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The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 had far-reaching consequences for the global economy, triggering widespread economic turmoil. We use the event-study method to investigate whether investors priced the effect of significant events before the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in European and Asia-Pacific banks. Abnormal returns on the event days range from −4.32% to 5.03% in Europe and −5.13% to 6.57% in Asia-Pacific countries. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, abnormal returns averaged the lowest at −4.32% in Europe and −5.13% in Asia-Pacific countries. The significant abnormal returns show that Lehman Brothers' collapse was a turning point, and investors paid attention to the precrisis events as warning signs of the oncoming crisis.

This chapter investigates attention theory by examining retail investors' true intention to purchase. Attention theory indicates that investors, and especially retail investors, typically invest in stocks about which they are aware. Previous studies test attention theory by analyzing stock price behavior or trading volume. However, stock prices and trading volume are primarily driven by institutional investors rather than retail investors. We examine investor attention using initial public offering (IPO) subscriptions in Taiwan because only retail investors are allowed to subscribe to Taiwanese IPOs. We use media coverage as a measure of passive retail investor attention and Google search volume as a measure of active retail investor attention. Our results reveal that active attention has a more profound relationship with retail investor IPO subscriptions than passive attention does. Additionally, information about the value of IPOs taken from trading prices in the pre-IPO market mitigates the effects of attention theory.

This chapter differentiates the effect of solicited credit ratings (SCRs) and unsolicited credit ratings (UCRs) on bank leverage decision before and after the credit rating change. We find that banks with UCRs issue less debt relative to equity when the credit rating changes are approaching. Such findings are also prominent when bank credit rating moves from investment grade to speculative grade. After credit rating upgrades (downgrades), banks with unsolicited (solicited) credit ratings are inclined to issue more (less) debt relative to equity than those with solicited (unsolicited) credit ratings. We conclude that SCR and UCR changes lead to significantly different effects on bank leverage decision.

The KOSPI 200 options at its initial stage generated a significant number of violations in no-arbitrage conditions which involve both options and the underlying index. However, when the arbitrage conditions are formed independent of the underlying index, the average size of violation is not large and few arbitrage opportunities exist. There are more frequent violations on near-maturity days, with in-the-money options and larger violation sizes during opening and closing hours. The arbitrage opportunities remain intact even after realistic transaction costs are taken into account and index futures prices are used instead of the stock index in an alternative specification.

Policymakers worldwide have proposed a new contract – the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB) – which they claim can allay the underperformance afflicting not-for-profits, by tying the private returns of (social) investors to the success of social programs. We investigate experimentally how SIBs perform in a first-best world, where investors are rational and able to obtain hard information on not-for-profits’ performance. Using a principal-agent multitasking framework, we compare SIBs to inputs-based contracts (IBs) and performance-based contracts (PBs). IBs are based on a piece-rate mechanism, PBs on a non-binding bonus mechanism, and SIBs on a mechanism that, due to the presence of an investor, offers full enforceability. Although SIBs can perfectly enforce good behaviour, they also require the principal (i.e., government) to relinquish control over the agent’s (i.e., not-for-profit’s) payoff to a self-regarding investor, which prevents the principal and agent from being reciprocal. In spite of these drawbacks, in our experiment SIBs outperformed IBs and PBs. We therefore conclude that, at least in our laboratory test-bed, SIBs can allay the underperformance of not-for-profits.