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This paper aims to study the determinants of variable compensation for top Portuguese executives (chief executive officers, chief financial officers and commercial directors).

Data from 101 firms were collected through an email questionnaire sent to the human resource directors of 500 largest and best Portuguese firms of Exame, a business newspaper. A Tobit regression analysis was used to estimate the basic equation of the study.

The conclusions are generally consistent with findings obtained in more developed capital markets. It was found that public and older corporations are more intensive users of variable pay, consistent with the agency theory prediction. A location in the centre of economic activity and a higher executive education increase the propensity to receive higher levels of salary in the form of variable compensation. The relation between compensation and performance was more elusive.

There are limitations as to the extrapolation of the obtained results, as the level of potential idiosyncrasy cannot be measured. Ideally, the study should be replicated in different contexts to control for country-specific influences. Nevertheless, the main finding that performance-related pay mechanisms are less used in countries where public corporations and potential agency problems are less pervasive should hold.

As the focus is on a small economy with a developing capital market, this paper contributes to executive compensation literature that has mostly analysed firms based in well-developed capital markets, with a higher separation of ownership and control (Anglo-Saxon countries).

This paper focuses on the firm‐specific assets, management processes, and organizational strategies displayed by a group of firms based in Latin America, a region that undertook a generalized attempt of economic liberalization during the 1990s. We analyze the operational and organizational strategies of 40 local firms with rapidly expanding international operations within the region – defined as “multilatinas” – and contrast them with those of 58 U.S. and European multinational corporations also operating in Latin America. By comparing these two sets of firms – emerging and experienced – in the same context and over the same time period, we can test for the universality of models of organizational change that are based largely on the latter. We show that multilatinas enjoy less firm‐specific assets and make less extensive use of sophisticated management processes than their foreign counterparts. We also see, however, many of these emerging multinationals evolving by adopting more complex coordination and control mechanisms as they face a more integrated and global environment.