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I. Introduction For over forty years, a model for Third World development has gained widespread acceptance. Three key premises underpin the traditional development model: (1) the identification of “development” with the maximization of the rate of national economic growth; (2) the quest to achieve Western living standards and levels of industrialization which require the transfer of labor from the agricultural to the industrial sector as well as increased consumerism; and (3) the integration into the interdependence of Third World nations in the global economy and the global marketplace. Increasing the demand for a Third World nation's exports (in other words, export‐led growth) is viewed as leading to the maximization of a nation's Gross National Product (GNP).

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Examines the evolution of the role of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), created in 1930 to promote co‐operation between central banks, into the arena of the Third World debt problem. The bank has extended loans to developing countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria and Brazil since 1982. It arranges these extremely short‐term credits as “bridge loans”, while longer term, conditional assistance through the IMF and the World Bank is being negotiated. This activity reflects the BIS′s effort to contribute to economic and monetary stability in an increasingly interdependent world.

The total of foreign debt of less developed countries (LDCs) is so great that only a modest part of the interest and principal due is ever likely to be paid. The dilemma of the situation is that further capital inflow is necessary for growth and poverty relief, but is unlikely to be granted because of non‐servicing of existing debt and governmental instability within the LDCs. Christian commentary on LDC debt is so often simplistic, condemning lenders and urging forgiveness of principal due and interest, write‐downs of loans and lower interest rates. In addition to the moral and humanitarian issues raised, due weight should be given to financial and economic analysis. A statement issued by the Political Commission for Justice and Peace provides a model of Christian comment on the eventual solution of the debt crisis, outlining ethical principles concerning the assistance wealthier countries should extend to LDCs, disclaiming technical recommendations as the Church′s role, and calling upon industrialised countries to draw up fresh plans for co‐ordinated assistance for LDCs, while stressing that the latter should put their houses in order.

Debt‐equity swaps represent a new market‐based mechanism, by which debtor countries and creditor banks can defuse the acute problems associated with the international debt crisis. This paper describes, analyzes and evaluates debt‐equity swaps from the standpoint of the debtor country. It also discusses some of the possible advantages and disadvantages for LDCs that might contemplate the use of such swaps. The paper demonstrates how a successful debt‐equity swap program could play an important role in alleviating the IDCs' debt problem as well as contributing to their future economic growth.

This study examines the pricing of international bank loans to LDCs as a group to ascertain if non‐price variables are dominant factors in granting these loans. Specifically, it attempts to test the hypothesis that banks, in extending Eurocredits to LDCs, have used credit rationing, rather than pricing, maturity or other variables, to respond to the perceived risks involved in such lending. Results of empirical tests for the period 1977–90 confirm that, in response to significantly higher perceived risks, lenders simply constrained the flow of credit to this group of countries.