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The main thesis of the chapter is to introduce a new idea to the field of peace negotiations, which will require the development of a new model of negotiations to enforce peace. The existing models of peace negotiations highlight the existence of a positive peace dividend to parties involved in conflicts and peace negotiation. They, hence, usually highlight a gradual and dynamic adjustment, or movement, away from a conflict-ridden outcome towards a peaceful outcome that offers a positive peace dividend to all relevant stakeholders. In comparison with the status quo, peace brings additional economic returns and peace therefore offers a win–win situation. Despite the fact that a win–win situation does not ensure the enforcement of peace, as agents can easily get locked into what is commonly known as the prisoners' dilemma – yet the possibility of Pareto improvement makes negotiations for peace somewhat artificial. At least in the short run all agents involved in active conflicts are apprehensive of peace as they expect immediate (expected) returns from making peace can outweigh the expected returns from conflicts. An important work that sidesteps the win–win situation of peace dividends is by Isard and Azis (1999) who introduced the possibility of an immediate loss of economic returns from the peace process in their conflict management procedure (CMP). However, in the existing work on CMP, the long-run returns from peace outweigh that from conflicts. One therefore presumes that peace brings economic benefits to all. The existing CMPs therefore assume away any possibility of lower economic returns from peace. There are some important models in which peace negotiations are also modelled as a zero-sum game in which the gain of a party represents a loss to others, which is known as win–lose negotiations. In this work we introduce the possibility of bargaining and negotiations against the backdrop of potential immediate losses while peace is favoured simply for its intrinsic value and not for pecuniary returns. In the real world, there is evidence to believe that agents involved in conflicts are painfully aware of two things: first, the decision-making agents who choose between conflicts vis-à-vis peace are the leaders who get rarely affected by economic returns from conflicts or peace. It is usually the foot soldiers who bear the brunt of costly conflicts and can benefit from peace. Secondly, most people value peace for the sake of it as peace has an intrinsic value that ensures the protection of rights and their lives and protection from violence. Thus, peace is a collective good that provides little extra economic returns to actual decision-makers who choose between courses of conflicts or peace.

The paper outlines and examines a social‐institutional conception of income inequality or economic distribution. The fundamental proposition of this conception is that income inequality/distribution is far from being the outcome of the operation of strictly market laws or economic forces but rather one of institutional arrangements or social structures. Of the latter particularly important have shown to be the institutional structure of the economy, particularly labour markets, as well as the degree of democracy of political systems. The results suggest transcending single‐factor economic explanations and predictions of income inequality, as implied in the Kuznets curve and its ramifications, in favour of an alternative multilevel sociological approach.

Illustrates and explicates the proposition that the critique of exploitation and injustice found in contemporary Liberation Theology is theologically grounded, in that these phenomena are rebuked as discordant with God′s will, as revealed by textual re‐examination of the Bible, notably the Old Testament, not merely as socially undesirable, by examination of four central themes: (1) the Old Testament characterization of God as hater of exploitation, lover of justice, and Liberator of the oppressed; (2) the Biblical depiction of the character and methods of oppression and exploitation and the identification of oppressors and oppressed; (3) the Old Testament model of stages in the liberative process and vision of a future society characterized by peace, freedom, justice, equality, community, and prosperity; (4) significant elements of continuity between Old and New Testament on these issues.

Introduction The connection between wealth and virtue or between economics and ethics has been severed. Pure or positive economics is believed to be objective and scientific, based on facts alone, while normative or ethical reasoning is believed to be less reliable and non scientific because it is subjective, value‐laden and prone to prejudice and personal preferences.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that free market capitalism is neither efficient nor just. This is in spite of the claims made by its proponents who, utilizing Adam Smith's doctrine of invisible hand or the fundamental theorem of welfare economics, assume that it is efficient, just, smooth functioning, and self‐regulating.

The paper utilizes conceptual/theoretical research and arguments that have emerged in the literatures of public economics and welfare economics.

In addition to proving the above, the paper also finds that Adam Smith is actually a moral egalitarian, thus he could not have agreed with Nozick and Friedman regarding the nature of capitalism. To the extent that Smith supported free market capitalism, it was because he thought, in contrast to mercantilist policies, that free markets would lead to equity and justice.

The paper is an original/valuable contribution since it rescues Adam Smith from the extreme proponents of laissez‐faire capitalism who claim him.

This study examines whether the Hong Kong stock market overreacts. By using monthly return data of all the common stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from January 1980 to December 1995, it examines the profitability of a contrarian strategy of buying prior losers and selling prior winners. The evidence shows that prior losers outperform prior winners by up to 68.59% in the subsequent five‐year test period. This finding can be interpreted as investors' tendency to react over‐optimistically to positive information and over‐pessimistically to negative information, thus causing stock prices to take temporary swing away from their intrinsic values and then reverse back subsequently. Our result is consistent with that documented by Debondt and Thaler (1985) for the U.S. market. This study also investigates whether seasonality accounts for the abnormal return but finds that the overreaction effect is not caused by the well‐known January effect. Further tests are conducted to investigate whether changes in betas of the winners and losers account for the abnormal return. The evidence shows that such changes are also minor, which cannot explain the price reversal phenomenon.