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This chapter discusses the challenges and opportunities that exist in the realm of management and business education. The author provides an in-depth analysis of the history and development of management education, highlighting the changes and evolution that have occurred over time. Furthermore, the author discusses the dominant paradigm that has shaped management education and the issues that have arisen as a result. Specifically, the author identifies the problems that have contributed to financial crises and business failures, demonstrating the inadequacies of the current approach. Finally, the author argues for the need to revolutionize the current management education system. This involves a significant departure from the traditional methods of teaching and learning, and instead emphasizes the development of critical thinking skills, problem-solving abilities and adaptability in a rapidly changing business landscape. This chapter challenges the current state of management education and offers a compelling call to action for reform. By addressing the issues that have plagued the field and proposing innovative solutions, the author aims to pave the way for a more responsible management education system.

This research chapter argues lawyers, not just bankers, for good and bad have been involved in all aspects of the current financial crisis. Indeed after examining and assessing various civil causes of action related to the “Mortgage Meltdown” and its aftermath, it appears if lawyers had been less involved or had raised warnings about legal risks as well as economic ones, whether the financial impact would have been so disastrous and widespread. Indeed by raising cautionary flags earlier, lawyers might have better served both the clients’ and the public's long-term interests. This view thus complements issues related to criminally prosecuting mortgage fraud that has also seen explosive growth and where lawyers have again played central roles. Lawyers have been involved at the back end too in terms of legislation or resolving issues such as bankruptcies and foreclosures.

The chapter examines several causes of action the media have reported being raised by various parties and how they illustrate the role lawyers, regulations, and legislation have played in the origins and evolution of the current crisis. The cases explored involve individual parties and class actions. The chapter also analyzes in detail a case representing opposite ends of the origination and foreclosure closure spectrum by describing a derivative shareholder suit against corporate officers and directors actively involved in creating the subprime mess, who were then sued for covering up the inevitable results from failed loans in the reports to shareholders. It thus illustrates the legal complexities emerging from the abuse of complex financial and organizational structures impacting many investors. Finally the chapter concludes by arguing there is a public policy need not only for financial regulatory reform but also for a tightening in the professional standards and regulatory penalties imposed on lawyers involved in such transactions.

This paper sets out to analyze the current global financial crisis that originated in the US subprime mortgage market through the lens of the Kindleberger‐Aliber‐Minsky (KAM) paradigm as set forth in Kindleberger and Aliber's Manias, Panics and Crashes, to first examine the bubble's origins in the displacement caused by the internet collapse, the subsequent US recession, and the aggressive lowering of US interest rates. It shows how these events, combined with other technological and regulatory factors, resulted in a US housing bubble fueled by the aggressive securitization of mortgages by many large financial institutions, a reduction in their credit standards, and a lack of regulatory oversight. In this way it assesses the prime players in the process in terms of motivation and performance.

The paper explores how the process peaked and began to unravel as cash flows at the base of the financial pyramid built through securitization slowed. Once the supporting cash flow came under pressure and was questioned, several major players went bankrupt or took tremendous losses. It became apparent that risk and innovation had been improperly balanced, a prime characteristic of the KAM paradigm. Indeed, greed, innovation, and technology had combined to substantially reduce credit quality and increase leverage, vastly expanding the likelihood of a liquidity crisis and a substantial drop in the value of asset‐backed securities.

The analysis then examines why this effect had significant global dimensions, unlike, for example, the Japanese real estate and stock market collapse or the US internet boom and bust. The analysis also shows how market reactions have been in line with what might be expected under the KAM paradigm. It also conforms with what Robert Shiller and Edward Gramlich anticipated and with normal bank behavior in a credit crisis.

The paper assesses the policy responses to the crisis and their likely success under a KAM paradigm analysis. The proposed remedies already include the aggressive fiscal and lender of last resort monetary responses typical of the KAM paradigm but regulatory measures too. Further, as KAM notes, almost all booms and crashes involve scandals and scams. So not surprisingly there has been growing recourse to the courts seeking criminal and civil remedies. Also typical of such a dramatic boom and bust, governments are examining regulatory and legislative actions to address the current difficult economic and credit situation and to make sure that similar things do not occur in the future. But politics and a US presidential election are driving significant differences in approach. Under these circumstances what can the lens of the KAM paradigm tell us about the actions taken or proposed and what is or is not likely to work?

This paper aims to, by drawing on two decades of field work on Wall Street, explore the recent evolution in the gendering of Wall Street, as well as the potential effects – including the reproduction of financiers’ power – of that evolution. The 2008 financial crisis was depicted in strikingly gendered terms – with many commentators articulating a divide between masculine, greedy, risk-taking behavior and feminine, conservative, risk-averse approaches for healing the crisis. For a time, academics, journalists and women on Wall Street appeared to be in agreement in identifying women’s feminine styles as uniquely suited to lead – even repair – the economic debacle.

The article is based on historical research, in-depth interviews and fieldwork with the first generation of Wall Street women from the 1970s up until 2013.

In this article, it is argued that the preoccupation in feminine styles of leadership in finance primarily reproduces the power of white global financial elites rather than changes the culture of Wall Street or breaks down existent structures of power and inequality.

The research focuses primarily on the ways American global financial elites maintain power, and does not examine the ways in which the power of other international elites working in finance is reproduced in a similar or different manner.

