Search results

This chapter's objective is to analyze, with a long-term perspective, the formation of an entrepreneurial culture in Mexico's Midwest, specifically in the state of Jalisco, in terms of the geographical environment, the culture in general, and the local economic institutions that, when viewed interconnectedly, will globally impact the practices, representations, and imaginaries of persons who at a given time have made the decision to undertake profitable economic activities – individual and collective entrepreneurs, in other words. To this end, we have divided the text into two sections. In the first, we conceptually review what we understand as entrepreneurial culture; in principle, we deconstruct its terms and then conjugate them from a social science perspective. We also emphasize the importance of studying the milieu as a scenario of action with different arenas, where a variety of agents have been involved. In the second part, without sidelining conceptual analysis, we present concrete empirical evidence of the role played by culture and local economic institutions that shape entrepreneurial culture in Midwestern Mexico over time, specifically in Jalisco. The text ends with some final considerations.

Our research is about the trade in material goods from Asia to Europe over this period, and its impact on Europe’s consumer and industrial cultures. It entails a comparative study of Europe’s East India Companies and the private trade from Asia over the period. The commodities trade was heavily dependent on private trade. The historiography to date has left a blind spot in this area, concentrating instead on corruption and malfeasance. Taking a global history approach we investigate the trade in specific consumer goods in many qualities and varieties that linked merchant communities and stimulated information flows. We set out how private trade functioned alongside and in connection with the various European East India companies; we investigate how this changed over time, how it drew on the Company infrastructure, and how it took the risks and developed new and niche markets for specific Asian commodities that the Companies could not sustain.

A newly discovered energy source is expected to make a positive contribution to the economic growth of the country. To some extent, it is even thought that this is the underlying difference between developed and developing countries today. However, in history, it is seen that the countries that find new energy sources are not always able to benefit from it. The state mechanism without the necessary financial institutions and absence of dynamic economic and commercial life may lead to the inability to benefit from the newly found energy source. In this study, we will compare two nineteenth-century empires, Ottoman and British, which found coal in their homeland. As history as shown, we argue that the political institutions and the state reflexes are critical when it comes to utilizing a newly found energy source.

During the interwar period, the Netherlands experienced a phase of rapid industrialization and mechanization and saw the introduction of many new labor-saving techniques on the shop floor. This process, which went under the name “rationalization of production,” caused great concern in the labor movement and sparked an intensive debate over the existence and extent of technological (or permanent) unemployment. Although the problem of technological unemployment was denied by the mainstream economists of the day, the problem was addressed by left-wing, mathematically trained economists such as Theo van der Waerden and Jan Tinbergen. They sought for rigorous “scientific” arguments that would convince policymakers, colleagues, and the public of socialist employment policies.

This chapter shows that van der Waerden and Tinbergen used ever-increasing formal methods to face the issue of rationalization, which became politically relevant and controversial in the specific context of the interwar period. Their new scientific tools gave them esteem and influence. In their role as advisers to the government, they gained influence and were able to recommend policies that were in accordance with their political beliefs.

A brief review of merger and acquisition (M&A) publications, while indicating high failure rates, also indicate that few studies have neither focused on the pre-merger period nor the contributions from leaders and managers, and especially during that period. Additionally, there are limited “behavioral due diligence” (BDD) assessment(s). This chapter begins with a brief overview of definitions. It continues with a data-driven presentation focused on the limited publications and research of M&A pre-mergers (compared with the post-M&A period). This is followed by discussions on M&A-related BDD and leader/manager tasks, activities, and issues. These dialogues set the foundation for M&A actions, and research, focused on leaders and managers relative to BDD in the pre-merger phase. This chapter will close with recommendations of “going forward” and a conclusion.

In this chapter, I take a talk show in which Coen Teulings, then Director of the official Dutch Bureau for Economic Forecasting and Policy Analysis (CPB) was interviewed about its economic forecasts in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 as point of entry into an examination into how personal experience and judgment enter, and are essential for, the production and presentation of economic forecasts. During the interview it transpired that CPB did not rely on its macroeconomic models, but on personal experience encapsulated in “hand-made” monitors, to observe the unfolding crisis; monitors that were, in Teulings’ words, used to “feel the pulse” of the Dutch economy. I will take this metaphor as a cue to present several historical episodes in which models, numbers, and a certain feel for economic phenomena aimed to make CPB economists’ research more precise. These episodes are linked with a story about vain attempts by CPB director Teulings to drive out the personal from economic forecasting. The crisis forced him to recognize that personal experience was more important in increasing the precision of economic forecasts than theoretical deepening. The crisis thus both challenged the belief in the supremacy of theory driven, computer-based forecasting, and helped foster the view that precision is inevitably linked to judgment, experience and observation, and not seated in increased attention to high theory; scientifically sound knowledge proved less useful than the technically unqualified experiential knowledge of quacks.

The process of commercialization of art is often referred to as “monetization,” denoting the use of art as an investment class. I discuss the reverse mechanism, defined as “Monet-ization,” where investment is overlaid with artistic value, and unproven art is imbued with aesthetic qualities. This mechanism is derived from a historical overview of key periods in the history of art, such as the flourishing of new genres in early 17th century Dutch art and the rise of Modern art in the early 20th century. An analysis of original data on the leading art collectors in the world in the period 1990–2015 highlights the tendency for collectors with an “investor” profile and eclectic taste to buy contemporary art. Combining artworks from diverse periods and styles, eclectic personal collections contribute to the conversion of economic into aesthetic value by way of spill-overs across genres and to the attribution by association of “old” value to “new” art. The “Monet-ization” process helps elucidate how paradigm shifts occur in the art world and how innovation survives under conditions of insufficient demand.