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This study empirically examines the moderating role of geopolitical risk on the tourism–economic growth nexus by applying a recent geopolitical risk indicator developed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2022) in a cross-country panel data growth model context for a sample of 24 countries.

A Dummy Variable Least Squares panel data model, nonparametric covariance matrix estimator and SYS-GMM estimation techniques are employed for the analysis. The authors capture the GPR moderating effect by disaggregating the cross-country sample according to low versus high country GPR score and through a GPR interaction coefficient. Several controls are included in the models such as gross fixed capital formation and—consistent with Barro (1990)—government consumption. Trade openness is used to account for the export-led growth effect. In line with neoclassical growth theory (e.g. Barro, 1991), the authors also include the real interest rate, to account for policy makers' commitment to macroeconomic stability, financial depth, as a proxy for financial development, population growth and the level of secondary school education. The authors also control for unobserved country-specific and time-invariant effects.

The research finds that the interaction term of geopolitical risk significantly contributes to the predictive ability of the regression and provides empirical evidence that confirms that only in low geopolitical risk countries international tourism positively and significantly contributes to economic growth. Important theoretical and policy implications flow from these findings.

The study not only contributes to advancing academic knowledge on the tourism–growth nexus, it also has impact beyond academia. Many countries have in the past pursued and many continue to pursue, tourism specialization and/or tourism-led growth strategies based on the theoretically well-established and empirically validated positive link between inbound tourism and economic growth. The findings alert policy makers in such countries to the significant moderating role that geopolitical risk plays in affecting the above-mentioned relationship and to the importance of prioritizing geopolitical stability as a policy precursor for the successful implementation of such strategies.

Dust (particulate matters) is very dangerous to our health as it is not visible with our naked eyes. Emissions of dust concentrations in the natural environment can occur mainly by road traffic, constructions and dust generating working environments. The purpose of this paper is to assess the ambient dust pollution status and to find out the association between PM concentrations and other determinant factors such as wind speed, ambient temperature, relative humidity and traffic congestion.

A cross-sectional study was conducted for two consecutive months (June and July, 2016) at a residential site (Defence Services Liver Hospital, Mingaladon) and a commercial site (Htouk-kyant Junction, Mingaladon) based on WHO Air Quality Reference Guideline Value (24-hour average). Hourly monitoring of PM2.5 and PM10 concentration and determinant factors such as traffic congestion, wind speed, ambient temperature and relative humidity for 24 hours a day was performed in both study sites. CW-HAT200 handheld particulate matters monitoring device was used to assess PM concentrations, temperature and humidity while traffic congestion was monitored by CCTV cameras.

The baseline PM2.5 and PM10 concentrations of Mingaladon area were (28.50±11.49)µg/m³ and (52.69±23.53)µg/m³, means 61.48 percent of PM2.5 concentration and 54.92 percent of PM10 concentration exceeded than the WHO reference value during the study period. PM concentration usually reached a peak during early morning (within 3:00 a.m.-5:00 a.m.) and at night (after 9:00 p.m.). PM2.5 concentration mainly depends on traffic congestion and temperature (adjusted R²=0.286), while PM10 concentration depends on traffic congestion and relative humidity (adjusted R²=0.292). Wind speed played a negative role in both PM2.5 and PM10 concentration with r=−0.228 and r=−0.266.

The air quality of the study area did not reach the satisfiable condition. The main cause of increased dust pollution in the whole study area was high traffic congestion (R²=0.63 and 0.60 for PM2.5 and PM10 concentration).

Regulatory authorities in Myanmar are increasing banks’ independence in providing loans to facilitate better financial resource allocations. On the other hand, not only in the USA but also among European countries, policymakers are designing regulations that could reduce banks’ autonomies in risk management and decrease risk taking behaviour. These governments have made policy interventions in their banking sectors which could be identified as repressive policies. They are commonly justified as macro-prudential regulations rather than financial repression. However, the authors are yet to understand as to what extent regulations need to be tightened or loosened up to reach optimal risk-taking behaviour. Using Myanmar as an example where the extreme form of governmental interventions and prudential regulations exists, this paper aims to identify the effectiveness of such policies.

