional spheres for member states and the Commission, with the Commission alone having jurisdiction over concentrations with a competition concern which potentially have a Community impact. Under the MCR, Community impact is determined by the two Community Dimension (CD) tests employing a numerical form‐based approach. The paper examines the Commission’s 2000 report on aspects of the MCR, particularly the appropriateness of the key CD tests in guaranteeing that all concentrations with a Community impact are centralised to the Commission, while those which are national in impact are dealt with at the member state level. It reveals that the tests are ineffective and undermine the goal of the concentration architecture. A streamlined single CD test is advanced and a radical alternative is put forward – based not on separate jurisdictional spheres but where the Commission and member states competition authorities form a network of co‐operation to regulate concentrations.

Demonstrates that the European Union (EU) has moved from a twin‐track to a triple‐track approach to the vetting of cross‐border competition concerns. The twin‐track approach is based on co‐operation at the multilateral and bilateral levels. The new third track, not based on co‐operation, is the legal right to unilaterally apply competition instruments extraterritorially. The EU has pushed to establish a multilateral approach through the auspices of the World Trade Organisation. Although there has been some support for this, the reservations from the USA and others make this track unfeasible for the foreseeable future. In the absence of any significant multilateral progress, the EU has concluded bilateral agreements with major partners, but the approach has its limitations – the EU can only deal with the countries with which it has such an agreement. The Commission’s third track unilaterally applies EU competition instruments extraterritorially using the effects doctrine.

The paper discusses how the Commission is shaping a decentralisation policy in the antitrust field. The paper details the procedural architecture ‐ “degrees of priority”, “preconditions for decentralisation” and “Community interest” ‐ which gives the Commission sole discretion to decide whether an antitrust case is dealt with by Brussels or is referred to a Member State. It reveals that the decentralisation procedure has been set up by the Commission, with the blessing of the Community courts, but with little real consultation with the Member States. The paper points out that the decision whether to decentralise turns on a new, qualitative and Commission decided Community interest test. The paper emphasises that the Community interest test runs in parallel with ‐ and has a similar function to ‐ a number of decentralisation provisions which already exist. The final section of the paper contrasts Community interest as a decentralisation test with the rival, and pre‐existing, quantitative approach to decentralisation ‐ the Community dimension test ‐ contained in the EC Merger Control Regulation (MCR). It explains that both tests have strengths and weaknesses and that the recent reform of the MCR has not fully addressed these concerns in respect to Community dimension. The paper’s main conclusion is that the Commission’s appropriation of the ability to decide which Member States are competent to deal with decentralised antitrust cases has created the possibility of a fragmented or two‐speed Europe in competition regulation.

The EU Commission's radical proposals to change the rule set controlling the implementation of Article 81 and 82 in antitrust matters are critically explored in this paper. This includes the Commission's reasoning behind the proposed changes, particularly the assertion that it will lead to a more effective application of community antitrust instruments, thus helping to safeguard the Single Market. The aim of the proposals is to establish a network of cooperating enforcers applying Articles 81 and 82 in an effective and uniform way, with the Commission guaranteeing this. The proposed decentralisation of antitrust applications stands in marked contrast to merger control at the EU level, with the Commission retaining exclusive jurisdiction over mergers having a community dimension. However, the Commission, in the longer term, particularly in the light of enlargement, is much more likely to rethink the architecture of EU merger control.

Examines the pioneering work of the European Commission, with the support of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of First Instance (ECFI), to apply the merger control of regulation (MCR) to situations of collective as well as to single dominance. Reveals that the Commission first applied the notion of collective dominance in the Nestlé Perrier merger in 1992 but that the legality of this practice was questionable, given that the express wording of the MCR does not mention the notion. The legal challenge arose from the takeover of Mitteldeutsche Kali AG by Kali und Salz with the landmark judgment favouring the stance of the Commission – the MCR does encompass situations of collective dominance. Examines why the court reached this decision, particularly given that the Advocate General’s opinion was exactly the opposite.

The purpose of this paper is to present the background to the development of the World Towns’ Framework, developed in June 2016 at the inaugural World Towns Leadership Summit in Scotland. The paper also provides an academic underpinning to the four pillars of the agreement; a unique sense of identity and place, economy, leadership and citizenship and environment. It ends with a call to action for practitioners, policymakers and organisations providing support to people in places who want to contribute to the development of the Framework and adopt it.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first section gives the background to the development of the World Towns Framework. The second section publishes the World Towns Framework in its entirety. The third section builds an evidence-base for the components or pillars of the World Towns Framework, based upon work undertaken by the think tanks and academic partners involved in its development. The final section sets out a call for action – explaining how the Framework can be further developed and utilised.

The paper contains three main contributions. It articulates a new narrative for towns, neighbourhoods and city districts in responding to contemporary urban challenges; it shapes a new urban agenda for these urban places and it asserts the need for new alliances and approaches essential for a strong competitive economy, which is more inclusive of towns and smaller places, combined with a fairer, more equal society.

The evidence base for the research is limited to the work that has been carried out by the academic institutions and think tanks that supported the development of the World Towns’ Framework.

The practical implication of the World Towns Framework are a shared understanding of how towns and smaller places can engage in management, development and marketing practices that will lead to a stronger economy and fairer society.

The focus upon place uniqueness and identity, a more equitable economy, a greener and cleaner environment and stronger place leadership and citizenship can lead to better, fairer and more liveable places.

This is the first attempt to develop a World Towns Framework to shape urban change outside of cities and metropoles.

Reports of a number of countries imposing a limited ban on the use of D.D.T. have appeared from time to time in the B.F.J., but in the last few months, what was a trickle seems to have become an avalanche. In Canada, for example, relatively extensive restrictions apply from January 1st, permitting D.D.T. for insect control in only 12 agricultural crops, compared with 62 previously; there is a reduction of maximum levels for most fruits to 1 ppm. Its cumulative properties in fat are recognized and the present levels of 7 ppm in fat of cattle, sheep and pigs are to remain, but no trace is permitted in milk, butter, cheese, eggs, ice cream, other dairy products, nor potatoes. A U.S. Commission has advised that D.D.T. should be gradually phased out and completely banned in two years' time, followed by the Report of the Advisory Committee on Pesticides and Other Toxic Chemicals recommending withdrawal in Britain of some of the present uses of D.D.T. (also aldrin and dieldrin) on farm crops when an alternative becomes available. Further recommendations include an end to D.D.T. in paints, lacquers, oil‐based sprays and in dry cleaning; and the banning of small retail packs of D.D.T. and dieldrin for home use in connection with moth‐proofing or other insect control. The Report states that “domestic users are often unaware that using such packs involve the risk of contaminating prepared food immediately before it is eaten”.