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Although decentralisation during crisis is more beneficial in the long run, still economic downturn increases the probability of centralisation. The purpose of this paper is to understand the sub-micro reasons of centralisation during recession.

To answer the research question, a qualitative methodology was applied based on interviews with senior managers of six English and seven Hungarian manufacturing companies.

In the time of crisis, companies centralise because they would like to gain efficiency. The short-term advantages of concentration of authority (such as whole company focus, easier communication and higher decision speed) override its longer term downsides such as less innovation and flexibility.

Cost cutting-driven centralisation can always generate faster results than a hazardous sales increase-driven decentralisation. A rapid centralisation can seem a safer and better choice than a stronger innovative capability of which results can be harvested only in the future. If companies centralise in the time of crisis and delegate during prosperity, adaptation to economic cycles can be crucial. This can gain competitive advantage if the companies can perceive economic situation and restructure their authority better than their competitors.

The paper would like to contribute to the quantitative-dominated literature with a descriptive, qualitative study analysing the root causes of change in concentration of authority.

There is no such thing as a truly centralized or decentralized management system. With regard to universities, most of the key areas in universities are centralized, e.g. finance, personnel, curriculum, management and quality. These key areas will exhibit a higher impact on learning and research by maintaining the appropriate balance between centralization and decentralization approaches. The purpose of this paper is to study the key features of balanced management implemented within the internal quality assurance system at the University of Bahrain. Areas of such balance will be explained while showing the pros and cons of each management approach.

In this paper, both quantitative and qualitative surveys were used to study this balanced approach.

The centralization approach at the university maintained systematic compliance through the development of policies and procedures, quality structure and a clear framework for quality enhancement. Centralization ensured consistency in quality, programmes and activities. It also maintained diffusion of innovation, for example, sharing and transferring the knowledge of international accreditation practices to other colleges. The balance of the centralized with the decentralized management approach provided additional advantages. For example, the management shared the vision of decentralization to raise the level of responsibility and accountability. The management provided an acceptable level of authority to take on spot decisions; hence, building expertise at the decentralized levels. However, this would require support and capacity building to ensure directly responsible persons, who can take on spot decisions. The ownership of the self-improvement cycles was implemented at the level of the departments and colleges.

This study showed that this balanced management had a great influence to maximize the benefits of the internal quality assurance (IQA) system, as it showed that 71.4 and 67.3 per cent of the academic and administrative staff, respectively, found that the IQA system was effective.

This balanced approach would guide the universities to enhance its quality system by organizing its structure, processes and systems in a harmonized nature.

Centralisation and decentralisation of the US economy is examined. How the organisational structures are changing, and why these changes are coming about, reasons such as technology changes in computers and communications, to the move from an agricultural to an industrial to a more service related society are outlined. Other factors such as corporation size and foreign competition are considered and discussed. It is concluded that a balance between centralisation and decentralisation are needed in the future.

The purpose of this study is to explore the use of shared services by end-users and why this may conflict with the use as intended by the shared service center (SSC) management.

By applying structuration theory, this empirical study draws on qualitative data obtained from semi-structured interviews with managers and end-users of an SSC. This SSC is part of a Dutch subsidiary of a multinational corporation that produces professional electronics for the defense and security market.

We find two main types of shared services usage by end-users which were not intended by the SSC management: avoidance and window-dressing. These forms of unintended usage were the result of contradictions in social structures related to the centralization and decentralization models as appropriated by end-users and management.

Our findings show that the benefits of shared services depends on how well contradictions in managers’ and end-users’ interpretive schemes, resources, and norms associated with centralization and decentralization models are resolved.

A popular argument in existing studies is that the benefit of shared services follows from the design of the SSC’s organizational structure. These studies overlook the fact that shared services are not always used as their designers intended and, therefore, that success depends on how the SSC’s organizational structure is appropriated by end-users. As such, the originality of this study is our focus on the way shared services are used by their end-users in order to explain why SSCs succeed or fail in reaping their promised benefits.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the major drivers behind the choice of centralising versus decentralising warehousing locations from a small‐ and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) perspective. Previous literature has investigated this solely from a large company perspective.

An in‐depth literature review was carried out and, in addition, a single case study was conducted in order to investigate the issue at hand. A Danish medium‐sized do‐it‐yourself (DIY) retailer was chosen, as this company faced the challenge of deciding between centralisation vs decentralisation of its warehousing structure.

