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This paper aims to assess the effectiveness of the Bribery Act 2010 in curbing corporate bribery.

The paper takes a doctrinal focus in assessing UK bribery law using both primary and secondary sources.

This paper finds that the effectiveness of the Bribery Act 2010 in curbing bribery lies in its approach of changing the basis for corporate criminal liability from focusing on the guilt of personnel within the company to focusing on the quality of the system governing the activities of the company. Companies have to address the risks of bribery or risk facing liability for failure to prevent bribery. With its regulatory approach to corporate liability, coupled with its extraterritorial reach, the Bribery Act is likely to change business cultures that facilitate bribery, thereby proving an effective law to corporate bribes.

This paper highlights the deficiency of earlier laws in tackling corporate bribery, examines the crime of bribery from a company law perspective and argues that the regulatory strategy in the Bribery Act is likely to be an effective tool against bribery.

The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 prompted a significant debate on corporate governance and shareholder empowerment. A question arises as to whether shareholders ought to be further empowered to have a greater influence over the companies’ activities. Yet, it is not self-evident that shareholder empowerment ensures better-run companies’ corporate activities. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to critically examine, identify and explain the corporate regulation forms and control collectively to evaluate the effectiveness of shareholder empowerment fully.

To do so, this paper sets out a comparative analysis approach between two jurisdictions, the UK and Delaware in the USA. The paper further addresses by undertaking three case studies; Barclays Plc which illustrated the Comply or Explain role, AVIVA (2012) that concentrated on the impact of the shareholder revolt, and the case of Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic (2000), which involved a claim brought by shareholders on the grounds of a breach of fiduciary duty.

This paper argues that the shareholder empowerment theoretically provides an effective means through which corporate activities can be regulated. However, to do this, account must be taken that a distinction should be made between long-term and short-term investors to encourage shareholder engagement by responsible long-term investors. Furthermore, the shareholders can exercise their powers effectively and influence the Board’s decision to award executive compensation.

This paper offered two distinct contributions: assessing whether in times of crisis shareholder empowerment represents a way to regulate corporate activities and by assessing the distinction between the perception of shareholder empowerment and the reality in practice.