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Taking a communication perspective, the paper explores management's rhetoric in profit warnings, whose sole purpose is to disclose unexpected bad news.

Adopting a close-reading approach to text analysis, the authors analyse three profit warnings of the now-collapsed Carillion, contrasting the rhetoric with contemporaneous investor conference calls to discuss the profit warnings and board minutes recording boardroom discussions of the case company's precarious financial circumstances. The analysis applies an Aristotelian framework, focussing on logos (appealing to logic and reason), ethos (appealing to authority) and pathos (appealing to emotion) to examine how Carillion's board and management used language to persuade shareholders concerning the company's adverse circumstances.

As non-routine communications, the language in profit warnings displays and mimics characteristics of routine communications by appealing primarily to logos (logic and reason). The rhetorical profiles of investor conference calls and board meeting minutes differ from profit warnings, suggesting a different version of the story behind the scenes. The authors frame the three profit warnings as representing three stages of communication as follows: denial, defiance and desperation and, for our case company, ultimately, culminating in defeat.

The research is limited to the study of profit warnings in one case company.

The paper views profit warnings as a communication artefact and examines the rhetoric in these corporate documents to elucidate their key features. The paper provides novel insights into the role of profit warnings as a corporate communication vehicle/genre delivering bad news.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of financial restatements (FRs) on the likelihood of the top management team (TMT) dismissal. It investigates the effects of types of FRs [corrective note and reissuance of financial statement (RFS)], of FR severity and of FR related to international financial reporting standards (IFRSs) easy or difficult-to-estimate.

The authors hand-collect: data about 96 FRs from the Italian public oversight board documents; chief executive officer (CEO) name, chairman name, year of the financial statement under investigation, total assets and operating income, from their financial statement. The authors use multivariate regression to test the effects of FRs on the probability of TMT dismissal.

The authors find that the RFS leads to a higher likelihood of chairman dismissal. A greater magnitude of misrepresentation on income statements, and FRs, which decrease net income, increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal. Difficult-to-estimate IFRSs increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal.

FRs are significant determinants of the CEO/chairman dismissal. The authors show that FRs directly involving shareholders (RFS) have negative consequences on the chairman of the board of directors, while the CEO is more affected by FRs that involve technical factors (FR severity or financial statement associated with difficult-to-estimate IFRSs).