The paper has two findings: existing literature does not deal with the difference between SMEs and large companies when speaking of centralised vs decentralised warehousing; and the difference between SMEs and large companies with regard to centralised vs decentralised warehousing lies in the fact that SMEs generally have scarcity in competences and fewer resources, have fewer advantages of economies of scale in a centralised setting, and, finally, have fewer management resources to carry out a centralisation project.

It is a limitation of this research that a statistical generalisation is not possible. Therefore, the findings in this paper might not be applicable for all SMEs.

When speaking of centralising vs decentralising warehousing, SMEs should be aware that different drivers are at play when compared with larger companies.

Research in supply chain management and logistics has not addressed the consequences of warehousing structure from an SME perspective.

In this paper the sometimes confusing concepts of structural centralization and decentralization and administrative centralization and decentralization are classified. Brief contrast Is made between the Latin American and North American models. It is hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between administrative decentralization and (I) leadership development at lower hierarchical levels, (II) greater participation in the decision‐making process by people at lower hierarchical levels, (III) an increased sense of responsibility, for the final output, by those at lower hierarchical levels, (IV) implementation of innovative changes which are proposed by individuals at lower hierarchical levels, (V) the development of different approaches to solving problems in the various subsystems at lower hier‐archical levels, (VI) the rapidity at which decisions can be made concerning local issues.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal allocation of authority within “chain” organizations and to show when partial centralization becomes dominant in the sense of organizational performance.

This paper takes an incomplete contract approach and uses an information transmission framework to investigate the optimal governance structure, in which non-contractible decisions must be adapted to local operating conditions, and also coordinated with the upstream and downstream divisions. We also use simulation analysis to numerically show the theoretical mapping between the underlying parameters (i.e. coordination need) and the dominant organizational structures.

Partial decentralization will arise as the optimal governance structure only when the information in the middle branch is relatively concentrated or dispersive, so as to exploit the underlying information structure in the “chain” organizations. Specifically, when information is highly concentrated, direct control of the middle branch can improve coordination within firms. When the information is highly dispersive, to delegate authority to the middle branch only can improve communication.

This paper characterizes the optimal governance structure in “chain” organizations. The findings may give some enlightenment on real authority driven by ex ante asymmetric information structures and have implications on asymmetric delegation within firms.

A number of internal and external pressures in UK local government have led to the examination of different options for internal organisation and management. A particular pressure has recently been the reorganisation of local government towards the creation of new unitary local councils. The review of non‐metropolitan local government from 1992 to 1996, and the creation of unitary authorities in a number of areas from 1995 to 1998, forced local authorities to examine their own organisation. This article considers the impact of local government reorganisation on the structures and management of the organisations concerned. The discussion concentrates upon pressures towards centralisation and decentralisation. The extent to which structural reorganisation has led local government to “decentralise” is considered in a number of senses: the expansion of the parish and community council level, changes to internal management, and area‐based initiatives. Drawing directly from current research, the authors examine competing trends towards decentralisation and centralisation and, specifically, identify a renewed focus upon corporate management as a whole. The importance of this new corporatism is then assessed.

Purpose – Research on hospital system organization is dated and cross-sectional. We analyze trends in system structure during 2000–2010 to ascertain whether they have become more centralized or decentralized.

Design/Methodology/Approach – We test hypotheses drawn from organization theory and estimate empirical models to study the structural transitions that systems make between different “clusters” defined by the American Hospital Association.

Findings – There is a clear trend toward system fragmentation during most of this period, with a small recent shift to centralization in some systems. Systems decentralize as they increase their members and geographic dispersion. This is particularly true for systems that span multiple states; it is less true for smaller regional systems and local systems that adopt a hub-and-spoke configuration around a teaching hospital.

Research Limitations – Our time series ends in 2010 just as health care reform was implemented. We also rely on a single measure of system centralization.

Research Implications – Systems that appear to be able to centrally coordinate their services are those that operate in local or regional markets. Larger systems that span several states are likely to decentralize or fragment.

Practical Implications – System fragmentation may thwart policy aims pursued in health care reform. The potential of Accountable Care Organizations rests on their ability to coordinate multiple providers via centralized governance. Hospitals systems are likely to be central players in many ACOs, but may lack the necessary coherence to effectively play this governance role.

Originality/Value – Not all hospital systems act in a systemic manner. Those systems that are centralized (and presumably capable of acting in concerted fashion) are in the minority and have declined in prevalence over most of the past decade.