This paper relies on a case study of the Myanmar’s Banking Sector. The paper adopts of the synthesis of institutional theory and Oliver’s strategic response to identify how banks respond to repressive financial policies. The empirical evidence is collected through conducting 16 interviews including banks’ general managers, deputy chairmen and loan officers. Afterwards, the authors analysed the data using categorical thematic analysis with the assistance of NVIVO.

First of all, the extent to which repressive financial measures enforced on banks differ depending on their political affiliations and ownership structures. Second, though repressive policies were enforced on banks to curb risk taking behaviour among banks and maintain financial stability, Myanmar banks themselves had inherent nature of risk aversion towards lending. Third, in Myanmar, financial repression does not always mean banks need to compromise their efficiency in profit maximisation to achieve legitimacy from the regulatory authorities. If the formal constraints were not in line with economic actors’ internal objectives, a different set of rules of the game were formed.

This paper provides new evidences for the controversial subject on financial repression and liberalisation through analysing micro level data of banks’ lending practice rather than using aggregate macro-level data. Bank-level information provides banks’ concerns, challenges and their loan assessment process while operating under repressive financial policies. This study is also unique in the sense that it is contributing to the limited academic literature on Myanmar’s financial system. It represents the last surviving case of repressed financial system and the presence governmental interventions and prudential regulations. Hence, it was used as an example to identify the effectiveness of such policies.

Many transition economies are former socialist planned economies and have undergone market reforms of their financial sector to signal their transition towards democracy. However, governments in these countries have been reluctant to relinquish the pre-existing controls on economy and have adopted nuanced and sophisticated approaches to retain control. In such context, scholars may find it challenging to investigate the role played by the state in the success or failure of attempted market reforms. This work investigates the different forms of state-induced accounting controls that may preserve the status quo within the economy during transition, using Myanmar as an example.

The authors adopted a longitudinal qualitative research method aiming to reveal the very processes and mechanisms used by the banks and their evolution over time. This method is in accordance with the historical institutionalist perspective that they have applied within this research.

The authors found that the Myanmar government embarked on the privatisation of their financial sector from 1990 to 2016 as a major public sector reform initiative. Under the guise of market reforms, it used both state-led and market-led controls to emulate and retain the socialist banking model where banks are used to fund the immediate government's budget deficits. This created a series of intended and unintended consequences, resulting in the ultimate failure of the government's market reforms.

Previously, research on public sector management accounting in emerging economies was not relying consistently on using theory. The relative limited theorisation led to gaps when attempting to understand and explain the opaque forms of state control mechanisms in transition economies. By applying historical institutionalist perspective, and a more theory-driven, reflective approach to the interpretation of the data collected, the authors have provided a deeper insight and understanding on how different forms of state controls can emerge, adapt and persist in transition economies such as Myanmar.

The authors demonstrated that though the state may have implemented market reforms to signal regimes change, this does not necessarily mean that the government has relinquished their control on the economy. The state could take a more sophisticated, covert approach towards state controls leading to both intended and unintended consequences. Thus, even if the state's preferences change, the decisions cannot be easily reversed, as path-dependent state controls may have become pervasive affecting any further institutional and policy developments. Thus, the authors suggest that governments in both transition and developed economies should be cautious when enacting regulations on corporate control.

In this paper, the authors have applied a historical institutional perspective in their analysis instead of the more widely used sociological, institutionalist approach. This allowed authors to harness rich longitudinal data indicating that market reforms and their success or failure should be examined as an ongoing process rather than a completed action. This is especially important in transition economies where the state may be unwilling to renounce the existing controls on the industry and may resort to more opaque forms of state control, eventually obstructing the intended reforms.