The findings of the article provide practical implications for understanding the gendering of financial policy making and how that gendering maintains or reproduces the economic system.

The paper provides an understanding of how the gendered rhertoric of the financial crisis maintains not only the economic power of global financial elites in finance but also their social and cultural power.

The paper is based on original, unique, historical ethnographic research on the first generation of women on Wall Street.

Catastrophe (CAT) events associated with natural catastrophes and man-made disasters cause profound impacts on the insurance industry. This research thus reviews the impact of CAT risk on the insurance industry and how traditional reinsurance and securitized risk-transfer instruments are used for managing CAT risk.

This research reviews the impact of CAT risk on the insurance industry and how traditional reinsurance and securitized risk-transfer instruments are used for managing CAT risk. Apart from many negative influences, CAT events can increase the net revenue of the insurance industry around CAT events and improve insurance demand over the post-CAT periods. The underwriting cycle of reinsurance causes inefficiencies in transferring CAT risks. Securitized risk-transfer instruments resolve some inefficiencies of the reinsurance market, but are subject to moral hazard, basis risk, credit risk, regulatory uncertainty, etc. The authors introduce some popular securitized solutions and use Merton's structural framework to demonstrate how to value these CAT-linked securities. The hybrid solutions by combining reinsurance with securitized CAT instruments are expected to offer promising applications for CAT risk management.

The authors introduce some popular securitized solutions and use Merton's structural framework to demonstrate how to value these CAT-linked securities. The hybrid solutions by combining reinsurance with securitized CAT instruments are expected to offer promising applications for CAT risk management.

This research reviews a broad array of impacts of CAT risks on the (re)insurance industry. CAT events challenge (re)insurance capacity and influence insurers' supply decisions and reconstruction costs in the aftermath of catastrophes. While losses from natural catastrophes are the primary threat to property–casualty insurers, the mortality risk posed by influenza pandemics is a leading CAT risk for life insurers. At the same time, natural catastrophes and man-made disasters cause distinct impacts on (re)insures. Man-made disasters can increase the correlation between insurance stocks and the overall market, and natural catastrophes reduce the above correlation. It should be noted that huge CAT losses can also improve (re)insurance demand during the postevent period and thus bring long-term effects to the (re)insurance industry.

The current crisis in the mortgage securitization industry highlights significant failures in our models of how markets work and our political will, organizational capability, and ideological desire to intervene in markets. This article shows that one of the main sources of failure has been the lack of a coherent understanding of how these markets came into existence, how tactics and strategies of the principal firms in these markets have evolved over time, and how we ended up with the economic collapse of the main firms. It seeks to provide some insight into these processes by compiling both historical and quantitative data on the emergence and spread of these tactics across the largest investment banks and their principal competitors from the mortgage origination industry. It ends by offering some policy proscriptions based on the analysis.

To provide an overview of the new uniform definition of “branch office” and to discuss how that definition will influence broker‐dealer supervisory programs.

Discusses the new definition of “branch office”, describes new NASD and New York Stock Exchange supervisory control system requirements and supervisory requirements for branch offices and other locations, and suggests guidelines for developing a branch office or remote office supervisory program.

In the current regulatory environment, no broker‐dealer should overlook regular and rigorous attention to supervision of branch offices and other remote locations. And in light of the new definition of a branch office, each broker‐dealer must include in its review and analysis a close evaluation of how the broker‐dealer supervises every location where broker‐dealer personnel engage in activities on behalf of the broker‐dealer and must document that evaluation.

Important reference for broker‐dealers’ branch office supervisory programs that underscores the need to pay proper attention to remote locations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse employees’ lying behaviour and its findings have important implication for the management and prevention strategies of lying in the workplace. Employee lying has caused both reputational and financial damage to employers, organisations and public authorities. This study adopts a psycho-cognitive perspective to examine the mechanism of lying reduction and the influence envy has on lying behaviour.

Incorporating social comparison phenomenon and cognate studies this study suggests that envy may restrain people from lying in the workplace. Specific hypotheses are developed and tested with 271 participants using dice game scenarios.

Research findings have found that people are likely to lie if lying brings them benefits. However, the findings also reveal that the envy aroused between two people may act as a psychological barrier to reduce the tendency to lie.

The research findings have provided an alternative perspective to the current prevailing view of envy as a negative emotion. Envy need not always be negative. Envy can provide an internal drive for people to work harder and enhance themselves but it can also act as a brake mechanism and self-regulator to reduce lying, and thereby has a potentially positive value.

On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and nearly caused a meltdown of the financial system. This article looks at the situation before Lehman went bankrupt and how this event came to trigger a financial panic during the fall of 2008 and early 2009. Two key ideas inform the analysis. The first is that what triggers financial panics are typically hidden losses. The second is that confidence plays a key role in financial panics and that confidence can be conceptualized as a belief that action can be based on proxy signs, rather than on direct information about the situation itself.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether switching to a CEO of the opposite sex affects the tax aggressiveness of firms.

Regression analysis using a difference in difference approach and propensity score matching on a dataset of 8,798 firms from 2007 to 2017.

The authors find evidence that switching to a female CEO reduces the effective tax rate paid, implying a higher level of tax aggressiveness.

The findings contradict the narrative that female CEOs are less tax aggressive.

The authors are the first (to the best of the authors' knowledge) to specifically investigate if changing the CEO gender has an impact on the effective tax rate paid by the firm.