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Considers one possible strategy for ensuring JANET’s continued growth and development, namely to introduce advertising on JANET web pages. Despite this strict policy of no commercial activity on JANET, a few passive advertisements are in fact permitted. Research into the feasibility of advertising was conducted by interviewing and by questionnaire. Key players involved in this topic and a number of JANET users were questioned. The best solution to the problem would be to allow Higher education institutions (HEIs) the choice of paying for an advert‐free JANET or receiving a free JANET with adverts.However, there would probably be more resistance on the part of HEIs to paying for JANET than keeping the service free of charge but containing advertisements.Therefore, it is recommended that advertising be placed on JANET for a trial period. During this period, reactions from users an the HEIs should be gathered.

This chapter examines the ‘new lateral surveillance’, spearheaded by government anti-terrorism campaigns urging citizens to report any suspicious people and objects they encounter. Drawing a comparison between this and the community crime prevention (CCP) programmes of past decades, the chapter discusses the likely effectiveness of such campaigns in controlling crime and increasing security, suggests an alternative interpretation and discusses the consequences of the culture of suspicion generated by this form of surveillance. It concludes that the new lateral surveillance is a form of ‘high policing’ that is both political and dangerous in its vulnerability to errors.

Since the 1980s, higher education institutions in many developed Western countries have been facing competition for resources, have undergone economic rationalisation, adopted a New Public Management style of performance management and aspired to meet global standards of quality. This chapter explores the self-tracking practices of academic institutions and workers as they negotiate a field that has moved away from a quality evaluation system based primarily on social reputation towards one based increasingly on quantified outcome indicators. Universities typically measure research performance not only in terms of quantity of outputs but also the ‘attention capital’ they receive, for example, the number of citations or awards and prizes. These metrics and the emphasis on attention capital generally encourage a culture of competition rather than collaboration, while promoting the ‘celebrification’ of academic life. We argue that this trend has been intensified by technologies that gamify research achievements, continuously update citation and ‘read’ counts, and promote networked reputation. Under these conditions, academic institutions and workers have attempted to pursue a variety of positioning strategies that represent different degrees of conformity, resistance and compromise to the power of metrics.