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In this paper the interconnectedness among financial institutions and the level of systemic risks of four types of Chinese financial institutions are investigated.

By the means of RAS algorithm, the interconnection among financial institutions are illustrated. Different methods, including Linear Granger, Systemic impact index (SII), vulnerability index (VI), CoVaR, and MES are used to measure the systemic risk exposures across different institutions.

The results illustrate that big banks are more interconnected and hold the biggest scales of inter-bank transactions in the financial network. The institutions which have larger size tend to have more connection with others. Insurance and security companies contribute more to the systemic risk where as other institutions, such as trusts, financial companies, etc. may bring about severe loss and endanger the financial system as a whole.

Since other institutions with low levels of regulation may bring about higher extreme loss and suffer the whole system, it deserves more attention by regulators considering the contagion of potential risks in the financial system.

This study builds a valuable contribution by examine the systemic risks from the perspectives of both interconnection and tail risk measures. Furthermore; Four types financial institutions are investigated in this paper.

This paper investigates the development of efficiency and the progress of banking integration in the European Union by checking for convergence among banks of European and Eurozone countries as well as contrasting the results with those of United States banks.

Initially, we employ the two-stage semi-parametric double bootstrap DEA method, which absorbs the effects of possible integration barriers in the measurement of efficiency. Afterwards, we apply a panel data model, in order to investigate the process of banking integration by testing for convergence and for convergent clusters in banking efficiency.

Our main findings show that the bank efficiency of the US is considerably higher than that of the Eurozone and the European Union. Although there is no evidence of convergence across the banking groups, our results indicate the presence of club convergence. We also conclude that the US banking system is closer to convergence than the Eurozone and the European Union banks. Nevertheless, this outcome is subject to change in the future due to the fact that Eurozone and European Union banks' speed of convergence is higher than that of US banks.

Our survey is unique in trying to check for convergence while controlling for country-specific and bank-specific factors that affect the efficiency of European and Eurozone banks. Moreover, recent literature does not compare the convergence of efficiency of Eurozone, European and US banking. Finally, in our paper special consideration was given to the comparison of commercial, cooperative and savings banks, as subsets of our banking groups.

Banks are institutions that inject money in the economy and help to boost it when there are problems in some markets, especially in productive sectors. In this way, analysing the competition in this sector is an important tool for policymakers as non-competitive behaviour could affect the financial system and economy. The purpose of this paper is to measure the degree of competition in the Ecuadorian private banking sector divided by size, from 2000 to 2015, using panel data collected by the official regulator institution.

The authors applied the model proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) and its H-statistic using a reduced price and revenue equation estimated by pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects, random effects, feasible generalised fixed effects and panel correction standard errors (PCSE).

The authors show that given the presence of some problems in data such as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the most appropriate technique is PCSE. The authors also found robust evidence supporting that large banks compete in a monopolistic market, small and medium-sized banks operate in monopolistic competition, and Ecuadorian small, medium-sized and large banks stay in long-run equilibrium.

This paper contributes to the actual literature of competition degree in two ways. First, different from traditional papers, we do not control by size; so, we divided the analysis by size, because in Ecuador and also in many developing countries, bank’s competition is different for each group of size because the levels of liquidity, risk and other indicators are different from one group to another. Second, we show the robustness of the results using a scaled and unscaled equation, using many controls and using five methods to contrast the competition degree.