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This paper examines the need for international regulation of financial markets and suggests the possible role that a global financial supervisor might play in providing effective regulation of international financial markets. The first part discusses the nature of systemic risk in the international financial system and the necessity for international Minimum Standards of prudential supervision for banking institutions. The second part examines the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to devise non‐binding international standards for managing systemic risk in financial markets. Recent financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America suggest, however, that informal efforts by international bodies such as the Basel Committee are inadequate to address the risk of systemic failure in financial systems. The third part therefore argues that efficient international financial regulation requires certain regulatory functions to be performed by a global supervisor acting in conjunction with national regulatory authorities. These functions should involve the authorisation of financial institutions, generation of rules and standards of regulatory practice, surveillance of financial markets, and coordination with national authorities in implementing and enforcing such standards.

The need for international regulation of financial markets became apparent in the mid‐1970s in response to the post‐Bretton Woods liberalisation of financial markets. The elimination of the fixed exchange rate parity with gold resulted in the privatisation of financial risk, which created pressure to eliminate controls on cross‐border capital movements and the further deregulation of financial markets. It became necessary for national regulatory authorities to promote safe and sound banking systems through the effective management of systemic risk in national markets. Similarly, the need for international standards of prudential supervision was also recognised, to prevent solvent banking institutions in one jurisdiction from losing business to less respectable institutions operating in other jurisdictions whose laws permitted cut‐rate financial services and other risky financial practices. The privatisation of financial risk also created the need for financial institutions to spread their risks over many assets and activities, which led, in turn, to a significant increase in short‐term cross‐border portfolio investment that has, in many instances, exposed capital‐importing countries to increased systemic risk due to the volatility of such investments.

This article aims to provide insight into the future of financial markets and regulation in order to define what would be the best strategy for Europe.

First the authors define the potential changes in financial markets and then the tools available for the regulator to tame them. Finally, they build five scenarios according to the main evolutions observed on the financial markets and on the tools used by the regulator to modify these trends.

Among the five scenarios defined, two present highly unstable features since the regulator refuses to choose between financial opening and independently determining how to regulate finance in order to preserve financial stability. Three of them achieve financial stability. However, they are more or less efficient or feasible. In terms of market efficiency, the multi-polar scenario is the best and the fragmentation scenario is the worst, since gains of integration depend on the size of the new capital market. Regarding sovereignty of regulation, fragmentation is the best scenario and the multi-polar scenario is the worst, because it necessitates coordination at the global level which implies moving further away from respective national preferences. However, the more realistic option seems to be the regionalisation scenario: this level of coordination seems much more realistic than the global one; the market should be of sufficient size to enjoy substantial benefits of integration. Nevertheless, the “European government” might gradually increase the degree of financial integration outside Europe in line with the degree of cooperation with the rest of the world.

Foresight studies on financial markets and regulation are quite rare. This may be explained by the difficulty to forecast what will be their evolution in the coming decades, not least because finance is fundamentally unstable. This paper provides a framework to consider what could be the best strategy of regulators in such an unstable environment.

The governance of financial markets is approached at various levels. National regulators are charged with the responsibility for maintaining a system of regulation for the purpose of ensuring stability and confidence in the financial markets. This has to be done according to ascertainable standards. Within the European Union, directives and regulations provide a framework for approximating practices within its member states. At the international level, organisations such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have developed standards and guidelines with the view to harmonising practices among relevant states.

Cryptoassets have recently attracted the attention of national and international financial regulators. Since the mid-2010s blockchains have increasingly been adapted to automate and replace many aspects of financial intermediation, and by 2015 Ethereum had created the smart contract language that underpins the digitization of real assets as asset-backed tokens (ABTs). Those were initially issued by FinTech companies, but more recently banks active on international capital and financial markets, and even central banks, for example, the Bank of Thailand, have developed their own digital platforms and blockchains. A wide variety of real and financial assets underpins ABTs, viz., real-estate, art, corporate and sovereign bonds, and equity. Consequently, owing to the significant market capitalization of cryptocurrencies, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published two consultative papers delineating its approach on cryptoasset regulation. In this study, the authors analyze the mechanics of ABTs and their potential risks, relying on case studies of recent issuance of tokens in equity, real-estate, and debt markets, to highlight their main characteristics. The authors also investigate the consequences of the increasingly oligopolistic structure of blockchain mining pools and Bitcoin exchanges for the integrity and security of unregulated distributed ledgers. Finally, the authors analyze the BCBS’ regulatory proposals, and discuss the reaction of international financial institutions and cryptocurrency interest groups. The main findings are, firstly, that most ABTs are akin to asset-backed securities. Secondly, nearly all ABTs are “off-chain/on-chain,” that is, the underlying is a traditional asset that exists off-chain and is subsequently digitized. The main exception is the World Bank’s bond-i that is genuinely native to the blockchain created by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and has no existence outside it. Thirdly, all ABTs are issued on permissioned blockchains, where anti-money laundering/anti-terrorist funding and know-your-customer regulations are enforced. From a prudential regulatory perspective, ABTs do not appear to pose serious systemic risks to international financial markets. This may account for the often negative reactions of banks, banking associations, and cryptocurrency interest groups to the BCBS’ 2021 proposals for risk-weighted capital provisions for cryptoassets, which are viewed as excessive. Finally, we found that issuance of ABTS and other smart contracts on permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum could potentially generate financial instability. A precedent involving Ethereum and The DAO in 2016 shows that (i) there is a significant accountability gap in permissionless blockchains, and (ii) the core developers of blockchains and smart contract technology, and Bitcoin mining pools, exercise an unexpectedly high- and completely unregulated-amount of power in what is supposedly a decentralized network.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution proclaiming the establishment of a New International Economic Order. One of the basic aims of this declaration was to enhance the voice and participation of developing countries in the international economic decision-making process based on norms of equitable governance. More than four decades have passed since its adoption. This paper aims to reflect on the past 43 years of the global financial regulatory system in light of the notion of equitable governance as envisioned by the “New International Economic Order”.

