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In the first of a three‐part series on Japanese success, suggests that Japan′s success is not based on quality but on underhand tactics set to undermine world competition. Discusses Japan and the battle for Europe. Considers the reasons for Japan′s past successes. Discusses the predatory practices favoured by the Japanese. Looks at the lessons for Europe, contending that, to Japan′s delight, Europe is following the US model. Attacks the British Government′s compliance towards the Japanese. Asserts that, once trade borders within Europe have disappeared, the Japanese will use compliant nations like the UK as a back door into a borderless Europe. Proposes measures to halt Japan′s success.

Crisis management (CM) has gained prominence in the last decades, as the complex global business environment has forced executives to pay attention to practices that may safeguard organizations against potential crises. However, despite the fact that various scholars point to the need for autonomy and delegation of authority when responding to crises, it appears that the overarching rationale in the crisis literature is geared toward a centralized approach. This suggests that preventive actions and response to crises lie mainly with the leader of the organization and with designated crises teams. It is also apparent that this literature places too much weight on contingency plans and classification schemes. Although behavioral factors have been discussed by some authors as a fundamental element in dealing with crises, it is not clear how to develop these traits. It is our contention then that these conventional perspectives, although valuable to CM, are insufficient to deal with the uncertainty that characterizes global business today where firms must be prepared for the unexpected. We discuss the limitations of this traditional approach and argue for a combination of central control with decentralized execution when responding to unexpected crises situations. This enables management to better comprehend the complexity embedded in any crisis and allows adaptive practices to emerge throughout the organization. An analysis of two cases paired with empirical field studies support our proposition.

Purpose – Institutional investors need to move beyond first- and second-generation interpretations of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) (based on negative filters), and also beyond third and fourth generations (based on positive and integrated filters), which are more sophisticated but still limited, and toward a fifth generation of SRI and CSR. A fifth-generation model systematically incorporates critical intangibles, such as human capital analysis, into the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investment process.

Methodology – This chapter incorporates a literature review and draws on a range of qualitative research and case studies on the current and potential role of regulators to regulate nontraditional measures of value.

Findings – The power of institutional investors is currently based on incomplete information from listed companies on how they create value, yet it rests on superior knowledge and insight into the workings of the companies in which they invest, and is only as strong as the quality of the information it uses to make investment decisions on behalf of clients.

Research implications – More research on the role of human capital analysis, and its regulatory consequences, is required.

Practical implications – Regulators need to act within the context of these fifth-generation models in order to create the environment for more transparent investment recommendations.

Originality of chapter – This chapter contributes a qualitative and conceptual perspective to the debate on the role of regulation beyond the global financial crisis.

This special “Anbar Abstracts” issue of Personnel Review is split into 8 sections covering abstracts under the following headings: Career/Manpower Planning and Recruitment; Health and Safety; Industrial Relations and Participation; Pay, Incentives and Pensions; Performance, Productivity and Motivation; Redundancy and Dismissal; Work Patterns; and Training and Development.

A Lack of Evaluation: Do employers' training efforts operate in isolation from mainstream business activities? One would like to think that they don't, but there is plenty of evidence to prove that they do. Take, for instance, a survey by IRS on training evaluation in the UK. It found that only a quater of employers always set overall targets for their training; even fewer take as their strating‐point the training implications of the organization's business plan; just over a fifth begin by conducting a training needs analysis.