This paper surveys the global financial regulatory system from the vantage point of equitable economic governance. This discussion covers the period that comes after the 1974 UN landmark resolutions that declare the establishment of a “New International Economic Order”. The authors use qualitative and quantitative approach in this study. They use descriptive statistics and intuitive discussions of certain cases to carry the objective of the paper forward.

First, part of the development in global financial regulation manifests the establishment of informal networks that embark on global regulatory issues, while being very exclusive in their membership policies. Second, the lack of full and effective participation of developing countries in the decision-making and norm setting remains unsolved in the global financial regulatory system. Third, the shadow role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was of great significance in assisting the implementation of non-binding regulatory rules of international finance in developing countries despite the concerns of legitimacy and equity in the making of international standards. In sum, the global financial regulatory system that emerged in the past four decades is quite different from that aspired by the NIEO.

The declaration of NIEO coincides with the collapse of the Bretton Wood’s fixed exchange rate which in turn leads to the emergence of a new financial system and regulatory development. This period marked the proliferation of informal networks that make policy recommendations or non-binding rules with global implications. As far as the literature review goes far, this paper is the first to survey the post Bretton Wood’s period of the global financial regulatory architecture based on the tenets of the “New International Economic Order”.

Purpose – The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has highlighted the need for reform of financial regulation in several jurisdictions across the globe, including the United Kingdom and the United States. This chapter argues that the reforms need to be comprehensive and will therefore have to cover several aspects of financial regulation.

Design/methodology/approach – The chapter critically examines some of the areas where reforms are most needed. This involves consideration of the merits and demerits of multi-functional or universal banking. It also involves consideration of the systemic and other problems that arise as a result of the increasingly international nature of banking and other financial services. Moreover, it examines the need for regulators to understand and keep pace with financial innovation. Furthermore, it involves discussion on the need to improve corporate governance and remuneration policies in banks and other financial services providers as well as the need for adequate arrangements for dealing with bank insolvencies and collapses.

Findings – Market fundamentalism and over-reliance on the alleged self-correcting powers of the market have led to excessive deregulation and liberalisation in world financial markets. Financial regulatory reforms will therefore have to be substantial and comprehensive to properly address the problems caused by excessive financial liberalisation.

Originality/value – The chapter examines significant issues that academics, regulators and policy makers should consider when devising or implementing reforms designed to prevent, or reduce the impact of, financial crises in the future.

Regulators have a duty to enforce anti-money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism regulation. However, in doing so, they should not to be overzealous especially in carrying out investigations into suspicious money laundering transactions. This does not mean that oversight agencies should not carry out the required investigations with due diligence. This study aims to propose that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless environment; however, there is a need ensure that businesses are able to operate with minimal regulatory interference.

Data was collected from primary and secondary sources such as Uganda’s Anti-Money laundering Act 2013 (amended 2017), Patriot Act 2001, Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 International legal instruments, case law, books, websites, journal papers, policy documents and scholarly debates and evaluated to foster the objectives of the paper accordingly. The paper has also been enriched by empirical experiences of countries in Europe, Africa and within countries on money-laundering regulation and its intricacies. There was a wealth of online data sources and in print, which were reviewed and internalised to foster the objectives for writing the book.

Regulation of businesses against money laundering and financing of terrorism imposes a heavy cost burden on poorer countries and should be funded by developed economies for some countries to easily operate desired International AML standards. It also needs to be noted that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless business environment, which makes money laundering an international and national security issue.

The thesis of this paper was drawn from the author’s presentation to security agencies in Kampala in August 2019. In his presentation, the author opined that investigations into money-laundering offences should be triggered when a financial institution forms suspicions of potential money-laundering offences to have been committed. Some of the questions he sought to answer during the presentation was whether sharing information on “accountable persons or the regulated sector” in Uganda’s AML 2013 with newspapers before investigations are concluded does not amount to tipping off presumed money-laundering culprits? How should investigations be conducted?

The purpose of this paper is to make an empirical contribution by investigating the boundaries between external financial reporting and decision making through assessing the degree of differences among practitioners’ perspectives of financial reporting measurement attributes across two countries, and the impact of the “domestic” practice through cultural factors on the implementation of financial accounting and regulation.

The authors employ the method of triangulation by employing two research instruments, namely interviews and a questionnaire. Triangulation cuts across and within research strategies, as one of its features as a processual technique is to cross‐check results deriving from both quantitative and qualitative research. Cross‐national studies is a very useful tool that can provide a basis for competing explanations, identifying the importance of regional factors across a universally‐changing environment or discriminating between explanations that are country‐specific and those that are universally applicable.

This study provides evidence for a diverging perceived effectiveness and acceptance of IAS39 in two different banking markets (Greece and the UK), suggesting that culture and domestic configurations play an important part in shaping management perceptions and that given these differences, the choice of a measurement system can potentially also affect the (re)liability of managers that sign a firm's financial reports.

Topical settings can potentially influence the preferences and perceptions of managers with regards to particular measurement bases as part of the wider accounting framework instituted by international authorities, as well as raise significant barriers to harmonisation efforts.

This paper seeks to examine the chasm between regulation and accounting through the lens of topical/domestic configurations of accounting practice and its application. The reason for doing so is also because of the recent structural developments in the international finance arena, namely signs of creation of markets for impaired assets.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.